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Abstract II 
Abstract 
In this thesis, we focus on the housing sector, which is important to the 
economy but is under-researched in business cycles analysis. \Ve discuss St'\,-
eral housing sector related issues in dynamics stocha.'it.ic general equilibriulll 
(DSGE) models. 
To begin with, we conduct a sensitivity analysis using a simple DSGE 
model with the feature of sticky prices and a fixed housing supply, which 
is similar with the basic model in Iacoviello (2005) but with represcntatiV<' 
agents. Then we introduce credit market imperfections ill two different ways. 
The first ca'ie is referred to a"l 'borrowing to invest', in which e J l t r ( ' p n ~ l H ' u r s s
take loans and accumulate production housing, which is a factor of produc-
tion. We observe the financial accelerator (or decelerator) effect sinet' tilt'ir 
borrowing is related to output directly. The second case is refcrn,d t.o a.-.; 
'borrowing to live', in which impatient households take loans to buy housing 
and gain utility from it. In contrast with the first ca.-.;p, we do not. find tlw fi-
nancial accelerator (or decelerator) effect, since the borrowing is not dif('ctly 
related to output anymore. 
First, we add a variable housing supply, thus w{' can discuss th(' supply 
side effect in the housing market, including both thp direct pffl'd awl till' 
feedback effect. The direct effect is the impact of a housing technology shock, 
and the feedback effect is the impact. of a change in rl<'W hOBsing production, 
which is caused by other shocks. We find, however, that the magnitudes 
of these two effects are negligible under the standard sett.ing of th(' housing 
market that is commonly used in the literature of DSGE model with housing, 
such as Davis and Heat.hcote (2005), Iacoviello and :\"eri (2010). Tlw key 
assumption in the standard setting is that every household trades housing in 
a given period. An empirical examination of the U.S. housing sector suggt'sis 
us to (i) re-construct the housing market and (ii) introduce the fmtl1ft' oftilll<' 
to build to new housing productioll. After constructing tht' U!'W spt,ting for 
the housing markd by introducing the probability of trading housing, wt' 
find that (i) the steady state ratios from the mod{'l are (,()llsist('nt. with tlH'ir 
empirical targets and (ii) the magnitudes of both t.he din'ct. eft'('d and t.hl' 
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feedback effect are 60 times larger. Furthermore, the feature of time to build, 
together with the new setting of the housing market, allows us to ohsprve 
overshooting behaviour on the real house price. 
Second, we discuss the impact of the assumption of adaptive learning, 
as we are convinced that the house price bubble is partially contributed by 
this alternative way of forming expectations. After writing the Notting-
ham Learning Toolbox,l we find that, given the AR(l) learning model, ill 
which variable is forec&'>ted using its own lagged terms, the adaptive learn-
ing mechanism largely amplifies and propagates the effects of a goods sector 
technology shocks to the economy, and also, enlarges thp impact of the tinl<' 
to build feature on the real house price. Furthermore, our sensitivity analysis 
shows that the values of initial beliefs are importa.nt to the mechanism hilt 
forecasting errors are not if the constant gain coefficient is small. 
Then we consider the &,>sumption of heterogeneous expectatiolls. From 
the impulse response analysis, we find that (i) til(' adaptive learning mech-
anism also h&,> amplification and propagation effects to the economy wlwn 
only a fraction of the population are learning agents; (ii) when two types of 
agents have equal weights, the impulse responses from heterogeneous expec-
tations are much closer to those frolll rational expectations than those froIll 
adaptive learning; (iii) WlWll rational agents are fully rational, the adaptive 
learning mechanism has larger amplification and propagation eff<'ds on the 
economy than when rational agents are partially rational. From the st'nsi-
tivity analysis, We find that fully rational agents always hav(' largpr impacts 
on model variables than partially rational agents. 
Finally, we introduce credit market imperfectiolls to the honsing markpt, 
thus the mortgage market subjects to a costly wrificat.ion prohlem. Our Plll-
pirical analysis suggests that, while the default rate is countercyclical, thp 
loan to value ratio is procycIicai. Our impulse respOIlSP aIlalysis shows that., 
given a positive goods sector technology shock, the default rate is ("ol1ntl'r-
lThe Nottingham Learning Toolbox is a st'ries of ),Iatlah fill'S that call sol\'(' a !!;l'IH'ral 
form of DSGE models under adaptive learning and hNl'rogt'IH'OIlS t'xppctation". Th(' 
toolhox solvps the modplusing til<' Klpin's QZ d(>('OlllPO:;iti(J1l Ilwthod. and fadlitat('s tllf' 
impuis(' response a l l 1 l l y ~ i s , , The Cambridge L t ~ a r n i l l g g Toolhox pro"id('s IH'lpflll I'l'f('f('IH'1' 
for this toolbox at the initial stage. 
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cyclical, but the loan to value ratio is also countercyclical. The f('il .. "iOll \W 
suppose is that, in our model, credit constraiIlPd households have less housillg 
in an economic upturn, thus the volume of loans they wceivp also decrea."ips, 
leading to a faU in the loan to value ratio. Moreover, we illustrate that, 
when the mean of the idiosyncratic shock is time-invariant, we always have 
a positive relation between the default rate and the loan to value ratio. In 
order to overcome this c ~ m o v e m e n t , , we show that a time-varying mean is 
necessary. 
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Chapter 1 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
In this thesis, we focus on the housing sector, which is important to the econ-
omy but is under-researched in business cycle analysis. I3y taking the V.S. 
economy as an example, here we list four reasons why we think the honsing 
market is important. Firstly, the bursting of the honse price bubble has heen 
proposed as one of the main causes of the Great R('cession, til(' most f('c('nt 
recession from December 2007 to June 2009, and til(' d('pressed housing mar-
ket slows the economic recovery in the V nited States. Figure 1.1 shows til!' 
business cycles in V.S. real GDP over the period 1963q1 to 2010Q4. In thl' 
period from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, the V.S. econOlllY ('xI}('riencpd four 
recessions. From the mid-1980s to the late-2000s, the volatility of the V.S. 
economy was largely reduced and this period was referred to a."l the Great 
Moderation, which was ended by the most recent recession begun froIll De-
cember 2007. Meanwhile, Figure 1.2 shows that real house price started 
to fall in 2007. It ha.'> been suggested that one of the causes of the Great 
Recession was the bust of the house price bubble, which wa.'> contributed 
by the declining underwriting standards and risky lending in the mortgagp 
market. l\leanwhile, the fall ill the house price ha.<; led to a 7 trillion dollars 
loss in home equity, more than half the amount that prevailed in 2006 (Fed-
eral Reserve reports). This large d e ( ' l i l l l ~ ~ in housdlOld wpaJth ha.'l weakelled 
household consumption and thus slows the economic recovery. III addit.ion, 
Figure 1.1 also shows the movement of the federal funds rate over tlH' sam-
ple period. We can see that the monetary policy ha. ... been used to combat 
recession. After the beginning of each economic downturn, the central bank 
reduced the federal funds rate to stimulate the economy, and then raised 
it when the economy returned to the recovery path. In particular, durin!!; 
the Great Recession, the nominal interest rate ha."l been reduced to l1<'<1r-
zero level, referred to a.."l the zero lower bound, indicating that tlwre Wil.'l no 
room for conventional monetary policy to have all impact on til(' real (lCOU-
omy anymow, and thus the central ballk needed to conduct nOll-COllventional 
Chapter 1 2 
monetary policy, such as quantitative easing. Although it was officially an-
nounced that the Great Recession ended in June 2009, the federal funds rate 
has been kept at near-zero level, as the negative impacts of the recession on 
the other aspects of the economy, such as high unemployment and depressed 
housing market, have not yet disappeared. 
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Figure 1.1: Business cycles in real GDP, and Federal funds rate. Sample 
period: 1963Ql - 201OQ4. Real GDP is detrended using the Rodrick-Prescott 
filter. Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System. 
Secondly, housing market related variables are volatile, i.e., residential 
investment may be the most volatile component of GDP and real house price 
is more volat ile than inflation. The two main components of GDP are private 
consumption and private investment, which account for 70% and 13% of GDP 
respectively. Figure 1.3 shows business cycles in these two components over 
the period of 1963Ql - 2010Q4. We can see that the volat ili ty of investment 
is higher than consumption. At a disaggregate level, business cycles in non-
residential investment and residential investment are shown in Figure 1.4. 
We can see that residential investment, which consists of purchases of private 
residential structures and residential equipment, is more volatile than non-
residential investment. Meanwhile, new housing production has a similar 
volatility with residential investment. 
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Figure 1.2: Business cycles in real GDP and real new housing price. Sample 
period: 1963Q1 - 201OQ4. Both variables are detrended using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Housing 
Finance Agency. 
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Figure 1.3: Business cycles in consumption and investment. Sample period: 
1963Q1 - 201OQ4. Both variables are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter. Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Figure 1.4: Business cycles in non-residential inve tment and residential in-
vestment Sample period: 1963Q1 - 2010Q4. Both variables ar detrended 
using the Rodrick-Prescott filter. Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis. 
Figure 1.2 shows business cycles of GDP deflator and r al house price. 
We can see that real house price is more volatile than GDP deflator. In 
particular, the movement of real hous price usually leads GDP defl ator, 
indicating that the housing market may play a role during both economy 
upturn and downturn. As mentioned before, there has been a sharp decrease 
in real house price since 2007, and the value was still below the long-term 
trend in 2010. 
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The third reason is that housing is relevant to every household and its 
stock is large. In 2010, U.S. nominal GDP was 14.5 trillion dollars, and 
the stock of private residential fixed assets was 17.4 trillion dollars, which 
was 120% of GDP. For comparison, the stock of private nonresidential fixed 
assets and the stock of consumer durable goods were 116% and 32% of GDP 
respectively. Therefore, any impact on the value of housing assets should 
have an influence on the U.S. economy. For example, as mentioned earlier, 
the decrease in home equity largely weakened household consumption and 
thus slows the economic recovery. The wealth effect of housing assets on 
consumption is discussed by Campbell and Cocco (2007). 
The final reason is that the mortgage debt outstanding is also large, as 
housing is usually purchased using mortgage. In 2010, the mortgage debt 
outstanding was around 13.8 trillion dollars, which is around 95% of GDP. 
We suppose that the interaction between credit market imperfections and the 
housing market is important to the economy. For example, better credit mar-
ket condit ions in the mortgage market pushes up house price and increases 
the value of housing assets. 
Variable (2010) Billions of dollars % ofGDP 
GDP 14, 526 
Stock of fixed asset 
Private nonresidential 16, 803 116% 
Private residential 17, 397 120% 
Consumer durable goods 4, 581 32o/c 
Stock of loan 
Mortgage debt outstanding 13, 813 95% 
This evidence suggests that the housing sector is important to the U.S. 
economy. This thesis attempts to discuss several housing sector related issues 
in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models . 
• To begin with, we conduct a sensitivity analysis. We illustrate a simple 
DSGE model with sticky prices and a fixed housing supply. Similar with 
Iacoviello (2005), we add credit market imperfections and discuss the 
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dynamics of the economy, where housing also plays a role of collateral. 
• Firstly, we show that the supply side effect of new housing productioll 
is largely underestimated in the standard setting of the housing markpt 
that is considered in Davids and Heathcote (2005), Iacoviello and :'\eri 
(2010). Then we develop a new setting for the housing market by 
introducing the probability of trading housing. l\lorcovcr, we examine 
the impact of the time to build feature on the real house price. 
• Secondly, we examine the hypothesis that the house price buhble is, 
at least, partially related to the way agents form expectations. To 
investigate this link, we construct a leaning toolbox, and examillP til!' 
impact of the small learning models on the economy. The small learning 
models are also discussed in Eusepi and Preston (2011), Slobodyall and 
Wouters (2012). In addition, we diseuss the impact of h(,terogeneouH 
expectations. 
• Finally, we discuss the dynamics of the default rate and the loan to 
value ratio. We consider a costly verification problem, which is dis-
cussed in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Aoki, Proudman awl 
Vlieghe (2004), thus default is a steady state phcnomenon. BesideH, w(' 
also discuss the importance of the timc varying mean of the idiosyn-
cratic shock. 
1.2 Overview of the thesis 
My thesis includes four chapters, and here I discuss them briefly ill turn. 
1.2.1 A simple DSGE model with a fixed housing supply and 
credit market imperfections 
In the 1990s, the Xew ~ e o c l a s s i c a l l Synthesis bCCctlll<' tlw most popular way 
to explain short-run cconomic fluctuations awl discuss the rok of 1ll00tetary 
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and fiscal policies.2 In this new synthesis, the economy is a dynamic general 
equilibrium system that deviates from an efficient allocation of resources 
in the short run because of sticky prices and perhaps a variety of other 
market imperfections. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Smets and 
Wouters (2003, 2007) discuss medium-sized New Keynesian models. These 
models have formed the foundation for the large-sized .[';ew Keynesianlllodeis 
that are employed to analyse monetary policy in the c(mtral banks. 
The first model we discuss is a simple DSGE model with the feature of 
sticky prices. In particular, we add a housing sector, as we are particularly 
interested in the dynamics of the real house price in response to variolls 
exogenous shocks. In this chapter, we assume that the housing supply is 
fixed for two reasons: (i) the housing is closed related to land, which is fixed, 
(ii) the supply of housing is not likely to change in the short run a.<; it takes 
time to build new housing. 
In DSGE models, the financial market is commonly a.'isnIlwd to be perfect. 
As this a.'isumption is inconsistent with reality, researchers try to introduce 
credit market imperfections, in which borrowers need to Ilse their assds as 
collateral when they take loans. A simple way to consider credit market 
imperfections is to assume that loans are fully secured by collateral. 
There are two different approaches to introduce credit market. illlperfl'c-
tions. Firstly, borrowers accumulat.e a fact.or of production, such a..., goods 
capital or production honsing, and then rent it to goods producers. f<.Iean-
while, t.hey t.ake loans from patient households, and use this factor of produc-
tion as collateral. In this ca.'le, the borrowing constraint is directly linkpd to 
output, i.e., a relaxed borrowing constraint leads to inerpCl.'les in the volume 
of loans and the stock of the factor of production, which in turn ha..., a posi-
tive impact on output. This type of borrowers is discussed in Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005). Our second model, i.e., ttl(' simpk mod!'l 
with entrepreneurs, also discusses this type of borrower. \Ve refer this easp 
to a." 'borrowing to invest'. In this model, we ohs('rve the financial accelera-
tor (decelerator) effect as the volume of loans is related to goods production 
1The simplest form in this synthesis is a DSGE mod!'l with tllP fpatlln' of sticky pri('!''', 
which is also referred to as a :.\'ew Kl'ynesian model. 
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through production housing. 
Secondly, borrowers accumulate long-lasting goods, such as durable goods 
or domestic housing, and then gain utility from it. Meanwhile, they also 
take loans from patient households, and the long-lasting goods are used as 
collateral. In this setting, the borrowing constraint is not direetly linked to 
output, i.e., a relaxed borrowing constraint leads to increa..r.;cs in the VOhlllW 
of loans and the stock of the long-la..r.;ting goods, which has no direct impact 
on output. This type of borrowers is considered in Campbell and Hercowitz 
(2005), Monacelli (2009), Iacoviello and ~ e r i i (2010). Our third model, i.e., 
the simple model with impatient households, considers t.he second type of 
borrowers. We refer this ca..r.;e to as 'borrowing t.o live'. In this lllodpl, t.ll(' 
financial accelerator (decelerator) effect is be influential a..r.; the volume of 
loans is not related to goods product.ion anymore. 
1.2.2 An examination of the direct effect and the feedback effect 
from the variable housing supply 
We suppose that the housing sector is important to the economy, hilt it. 
is usually ignored in DSGE models. Davis and Heathcote (2005) begin to 
consider a multi-sector model featuring housing production, and tlwir lIIoci('\ 
can explain the dynamics of housing capital investment well. 
When researchers raise concerns over credit market imperfectioIls, housing 
is a..'lsigned another role, Le., being collateral of loan in the credit lIIarket. 
An important paper that considers housing a..r.; an alternative market good is 
written by Iacoviello and Xeri (2010). Following this work, various versions of 
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) model have been widely used, snch as ~ o t . a r p i < ' t r o o
(2007), Paries and Xotarpietro (2008), Kalman, Rabanal and Scott (2009), 
Christmu;;en et a1. (2009), Sellin and Walentin (2010), and thp settillgs of the 
housing market are similar. \\<'e wfer this setting to as 'the st.andard sctting 
of the housing market' and we consider it in our heudllnark model, which is 
a simple DSGE model with sticky prices and housinp; production. 
After introducing a variable housing supply, w(' can discllss the supply side 
effect to the peonomy, including both the direct effect and the f('<,dback ('ffpct. 
Chapter 1 9 
While the direct effect is the impact of a housing sector technology shock, the 
feedback effect is the impact of a change in new housing production, caused by 
other shocks, such as a goods sector technology shock or a monetary policy 
shock. We find that, under the standard setting of the housing market, 
'the magnitudes of these two effects from new housing production sector are 
negligible to the economy. 
Next, we examine the U.S. housing sector using data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau for the period of 1968Ql - 2009Q4. We generate several empirical 
ratios, but we notice that the steady state ratios from our benchmark model 
cannot meet their empirical targets. We argue that this inconsistency is 
caused by the standard setting of the housing market. Therefore, our first 
contribution in this chapter is to construct a new setting for the housing 
market by introducing the probability of trading housing. As a result, we 
find that the steady state ratios are consistent with their empirical targets, 
and both the direct effect and the feedback effect are 60 times larger. 
Meanwhile, our empirical analysis also suggests us to apply the feature 
of time to build to new housing production. The feature of time to build 
has been introduced to goods capital, such as Kydland and Prescott (1982), 
Gomme, Kydland and Rupert (2001), Tsoukalas (2011). For the first time, 
this feature is introduced to new housing production in this chapter. Orw 
important implication of the feature of time to build is that, given a goods 
sector technology shock or a monetary policy shock, the feedback effect of 
new housing production leads to overshooting behaviour for the real house 
price since (i) the response of new housing productioll ha..<; an opposite impact 
on the real house price against with the shock, and (ii) the fcat ure of time 
to build delays this impact while the demand for housing is diminishing. 
1.2.3 Adaptive learning and heterogeneous expectations 
Rational expectations is a standard assumption in DSGE models, i.e., agents 
know the structure of the true model and the values of the model parameters, 
and use them to form expectations for the future. Therefore, agents are able 
to form beliefs that are consistent with actual outcomes. Some fPsearciwrs, 
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such as Slobodyan and Wouters (2012), argue that the assumption of rational 
expectations is too strong and models under rational expectations find them 
difficult to capture the persistence of macroeconomic variables. 
The adaptive learning mechanism, an alternative way of foreca.-;ting the 
future, is discussed by Marcet and Sargent (1989a, 1989b), Evans and HOllkapo-
hja (1999, 2002), but they focus on the convergence of the models to the 
rational expectations equilibrium. In their adaptive learning mechanism, 
agents do not necessarily have full information about the structure of the 
true model and the values of the model parameters, thus they foreca."It the 
future according to their past experience, and then update their beliefs using 
the forecasting errors. 
Since this alternative was suggested, the quantitative importance of the 
adaptive learning mechanism in business cycle fluctuations ha."1 been discussed 
in the context of DSGE models. Milani (2007) provides the first example of 
using Bayesian methods to estimate a DSGE model under adaptive learning, 
and he finds that the adaptive learning mechanism is an importa.nt source 
that can lead persistence to the economy. Slobodyan and Wouters (2009) 
find that their model under adaptive learning fit the data. better than the 
model under rational expectation. In particular, their model can explain 
the data even better when only a few variables are included ill the forecast-
ing equations. The success of small learning models is shared by other re-
searchers, such a.'l Williams (2003), Adam (2004), Eusepi and Preston (2011), 
Slobodyan and Wouters (2012). Their results suggest that the model with 
simpler assumptions about the expectation mechanism can improve the em-
pirical fit of the model. 
In our chapter, we suppose that this way of forming exp()ctations par-
tially contributes to the recent house price bubble in the United States, and 
we discuss the impact of the a.-;sumption of adaptive learning in a t.wo-sector 
DSGE model with sticky prices, housing production, t.he IWW setting of the 
housing market, and the feature of time to build. In particular, we explof(\ 
the impacts of the AR( 1) learning model and discuss the interaction betw(\('lI 
the adaptive learning mechanism and the feature of time to build. Using th(\ 
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Nottingham Learning Toolbox,:! we find that the adaptive learning lIH'cha-
nism largely amplifies and propagates the impact of a goods sector tecilIlology 
shock on the economy. ~ l e a n w h i l e , , it enlarges the impact of the time to build 
feature on the real house price and allows this variable to exhibit more ohvi-
ous cyclical behaviour. Besides, we suppose that a relatively higher w ( ~ i g h t t on 
the lagged variables in the model solution is the rea.,>on for the amplification 
and propagation effects from the adaptive learning mechanism. 
The sensitivity of the dynamics to the initial beliefs and the updating 
algorithms under adaptive learning are a.9sessed by Carceles-Poveda and Gi-
annitsarou (2007) in an univariate forward looking linear model. Tlwy find 
that the behaviour of macroeconomic variables depends on both tIl(' initial 
beliefs and the learning algorithms. We also carry out a sensitivity analysis 
to check the robustness of our results. We find that the values of initial 
beliefs are crucially important for the responses of model variables, and tlw 
forecasting errors do not have obvious impacts on the dynamics, when thl' 
value of the constant gain coefficient is relatively small, 0 - O.D'). 
While the assumption of rational expectations or adaptive learning im-
plies that there is only one type of agents in the economy, it is more n ~ a l i s t i c c
to assume that we have both types of agents simultaneollsly, and this case 
is referred to a.'> heterogenous expectations. Branch and t\lcGollgh (2009), 
Branch and McGough (2010), Fuster, Laibson and ~ l e n d e l l (2010) discuss 
the assumption of heterogeneolls expectations in which non-rational agent.s' 
beliefs arc constant. 
Our second contribution in this chaptcr is to discuss thl' impact of hetpro-
geneous expectations with adaptive learning agents, who Hpdat!' thl'ir hdkfs 
at the end of each period. Besides, we consider two types of rational agcnts: 
(i) partially rational agents, i.e., they do not know till' ( ~ x i s t . e n c p p of learning 
agents; (ii) fully rational agents, i.e., they know til<' existence of h ~ a I ' l l i l l g ; ;
agents and take learners' beliefs into account. W(' fiud that, giV<'n that two 
:IThe :\"ottin!!;ham Learning Toolbox is a ,.;pries of \lat lab hIPs t hat ('an "ol\'f' a ~ ( , I l l ' r a l l
form of DSGE modeb undpr adaptin' It'arrling and heterogpnpoll" t'xppctatillll", TIl(' 
toolbox solves tlIP lIIodelu,;ing the Kkill'" QZ d{'('olllposition lIIethod. alld facilitatl'''' tl\l' 
impulse [('spOllse analysis. TllP Call1bri<ig(' Lparning Toolbox providp" IlPlpflll n·fprt'II(,(' 
for this toolbox at the initial stagt'o 
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types of agents have equal weights, (i) the responses of variables from Iwt-
erogeneous expectations are larger than those from rational expectations, 
(ii) the impulse responses from heterogeneous expectations are much closer 
to those from rational expectations than those from adaptive learning, (iii) 
when rational agents are fully rational, the adaptive learning mechanism has 
larger amplification and propagation effects on the economy than whcn rati(}-
nal agents are partially rational. l\loreover, in our sensitivity analysis, fully 
rational agents always bring larger impacts on model variables than partially 
rational agents. 
1.2.4 A discussion of the default rate and the endogenous loan to 
value ratio 
The assumption of perfect credit markets is commonly seen in DSGE mod-
cis. Recently, however, researchers have raised concerns over credit market 
imperfections. The costly verification problem or the agency problem has 
been introduced to the investment sector by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1 U97), 
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). Then Aoki, Proudman anel Vli('glw 
(2004) discuss this problem in the housing market hut they actually it.'iSllllH' 
fixed default rate and loan to valu(' ratio when tll<'Y solV<' the Ill()(h'1. l\IOf('--
over, Iacoviello and ~ e r i i (2010) also discuss the impacts of th<' cf<'<iit llHtrkd 
imperfections in the housing market. In their modPl, til(' d ( ~ b t t is fully collat-
eralised, and there is no possibility of default. 
In our chapter, we introduce the agency problplll to the housing lIlarkd, 
and focus 011 the default rate and the loan to vahl<' ratio. In particular, Wl' 
assume that an idiosyncratic shock realise on tlw vahlP of housing assd,s. 
tvleanwhile, we assume that both lenders and horrowers <"an purchas(1 hous-
ing. Our impulse response analysis shows that, givnn a positivI' goods s('i"tor 
technology shock, the response of the default ratl' is COllllt('rcydical, which 
is consistent with our empirical analysis. Thn loau to vulll(' ratio, h o w ( ~ v < ' r , ,
is also countercyclical, while our empirical aualysis suggests procyclical h(,--
haviour. The reason we suppose is that, in our lllodd, ("[{'<iit constraiw'd 
households have less housing in au economic upturn, thus th(, VOIUIl)(1 of 
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loans they receive also decreases, leading to a fall in the loan to value ra-
tio. Therefore, the inconsistency between the results from our model and 
empirical evidence suggests that, in the future research, we need to improve 
the model in a way that allows credit constrained households to obtain 1ll0f(' 
housing in an economic upturn. 
Furthermore, we discuss the implications of the time-varying I l J ( ~ a n n of t.iw 
idiosyncratic shock. Faia and Monacelli (2007) discuss this feature based 
on the agency problem framework of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The.v 
show that, after linking the mean distribution of investment opportunities 
to aggregate total factor productivity, a countercyclical premiuIU on external 
finance is successfully generated. 
III our IIlodel, we illustrate that, when tlH' mean of t.h(' idiosyncratic 
shock is time-invariant, the structure of the lllodel implies a positive relatioll 
between the default rate and the loan to value ratio. In conseqll<'IlCe, if we 
can improve the model to have a procyclical loan to value ratio, tlw default 
rate will become pro cyclical as well. Therefore, we lw('d to ovprcoIll<' this <:0-
movement and to have both procyclicalloan to value ratio and countercyclical 
default rate, as suggested by data. We show that a time-varying llleall of the 
idiosyncratic shock is required. 
1.2.5 My contributions 
Chapter 2 
• We consider a simple DSGE model with the featuf(' of sticky prices, 
credit market imperfections, and a fixed housing supply. \VIH'n tIl<' 
borrowing constraint is related to production housing, which is a factor 
of production, we observe the financial 3.(x('lerator ( d t ~ c e l e r a t ( ) r ) ) effed . 
• \Vhen the borrowing constraint is related to dOlllPstic housing, which 
provides utility to owners, w(' do not observe the financial a(TPkrator 
effect. 
Chapter 3 
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• After introducing a variable housing supply, we can discuss til{' supply 
side effect on the economy, including both the direct effect and tht' 
feedback effect. We find that the magnitudes of thes(' two ('ffects are 
negligible in the standard setting of the housing market. 
• We examine the U.S. housing sector and suggest that we should (:011-
struct a new setting for the housing market and introduce till' feature 
of time to build to new housing production. 
• After constructing the new setting for the housing market, the magni-
tudes of the direct effect awl the feedbaek cff('d are GO tillWs larg('r. 
• The feature of time to build, together with the new setting of tlw 
housing market, allows us to observe cyclical behaviour on t.he real 
house price. 
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• Our contributions to the literature of adaptive learning are that (i) t1w 
dynamic impacts of the AR( 1) learning model are explor('<i; (ii) th(' 
interaction between the adaptive If'anling mechanism alld t}j(' f('atu[(' 
of time to build is discllss£'d. After writing t.h£' Xottillglmm Leaminl,!; 
Toolbox, we find that the adaptive learning mechanism largely alllplifil's 
and propagates the effects of exogenous shock to the eCOIIOlll,V, and also, 
enlarges the impact of the time t.o build feature to tlw real hOllS!' prict'. 
We also show that the amplification and propagation effects from tlw 
adaptive learning mechanism are possibly caused by a rdatively higlwr 
weight on the lagged variables in the model Holutioll. 
• From the senHitivity analysis, we find that (i) the shapeH of impuiHe [('-
sponses heavily depend on the values of initial heliefs, (ii) the updating 
process is not crucial for til<' mechaniHIll if the constant gain codficiPllt 
is sIllall. 
• \V(' then consider the a.r.;sulllptioll of Iwtprogpll('OUS ('xpectatiolls. Our 
contributions to this literatur(' an': (i) we cOllsider 1(,lll'lling ag('uts 
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under heterogeneous expectations; (ii) we compare two ca."'les of lH't('ro-
geneous expectations, i.e., one with partially rational agents awl ow' 
with fully rational agents. 
• From the impulse response analysis, we find that (i) when we haw 
an equal weight on learning agents and rational agents, the impulse 
responses from heterogeneous expectations are much closer to t h ( ) s ( ~ ~
from rational expectations than those from adaptive learning; (ii) when 
rational agents are fully rational, the adaptive learning mechanism ha.s 
a larger amplification and propagation effect on t.he economy than that 
when rational agents are partially rational. 
Chapter 5 
• We introduce the agency problem to the housing market. Our empirical 
analysis suggests that, while the default rate is countercyclical, the loan 
to value ratio is procyclieal. 
• Our impulse response analysis shows that, given a positiv(' goods s ( ~ ( ' '
tor technology shock, the (If'fault rate is cOllntercyclical, but till' loan 
to vahw ratio is also cOllntercyclical. TIl<' incollsist('nc,V iwtwP('1l our 
results and empirical evidence suggests that we' n('('d t.o illlproV<' tlH' 
model in a way that allows borrowers to obtain llIore housillg ill all 
economic upturn. 
• Moreover, we illustrate that, when the mean of the idiosyncratic shl wk 
is time-invariant, we always have a positive relation between th(' default 
rate and the loan to value ratio. In order to overcollle this CO-1lI0Vl'llIl'nt, 
we show that a time-varying mean is essential. 
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2 A Simple DSGE Model with A Fixed Hous-
ing Supply and Credit Market Imperfec-
tions 
2.1 Introduction 
In the 1990s, the New Neocla.'.;sical Synthesis, referred by Goodfriend and 
King (1997), emerged among macroeconomists about the best way to ('x-
plain short run economic fluctuations and the role of mOIlf'tary and fiscal 
policies. The heart of the new synthesis is tlw vimv that tllP ('collomy is a 
dynamic general equilibrium systmn that deviates froUl an efficient allocation 
of resources in the short run because of sticky prices and perhaps It variety 
of other market imperfections. In many ways, this new synthesis forms tIl(' 
intellectual foundation for the analysis of monetary policy at the' F('(kral 
Reserve and other central banks around the world. Christiano, Eich('nIJaulll 
and Evans (2005), SIllets alld Wouters ( 2 0 0 : ~ , , 20(7) illustratl' llwdilllll-siz('d 
OSGE models, which include Illany frictions and shocks, and these lllodP)s 
have formed the foundation for tIw large-sized OSGE models that Ilsed in 
the central banks. l\Ieanwhile, r e s e a r d l f ~ r s s also IISP sIIIall OSGE lllo(h'ls to 
analyse particular questiolls. For example, Davis and Ikathmte (200G) dis-
CllSS the dynamics of U.S. house price, l\Iillard (2011) analys('s the impact of 
energy on the UK ecollomy.,t 
In this chapter, we firstly illustrate a simple OSGE model \vith st.icky 
prices.:; In particular, we add a housing market, a.'l \ve are particularly int.l'r-
ested in the dynamics of the real house price in respons(' to variolls ('xop;t'n()IlS 
shocks. In this chapter, we a.'lSUIlW that the housilll!; supply is fixt'd for two 
reasons: (i) the availability of land is fixed; and (ii) it takl's tiult' to bllild 
new housing. Under this assulllptioll, we can disCllss the dellland silk l'ff('l't 
on the real house price, but not the supply side eff{'C't.t; Our impuis(' f('SPOllS(' 
'Blanchard (2009) and Woodford (200!)) discus" thl' COIlVl'r!!:l'Il('p ill llH'thodol()!!:y III 
rnacropconomics and explain the elel\wllts of t hp \'pw SynttH'sis. 
c'\Ve also rt'fer it to as simple OSGE model or simple IIHHtt'l ill this the,.,is, 
"TIl!' demalld (supply) "iell' pffed is tit!' impact of a chall!!:" ill til(' hOIlSill1-!: df'1I11111d 
hllpply) on thp rpal hOlls!' priep, 
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analysis suggests that the real house price responds positivciy to a positive 
goods sector technology shock or a negative monetary policy shock, and is the 
only variable that responds to the housing preference shock. Given a positive 
goods sector technology shock, our sensitivity analysis suggests that, while 
the feature of consumption habit mainly affects consumption and output, the 
dynamics of the real house price are affected largely by the feature of price 
indexation and the alternative monetary policy rule. 
While New Keynesian models have become the workhorse for the mone-
tary policy analysis in the central banks, there are still active projects to in-
troduce important elements into this framework. In standard l'.'"ew Keynesian 
models, the financial market is a.'lsumed to be perfect, but this assumption 
is inconsistent with reality. Therefore, researchers introduce credit market 
imperfections, in which borrowers need to use their a.'lsets as (ollateral to se-
cure their loans. The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the rdation 
between credit market imperfections and the financial accelerator effect, and 
also discuss how agents are affected by various exogenous shocks. 
A simple way to consider the feature of credit market imperfections is 
to assume that loans are fully secured by collateral. In this literature, there 
are two types of borrowers. The first type of borrowers accumulates a faetor 
of production, such as goods capital or production hOllsing, and then rents 
it to goods producers. Meanwhile, they take loans from pat.ient households, 
and use t.his factor of production as collat.eral. Therefore, the horrowing cou-
straint is directly linked to output, i.e., a relaxed borrowing constraiut !Pads 
to increases in the volume of loans and the stock of the fa.ctor of production, 
which in turn has a positive impact on output. 
Here we discuss two papers that have studied the first type of bOiTowprs. 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) construct a real business cycle model with two 
types of agents, lenders and borrowers. In the imperfect cwdit. market, th£' 
maximum volume of loans is tightly constrained by tIl<' level of borrowers' 
net worth. In such an economy, goods capital is not only a factor of pro-
duction, but also the collateral for loans. Therefore, borrowers' CH'dit limits 
are affected by the prices of the collateralispd assets, awl at the sallw time, 
these prices are affected by the size of the cwdit limits. The dynamic interac-
Chapter 2 l ~ ~
tion between credit limits and asset prices becomes a powerful transmission 
mechanism that temporary shocks to technology or income distributiou could 
generate large, persistent fluctuations in output and asset prices. Iacoviello 
(2005) explores the interaction of credit limits and asset prices iu a ~ e w w Key-
nesian model with housing. In his model, the collateral constraint is tied to 
the value of real estate of firms. The reason for using housing a.'l collateral 
is that a large proportion of borrowing is secured by real estate. He finds 
that credit market imperfections leads to (i) an increased n ~ s p o n s e e of out.put 
to a monetary policy shock, and (ii) a positive response of consumption to a 
house price shock. 
Our second model, i.e., a simple DSGE model with entrepreneurs, also 
considers this type of borrowers. \Ve refer this case as 'horrowing t.o invest'. 
In this model, we can discuss the financial accelerat.or mechanislll, a..., HlP 
volume of loans is related to goods production through production honsing. 
The hypothesis of the financial accelerator mechanism is that, given a posi-
tive goods sector technology sIwek or a negative Illolwtary policy shock, both 
agents demand more housing and the real house price incfPases, hence en-
trepreneurs' borrowing constraint is relaxed and thus they accumulate more 
production housing, which in turn has a positiv(l impact on output. Our im-
pulse response analysis suggests that (i) a positive goods sector technology 
shock leads to decreases in entrepreneurs' housing and tlw VOlUlllP of loans; 
(ii) a negative monetary policy shock increases entrepn'neurs' housing and 
leads to a higher volume of loans; (iii) a positive housing PI"l'fpl"l'IlCP shock 
leads to decreases in entrepreneurs' housing and the vohullt, of loans. T1H'n 
we find that the dynamics of the economy are affected if we switch off tht' 
collateral effect, indicating financial accelerator (or decelPrator) eifl'et plays 
a role. Furthermore, given a goods sector technology shock, our sensitivity 
analysis suggests that (i) we obtain the financial accelerator eif{'ct under the 
alternative monetary policy rule; (ii) a higher loan to value ratio strengtlwns 
the re-allocation of housing and the deel"l'HSP in tll(' VOhUlH' of loans. 
The second type of borrowers acculllulates long-lasting goods, SUd1 as 
durable goods or domestic housing, awl tlwn gains utility from it. 1\1(',U1-
while, they also take loans from patient households, and IIS(, tlH'se goods as 
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collateral. In this setting, the borrowing constraint is not directly linked to 
output, i.e., a relaxed borrowing constraint leads to increases in tlw VOhIllH' 
of loans and the stock of the long-Ia..'iting goods, which have no dire(,t impact 
on output. 
Here we list several papers that have discussed the second t y P ( ~ ~ of bor-
rowers. Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) consider heterogeneous agents and 
the collateral constraints in a one-sector real business cycle model, where 
durable goods are used as collateral. They e x a m i l l ( ~ ~ the contribution of tIl<' 
financial reform of relaxed collateral constraints to households borrowing and 
they find that the relaxation of collateral constrains can explain a large frac-
tion of the actual volatility decline in the macroeconorny. Monacelli (2009) 
also considers heterogeneous agents and the collateral constraints bllt in a 
two-sector New Keynesian model. His model can explain the facts that, in 
response to monetary policy shocks, (i) durable and Ilon-durabh' sppuding 
co-move positively, and durable sp('uciing exhibits a llluch largPf smlsitivity 
to the shocks. Iacoviello and ~ e r i i (2010) consiciPf uominal rigidities, credit 
market frictions and housing production a two-sector model, wlwre domcHtie 
housing is used as collateral. At business frequencies, their model matches 
the observation that both house prices and houHing investment are strongly 
procyclical, volatile, and sensitivp to monetary sho('ks. Ov('r the long('r hori-
zons, they suggest that the house price boom in the 1970s was callsed by 11 
productivity slowdown in the houHing sector and that housing dPlllctllci shocks 
are the main rea..'lon for the recent house price boom. 
Our third model, i.e., the simple DSGE model with impatient hOlls('holds, 
considers the second type of borrowers. \Ve refer this case as 'borrowillp.; to 
live'. In this model, we do not observe the financial accelerator dfeet as thl' 
volume of loans is not related to goods production a.nyIllore. Our illlPlllsl' 
response analysis suggests that (i) a positive goods sector tedmolop.;y shock 
leads to a decrease in the volulllc of loans; (ii) a negative Ulon('tary policy 
shock leads to an incrca..'ie in the volume of loans; (iii) a hOIlHing prdl'n'llc(' 
shock leadH to a re-allocation of housing from pati('nt hOllsdlOlds to impa-
tient households and an increas{' in th£' volume of loans. Thell w(' switch 
off the c o l l a t . ( ~ r a l l effect to show that til(' financial accelerator (or d('('('krator) 
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effect is not observed in this model. Moreover, given a positive goociH sedor 
technology, our sensitivity analysis suggests that (i) the alternative llIOIlC''' 
tary policy rule weakens the re-allocation of housing and the decrpase in the 
volume of loans; (ii) a higher loan to value ratio strengt.hens the decrease ill 
the volume of loans and the re-allocation of housing. 
Finally, we summarise our results in the following table and e I l l p h a s i s ( ~ ~
that (i) the financial accelerator effect is only relevant to the s i m p l t ~ ~ modPl 
with entrepreneurs, (ii) we observe the financial accelerator effect given a 
monetary policy shock, (iii) given a goods technology shock, this effect is 
sensitive to the monetary policy rule. In addition, the response of output to 
a housing preference shock depends on the model setting. 
The model with E Housing Market IRA SA 
positive goods technology shock E ~ P H H FD FA 
negative monetary policy shock P H ~ E E FA 
positive housing preference shock E ~ P H H
The model with IH 
positive goods technology shock I H ~ P H H XO FA/FD 
negative monetary policy shock P H ~ I H H :\"0 FA/FD 
positive housing preference shock P H ~ I H H
where E denotes entrepreneurs, IH denotes impatient households, IRA is 
impulse responses analysis, SA is sensitivity analysis, and FA (FD) stands 
for financial accelerator (decelerator) effect. 
2.2 The simple model 
In this section, we illustrate a simple DSGE model with sticky pricps. In 
particular, we add a housing market, <1.'-; WC' arC' particularly interested ill til£' 
dynamics of the real house pricC' ill reSpOIlS(> to various <,xogpnolls sho('ks. 
In this chaptpr, we assume that the housing supply is fixed. similar with 
Iacoviello (2005). This assumption is simplf' and intuitiw h<'c'aus(' Hw qllan-
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tity of housing is closely related to the availability of land, which is fixpd. 
Besides, in the short run, the supply of housing call be seell a.s fixed lH'c<Llls(' 
it takes time to build new housing. Under this a.<.;sumptioll, we can discuss 
the demand side effect in the housing market, i.e., the impact of a change 
in the housing demand, but not the supply side effect, i.e., the impact of a 
change in the housing supply. 
2.2.1 Patient households 
Patient households are infinitely lived and of measure one.' They COllSllIlW 
final goods, demand domestic housing, and supply labour. They maxilllis(' 
their lifetime utility subject to their budget constraint. \\7<, a.<';SllIlle that they 
own the profitable retail goods firms. 
The patient households' lifptime utility functioll is 
where Et is the expectation operator, 3 in the patient households' dis("ollut. 
factor, Ct is patient households' consumption, Cr n w a . s l l f ( ~ S S the degree of COJl-
sumption habit, rc is a scaling factor, hI. is domestic housing, (/,1 is the supply 
of patient households' labour, and ,In is the Fisher ela.'iticity of lahour supply, 
i.e., the elru-;ticity of labour supply respect to the change in til(' current wage 
rate keeping fixed marginal utility of consllluptioll. The wPi).!;ht Oil domestic 
housing, jl., follows the stationary proc('ss 
Cj.t '" IV (0, IT]) (2.1 ) 
Given the lifetime utility function, the patient households' marginal IItil-
ity of consumption is 
1 1 
Itrl = rr· - :,c(.rr-----
, . ("I. - CcC'_1 Elc'+1 - Cc (', 
(2.2) 
7\Ve use 'patipnt households' in this r ( ' p r l ' ' ' l ' n t a t i V ( ~ ~ agl'llts lllod('1 b('("lIIlH' WI' will add 
allot IH'f tvp<' of agellts in t 1)(' lat!'f l ' o n t ( ~ x t . .
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which expresses the marginal utility of consumption, Uc,t, in terms of lagged, 
current, and future c o n s u m p t i o n . ~ ~
The patient households' real budget constraint shows that the real total 
expense (LHS) should be no more than the real total income (RHS), and is 
expressed as 
where qh,t is the real house price, bt is the volume of bonds purchased in 
pp;riod t, Wt is the real wage rate, R I _ 1 is the (gross) nominal interest rat!' on 
the bonds hold in period t - 1, 7r c,t is the (gross) inflation rat(', and fl is the 
real profit from retail goods firmsY The real prices of final goods and bonds 
are normalised to one. 
We obtain three first order conditions from the patient households' lifl'-
time utility maximisation problem. 1O Firstly, the patient households' Ellkr 
equation is 
U",t = tJEt ( ~ ' l l C . t + l ) )
7rc,t+l 
(2.3) 
which implies that the real price of bonds in terms of the marginal utility 
of consumption at t is equal t.o the real gross return of bowls in terms of 
the discounted marginal utility of consumption at t + 1. This equat.ion is 
an intertemporal optimality condition that governs the optimal allocation of 
consumption over time. 
Secondly, the equation that governs the patient households' labour sllpply 
is 
(2.4 ) 
which implies that the marginal disutility of labour supply at is equal to 
the real wage in terms of the marginal utility consumptioll at t. This first 
x If we do not haw the featurp of consllmpt ion habit. t IH' Illarginal lit il ity of {'Oll,.,llIlIpl i()n 
depends on current consumpt ion only. U ... t = ~ . .
()\\'e lise a lagged time subscript for til(' variables that an' pn'dl'tprlllillf'din pt'riod t. For 
example. we ust' R t -I as tllf' nominal intprpst ratl' Oil bonds hPld in t hI' prl'violls pprio<i. 
bt - I • Iwcause it is already dpt('rrnirwd in ppriod t- 1. 
IIiTIH' patient households' lifl'tilIlP utility lIlaxillli,.,ation problmn is shown ill APPPll<iix. 
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order condition is an intratemporal optimality condition that indicates how 
patient households make decisions about consumption and labour supply ill 
period t.ll 
Thirdly, the equation that governs the patient households' demand for 
domestic housing is 
(2.5) 
which implies that the real house price in terms of the marginal utility of 
consumption at t is equal to the sum of the marginal utility of domestic 
housing at t and the expected real house price (for resale) in terms of dis-
counted marginal utility of consumption at t + 1. This first order condition 
is an intertemporal optimality condition that describes an optimal allocation 
of resource between consumption and domestic housing. 12 
2.2.2 Goods production sector 
In the goods production sector, we have three players: (i) final goods pro-
ducers buy retail goods from individual retail goods producers, and C O I l l r ) ( ) S { ~ ~
them into final goods, which are ready for consumption; (ii) retail goods pro-
ducers (or retailers) buy intermediate goods from intermediate goods produc-
ers, and differentiate the goods at no cost into [{'tail goods; (iii) illt('rmediate 
goods producers combino goods sector technology and labour frolll patient 
households to produce intermediate goods, which an' thell sold to [{'tail goods 
producers. 13 
Final goods firms Final goods producers buy retail goods froIl! individ-
ual retail goods producers, and compose them into final goods, which an' 
11 The alternative way to interpretes the first order condition is that the' lllarginal rnt(' 
of substitution. ~ . . is equal to the real \Vagt'. . 
lic,1 
uThis condition indicates the choice bl'tw(,PII con';llmptioll and hOIlSilll!; ill I ) ( ~ r i ( ) d d t. but 
we refer it as an interternporal optimality condition as it i l l v o l \ ' P ~ ~ t + 1 t(,rIll. 
';'It is equivalent to combirw retail goods firms and illterllH'dint(' good" finn;.;. 
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ready for consumption. These firms are perfectly competitive, thus make 
zero profit. The main objective of this stage is to derive the individual d(,-
mand curve for retailer. 
Final goods producers compose retail goods into final goods according to 
the following production function, 
where Yt is final goods, Yt (z) is retail goods from retail goods producer ~ , , s 
is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated varieties. 
The final goods producers' real profit maximisation problem is 
[ /
.1 Pe t (Z) ] 
max Yt - P. Yt (z) dz 
Yt(Z) • [) c,t 
where Pe,t is the nominal price of final goods, P ~ : ~ t z ) ) is thn real pric(\ of rt'tail 
/
.\ p (z) goods from retail goods produeer z, . [) ~ : , t t Yt ( ~ ) ) liz is til(' real total cost of 
buying retail goods from retail goods producprs. 
The aggregate Ilominal priee level or the nominal price of final goods is 
expressed as 
Pe" ~ ~ [l Pd (z)l-c dZ] ,'. 
which indicates that the nominal pricp of final goods is a composite of 1,11(' 
nominal prices of retail goods. 
After solving the final goods producers' real profit maximisation probkm, 
we obtain an individual demand curve for each retailer as 
y ( ~ ) ) _ (PC,/+k (z)) -0 y 
t+k - - Pe,t+k I+k 
which indicates that the relative output, Y,,; d z), depends on the n ~ l a t i V ( ' ' pric(', 
'/. k 
I \ ~ I ' ' k(Z), together with the ela.'lticity of substitution betwcpn diHen'lltiated 
r,t - k 
varieties, s. In other words, when the relative pric(\ iuncas('s by t %, tlw 
relative output decrea.'le by s%. 
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Retail goods firms The economy is composed of a continuulll of retailprs, 
whose total is normalised to unity. Retailers buy intermediate goods frolll 
intermediate goods producers, and differentiate the goods at no cost into 
retail goods Yt (z). They are monopolistic competitive, thus tlwy are pric(L 
setters and are able to make profit by selling retail goods with a price markup. 
We assume that these profitable retail goods firms are owned by patient 
households. 
Additionally, the feature of sticky prices arises from these finns. Following 
Calvo (1983), we assume that retailers can reset their pric(ls optimally ill a 
given period with probability 1 - e. Let Pr* I (z) denote the optimal nominal 
price set by retailers who are able to change prices at period t. Iksides, by 
introducing the feature of price indexation, the fraction f} of retailers, who an' 
not able to reset their prices in period t, index their prices to pa."It inHatioll 
with a degree of indexation 11C , thus their p r i C ( ~ s s become pc•l (z) (/'," I ) , ~ ~ , 
instead of PC,! (z). 
The retailers' real profit maximisation problem is 
. E ~ ( ) k \ \ [P;'t(Z) (Pr,l+k-I)'" \.,' ( ~ ) ) I J I t ' ( " l t ~ · } . . ( ~ ) ] ]
max t Lit t+k ll+k ~ ~ - I+k ~ ~
P;,t(z) k=O ' Pc.I+1< P",I-I Pc:,I+k 
where At t+k = Et (rl Itc,t 'k) is the stochastic discount factor, which is used 
, Uc,t 
to discount profit in terms of consumption, II PU'c .1 is the nominal p r i ( ' ( ~ ~ of 
intermediate goods, and J ~ ~ ; , , is tIl(' real price of intel'Inediatp goods. If Ii 
retailer is able to reset price at period t, lw will S ( ~ t t a price ~ ~ . I I (z) to maximise 
the expected profits for all suhseqlH'ut periods, t.aking til(' possibility of hdllg 
unable to reset prices into account. 
Substituting the individual retailer's output, Y ~ + k k (z), by tlw individual 
I lEt (jk U,·,I f k) is abo knolVll a ~ ~ t IH' marginal ratp of ;;lIb,.;tit lit iOIl bt't\W'1'1I ( , ( ) I I ~ l I l I l p t i ( ) 1 I I
U, 01 
at period t+k and consumptioll at p('riod t. It tl'lIs how tllP individllal \'1\III(,s ( , o l l ~ \ I l l 1 p t i ( ) l l l
at period t + k relative to cOI1;;lImptioll at ppriod t. 
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demand curve in the profit maximisation problem, we have 
:xl [ I';,,(z) (PC;',k-I)'" ( / Y . I ( Z ) ) ~ ' ' 1/+/,; 1 max E L:fiA Pr,lek Ir,I-1 ir.t.k 
t t,t+k I) (IJ' (_))-C P;,(z) _ ~ ~ ~ ~ y 
'k=O l'c,1 I k Pc,t , k t +k 
The first order condition derived from the retailers' n ~ a l l profit maximi-
sation problem is the equation of the real optimal price, and it is expressed 
Q - ~ E Ec,t - 1 t f:- (2.6) 
in which we define the real optimal price as Qc I = 1/::." and inflation as 
, r , 
IT c t = pPc" • 1:; This equat.ion implies t.hat. the optimal 'pric(' set ill l){'riod 
, c.t-l 
t depends on the expected real price of illt.ernH'diate goods, I;:,''';'. 'kk, in all 
subsequent periods. 1(j 
Given the features of sticky prices and price indexatioll, tIll' nominal price 
level can also be written as 
1 
Pc,t = [0 ( 7 1 " ~ 7 t ~ I P ( ' , I ~ d l ~ S S + (1 - fJ) P ( ~ l l - c - ] I < < (2.7) 
which implies that the nominal price level at period t depends Oll tlip iud('xed 
nominal price, 7 1 " ~ 7 t - l l P c , t ~ ~ 1, set by the fraction f} of retailers that ar(' HOt. able 
to reset their prices, and the optimal nominal price, P ( ~ I ' ' s('t by the fract.ioll 
(1 - fJ) of retailers that are able to reset their prices. 
By combining the log-linearised form of the equations of the real optimal 
price and the aggregate nominal price level, we have t.Il(' Xcw K(·yncsian 
Phillips curve as 
~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ (1 - fJ) (1 - fI,1) ( ~ ) )
71"c,/ - Lrr lTc'/'-1 = d (IT(',ltl - lrr71",·,I) - fJ Z/ 
I ~ ) \ \ ' ( ' ' have P , ~ . t t (:) = P , ~ , t t becalls!' rptail firms will sl't a SHIll(' pri('(' if tlll'y' 1IIT al>I(' to 
respt t ~ l f ' i r r pricp,;, 
Iii If thE' monopolistic cOlllpl'titiv(> firms are i l l t f ~ r r n e d i a t l ' ' )!;oods finll';. till' optililal real 
pri('p will dPIWllds 011 the rpal marginal cost,;. 
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which is not purely forward looking but depends on lagged inflation since it 
fraction () of retailers index their priceR to paRt inflation with an elasticity L7f. 
The real profit from retail goods firms is 
f v Pwc,t V' ( 1 ) ' ~ T Tt=I(---I(= 1-- 1/ Pc,t Zt (2.8) 
which implies that the real profit is the difference between the real p r i c ( ~ ~ of 
final goods, which is normalised to one, and the real price of i n t e n J l ( ~ d i a t e e
goods, ~ ~ ~ ; t . . Besides, Zt = I ~ ~ ~ t t is the price markup of retail goods finns. 
Intermediate goods firms Intermediate goods pro<iucerR combine exog<'-
nous goods sector technology and labour from patient how.,C'holds to product' 
intermediate goods, which are then sold to retail goods producers. vVe as-
sume that intermediate goods firms are perfectly competitive, aJl(I thus they 
make zero profit. 
The intermediate goods prod uctiOil function is 17 
(2.9) 
where nc,t is patient housdlolds' labour, aud It" is thp labour shaw of out-
put.11' The goods sector technology, A,.,t, follows the stationary proC('SS 
A - AI-P.le AP.\c e,,"A,',1 
c,t - C c,t-· I ' (2.10) 
The intermediate goods producers' real profit maximisa.tion prohll'lll is 
17Precisely. WI' should uo;e Yr,t to ciPllotp Olltpllt frolll internH'diatl' !!;()O.\S f i r l l l ~ . . A ~ ~
Ye,t = Yt at aggregate term. we use Yt dirpdly for simplicity. 
1XIt i,.; f'quiyall'llt to as";llme a fixed l('vPl of goods capital. ft, .. ill tlH' illtl'rlll(''\iatl' ! ! ; o ( ) d ~ ~
prodllct ion flln('t ion. 
Y/ = .4( .. / (I/. e ,/ )It" f t : ~ " "
where J-lkc is t Iw goods capital share of output. 
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where At t+k is the stochastic discount factor, ,; is the real price of intef-
J r-Jt 
mediate goods, it Y, is the real total revenue, and 11'1 n",1 is the rcal total 
cost. 
The first order condition derived from this real profit maximisation dt'-
scribes the intermediate goods producers' demand for patient households' 
labour, and it is expressed as 
(2.11) 
which implies that the real wage of labour, i.e., the marginal cost of lai>olU, 
is equal to the marginal product of labour. 
2.2.3 Monetary authority 
The monetary authority uses the nominal interest rate as a policy instrullwnt. 
to affect the real economy. In our model, monetary policy is non-Iwut.ral 
because of the feature of sticky prices t.hat arises from the IlloIlopolistic COIll-
petition among retail goods firms. Therefore, the nominal iuterest rate cau 
affect the real interest rate, thus has an impact on real variabl('s. 
The monet.ary policy rule, which reacts to inflation and output, is I 'I 
R - (R )"'r (,I-,/lr),/)". t ,UII,I (Y.) (l-or)I'y t - t-I if,.,1 Y ( (2.12) 
where Rt - I is the lagged nominal interest rate, if",1 is the gross inflation ratp, 
Y, is actual output, and Y is till' steady statl' vahl!' of output, 1.\, (/)". (;ill an' 
weights coefficients. The monetary policy shock, /JR," follows the stationary 
I!) AlternativPly. we can also assume that the Ir\ollt'tary authority i ~ ~ ('OIl<'('rI\f'cl with GOP 
rather than output from goods sector. thus the policy rllie IH'COlll('S 
R = (R )'" rr(l-<J>. )<J>, __ I ." ,"",I (
CD? )(1-,1> ),;. 
t I-I ",I CDr /, 
where CDPt = YI + qhIHI' F o l l o w i l l ~ ~ IH('O\'ipllo alld. :'-ipri ( : ~ O J ( ) ) , , WP (,HII liSP till' ~ t f ' a d y y
,;tatp value of tlIP real houo;ing pri('!'. thus ~ h ( ) r t t rtlll fill('tuatioll ill t h!' rl'al hOlls!' pric!' Ita" 
no impact Oil CDP, 
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process 
(2.13) 
The Fisher equation, which governs the relat.ion bptween t . 1 1 ( ~ ~ wetl illt.erest. 
rate and the nominal interest rate, is 
(2.14) 
which implies that the (gross) real interest rate, "1, is equal to the nominal 
interest rate, Rt. adjusted by the expected inflation rate, E I 7f,.,/t 1. 2() 
2.2.4 Market clearing conditions 
The bonds market clearing condition is 
(2.15) 
which implies that (i) the aggregate saving is zero, and (ii) there is no bor-
rowing between agents since we consider a model with representative agents. 
The economy-wide resource constraint or the goods market dearing COIl-
dit.ion is 
} ~ ~ = ('I (2.W) 
which implieH that the final gOOdH are all consumed hy pati('llt hOUHeholds <1.-; 
consumption goods. 
The labour market dearing condit.ioll is 
( 2.17) 
whieh implies that the supply of patient households' labour is ('quai to t.hl' 
intermediat.e goods producers' demand for patient hOllseholds' labour. 
lOOur monetary policT rule guarantee that the rpal intPrp:o;t rat!' nHl\'p" in it :-;alll" din'('-
tion with the nominal intere:o;t rate, 
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The housing market dearing condition is 
H=h, (2.18) 
which implies that housing has a fixed supply, H, and is fully occupied. 
2.2.5 Equilibrium 
An equilibrium is an allocation of prices (7rc ,t. R" (2",1, (jh,t, W" Z" 1'1)' quanti-
ties (r-t, Uc,t, ht, yt, nt, nc,t, ft. bd, and'exogenous st.ochatit.ie process {A"", .i" II If'! } ~ ( ) )
satisfying equations (2.1) - (2.18) given the init.ial condi t.ious for 7r c.1 - 1, R, __ 1 , 
Ct.-I' 
2.2.6 Calibration 
Most of parameters are calibrated in a way that is consistent. with Ia('()viellu 
and Neri (2010). For the patient hOllseholds' discount factor, we set ,3 = 
0.9925 = 1.03-0,25, implying a steady state annual rea.l interest. rat.e of 3 
percent. The patient households' labour schedule is assumcd to 1)(' flat, 
III = 0.01, which is suggested by Iacoviello (2004), who argues that. t.his flat 
labour supply curve ha." the virtue of rationalising the weak observcd r ( ' s p ( ) n s ( ~ ~
of real wages to macroeconomic dL"turbance. 21 Besides, the coefficient. of 
housing preference is set to j = 0.12. In the ba."leiilll' calibratioll, we switch 
off the feature of consumption habit by setting Ec = O. 
Patient households preference 
The patient households' discount factor j 
The inverse of the cia."lticity of labour supply ~ ' I l l
The weight on hOllsing J 
The degree of consumption habit ::.,' 
0.9925 
(Ull 
0.12 
o 
TIlE' sharp of labour in the goods production function is st't to 11" = 0.6,), 
implying that the steady stat(' shar(' of lahour ilH'OIlW is 6,jj{. For till' r('tail 
21 "Vith 1 + ~ : " " approachill/,: 1. tlIP 1Itility f1lllctioll hpCOlllf'S lill(,Hr ill l('islIl'(', 
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goods sector, we assume a steady state markup of 15% ill the goods spdor 
by setting Z = 1.15. For the degree of prices stickiness, we aSSUIllP that 25o/c 
of retailers is able to re-optimise their prices in a given I ) ( ~ r i o d d by setting 
f) = 0.75, implying that price setters can re-optimise their prices O1lce pwry 
l ~ O O = 4 periods. In the baseline calibration, we also switch off the feat Ill"!' of 
price indexation by setting Ltr = o. 
Intermediate goods firms 
Labour share I-lTl 0.65 
Retail goods firms 
The steady state gross markup Z LEi 
The probability of fixed prices f) 0.75 
The degree of price indexation 
"tr () 
For the monetary policy rule, we set the weights codfkiPlltS to 4>,. = 0.6, 
6 tr = 1.5, and q)y = 0.5, which are similar with Iacoviello and :Xpri ( 2 0 1 0 ) . ~ : ! !
Monetary policy 
The interest rate inertia c\ 0.6 
The weight coefficient on inRation Otr 1.5 
The weight coefficient on output cPy 0.5 
As we focus Oil the impulse responses of variables to various tl'llI(>(}-
rary shocks, the autocorrelation coefficients of thes(' shocks are set. t.o ( l . f } l . ~ : l l
12The estimates in Iacoviello and ~ ( ' f i i (2010) for thesp c()('ffici(,lIb an' ,'J, = O.Gl. 1,'" = 
1.36. and Oy = 0.51. 
2aWc use 0.01. instead of O. to facilitatp ~ l a t l a b b programs ill till' futttrP resl'arch. 
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Meanwhile, we set the standard deviation of all shocks to O.DI. 
Autocorrelation of shocks 
Goods sector technology P.le D.Ol 
Housing preference Pj 0.01 
Monetary policy Pull 0.01 
Standard deviation of shocks 
Goods sector technology (TAc 0.01 
Housing preference (T. J 0.01 
l\lonetary policy (JIlH 0.01 
2.2.1 Impulse response analysis 
In this section, we discuss how variables respond to various exog{'1I0\lS shocks 
in the simple model. We consider three types of shocks: (i) a positiw goods 
sector technology shock, which brings extra resource to the e('OIlOlUY; (ii) a 
uegative monetary policy shock, which affect the intertcmporal optimality 
condition by making current consumption cheap('r ill terms of fllturE' ('011-
sumption; (iii) a positive housing preferenCf' shock, which aff('ct tlt(, intt'rt('lll-
poral optimality condition between consumption and housing by ill('nm.<;illg 
the utility from domestic housing. 
Goods sector technology shock Figure 2.1 shows t.he impulse r(,Sj)(lllS(,S 
of variables to a oue percent positive shock in goods sector t('chuoiogy with 
persistence of PAc = 0 . O 1 . 2 ~ ~ A higher goods sector technology ll'a<is to a 
higher marginal product of labour, and thus a h i g t H ~ r r rpal wag(' and n ~ a l l
income. The higher real income implies that households increas(' thdr COIl-
sumption. Meanwhile, households also demand IlIon' hOllsing, kadillg t.o a 
rise in the real house price. :2:, In the labour markpt, ( ~ I l l p l o Y l l H ' l I t t <I('('[('<1."I<'S 
21 In all figures. impulse responses ar!' measured as per<:Plltagp deviatioll" from t IH' "t pad.\' 
statp. and horizontal axes display tlIP nUlllhpr of quarters aftl'r thl' ,.;hock. 
2;, A higher (lower) housing pric'P implies an illcTeasl'd (d('(T{'aspd) dPlIlHlld for 
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because the negative impact of the lower marginal utility of consumpt.ioll 
dominates the positive impact of the higher real wagc.:w Moreover, a higher 
output (Le., a higher supply of intermediate goods) leads to a fall in the price 
of intermediate goods, and thus a higher markup, as the price of final goods 
are sticky. Also, the lower price of intermediate goods ha.'l a negative impact 
on inflation, through a higher markup, a.-; the New Keynesian Phillips curve 
shows that inflation is negatively related to the markup. For the monetary 
policy, the nominal interest rate deerea.<;es because it reacts more to the lower 
inflation dominates than the higher output. 
x 10 Nomlnellnleresl rate x 10 Inflation x 10 Output 
: T ~ ~ 5 f ; ~ ~-- - . - - . - . - - - " ~ ~ -.- 05 ~ ~
.e o - -.'- .-
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Figure 2.1: Impulse responses to a positive goods sector te(,hnology shock 
from the simple DSGE model. 
Monetary policy shock Figure 2.2 shows the impulse respOllSt'S of vari-
ables to a one percent negative monetary shock with p('rsist(,w'(' of fill/( = 
lliThp optimality condition Iwtw£,pn ('OnSlllllptiol1 and labour "upply indicatt's that a 
100VPr marginal lit ility of conSlllllpt ion lpads to a lo\\,pr labour supply. kf'Ppin)2; til<' n'HI 
wag£' rate constant. 
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0.01. A negative monetary policy shock causes a lower nominal interest rate 
and thus a lower real interest rate, making current consumption cheaper ill 
terms of future consumption. This leads to a higher current consumption 
as households re-allocate their resource over time horizons, according to the 
intertemporal optimality condition. Meanwhile, because of the optimalit.y 
condition between consumption and housing, a higher current consumption 
leads to a higher demand for housing, and thus a higher real house price. 
Moreover, the higher consumption causes higher levels of output, marginal 
product of labour, and real wage. The employment increases because the 
positive impact of the higher real wage dominates the negative impact of 
the higher marginal utility of cOIlsumption. Furthermore, given a rise in the 
price of intermediate goods, caused by a higher demand, the feature of sticky 
prices in the final goods price leads to a decrease in the markup, and thus 
an increase in inflation. 
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Figure 2.2: Impulse responses to a negative lllOItetary policy shock fro III th(' 
simple DSGE model. 
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Housing preference shock Figure 2.3 shows the impulse responses of 
variables to a one percent positive housing preference shock with persistence 
of Pj = 0.01. A higher housing preference leads to higher demand for housing, 
and thus a higher real house price. In this simple model, however, the housing 
supply is fixed and households are identical, thus there is no transaction of 
housing and households' decisions on consumption and labour supply are not 
affected. Hence, the real house price is the only variable that responds to 
the housing preference shock in this representative agents model with a fixed 
housing supply. 
...._-
Figure 2.3: Impulse responses to a positive housing preference shock from 
the simple DSGE model. 
2.2.8 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we examine how the impulse responses of variables are afFected 
by changing the values of orne parameters, given a positive goods sector 
technology shock. We consider different degrees of consumption habit and 
price indexation, and an alternative monetary policy rule.27 
27[n t hi th si . a mplification mean t hat variable reach s a higher maximum point a nd 
propagation mean that variab le take longer to return to it t ady sta t . 
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The feature of consumption habit The feature of consumption habit 
has been introduced into DSGE models to increase the internal persistence. 
This feature includes lagged consumption into the households' utility func-
tion, and thus the marginal utility of consumption depends on current, future, 
and lagged consumption. This motivates households to smooth consumption 
at a higher degree. Here we examin how our results are affected by intro-
ducing this feature. We s t the degree of consumption habit to Cc = 0.32, 
which is consistent with Iacoviello and Neri (2010). Figure 2.4 shows the 
impulse responses of variables to a one percent positive goods technology 
shock with persistence of PAc = 0.01 under various degrees of consumption 
habit. We can see that, after introducing this feature, output (consumption) 
increases less but its pace of returning to steady state is slower. Meanwhile, 
households shift a fraction of r source to housing, thus the r -al house price 
increases more. In addition, the nominal interest rat de reas s further as the 
positive impact of the higher output is weakened. In sum, the main impact 
of this feature is on the dynamics of output (consumption) . 
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Figure 2.4: Impuls responses to a positive good e tor t hnology shock 
under variou degrees of consumption habi t from the imple DSGE model. 
The solid line i from the baseline calibration c = 0, and the dashed lin is 
from the alternative calibrat ion Cc = 0.32. 
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The feature of price indexation Next, we discuss tlw impact of tlw f('a-
ture of price indexation, which is also used to increase the intmnal persistcuce 
of DSGE models. This feature allows price-setters to index tlwir prices to 
past inHation if they are not able to resct thcir prices, implying that current 
inflation has an extended impact on the cconomy. 'VI' set the degree of price 
indexation to t" = 0.69, which is also consistent with Iacoviello and ~ ! ' r i i
(2010). Figure 2.5 shows the impulse responses of variables to a one pl'rccnt 
positivc goods technology shock with persistence of P.1c = O.Dl under various 
degrees of price indexation. We can see t.hat inHation takes longer to rdufll 
to its steady state, leading to a slower adjustmcnt in the nominal interest rate 
as well. Given the slower adjustment in the nominal and thus t.he rpal iuter-
est rate, the consumption also takes longer to retllfll to its st.eady st.at.(', a.'i 
households need to re-allocate their resource over time according to t.heir iu-
tertemporal optimality condition. Recall that a lower rpal illt.en'st. rat.(' mak(' 
current consumption cheaper in terms of future consumption. Furth('nnol'{" 
the real house price also adjusts slowly, a.q housdlOlds ('hallge t.heir dPllUUHl 
for housing correspondingly according to the optimalit.y cOllditioll b ( ' t W ( ~ ( , l I I
consumption and housing. In SUIll, this fpature brings l)('rsist('llt dfpct t.o 
model variables. 
Alternative monetary policy rule In tIw basPiiIH' setting, th(' uOJllinal 
interest rate needs to respond to inflation and output simultaueously, but 
these two variables respond differently to a goods sector technology sho('k. 
It is suggested that a stable inflation is the primary targd, of til(' ('pntral 
banks, thus here we examine how our results are affected if the lllolld,ary 
authority reaets to inflation only by setting the weight co('ffiC'i('llt OIL output 
to (!;/I = 0, Figure 2.6 shows the impulse responses of variables to a OIl(' 
percent positive goods technology shock with persist.ell(,(' of P.lt- = (l.O 1 Hud!'r 
two different. monetary policy ruks. "",,'hen the central bank dOl's uot pa.v 
attention to output, thp positive impact of tlw h i g h ( ~ r r output on tit(, llominal 
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Figure 2.5: Impulse r sponses to a positive goods sector t chnology shock 
under various degrees of price indexation from th simple DSGE model. The 
solid line is from the baseline calibrat ionL-/r = 0 an 1 the dashed line is from 
the alternative calibration L-." = 0.69. 
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interest rate disappears, and thus the nominal interest ra te decreases further 
in response to the lower· inflation. Meanwhile, the lower nominal and thus 
the real interest rate makes current consumption cheaper in terms of future 
consumption. This motivates households to increase curr nt consumption 
further. Meanwhile, households also demand more housing, and thus leads 
to a higher real house price. In sum, if the central bank does not pay attention 
to output, the goods sector technology shock has larger impacts on output 
and the real house price. 
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to a positiv goods sector technology shock 
under alternative monetary policy from the simple DSGE model. The solid 
line is from the baseline calibration <Py = 0.5 and the dashed line is from the 
alternative calibration <Py = o. 
2.3 The simple model with entrepreneurs 
In this section, we add entrepreneur into th impl DSGE model, as we 
want to discu s the impact of redit market imp rfections on the economy. 
In the credit mark t, ntr preneurs take loans from patient households, and 
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the main purpose of the loans is to accumulate production housing and tlwn 
rent it to intermediate goods firms. This type of agents an' also considpre<i 
in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005), and we refer this ca.se 
as 'borrowing to invest'. In this model, we can discllss tllP financial accel-
erator mechanism, as the volume of loans is related to goods production 
through production housing. According to the hypothesis of t.he financial 
accelerator mechanism, given a positive goods sector technology shock or a 
negative monetary policy shock, both agents demand more housing and the 
real house price increases, hence the entreprenf'urs' borrowing constraint is 
relaxed and they accumulate more production housing, which in turn has a 
positive impact on output. 
2.3.1 Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs are infinitely lived and of mea."iure oue. They consume final 
goods and supply accumulated production housing to intermediate goods 
firms. In the credit market, they take loans from patient households and us!' 
their production housing as collateral. They maximise their lifetimc ut.ility 
subject to their budget constraint and the borrowing const.raint. \Vp aSSUll)(' 
that entrepreneurs only gaiu utility froIll cousumption hut not. production 
housing. 
Till' e n t r e p n ~ n e u r s ' ' lifetime utility function is 
00 
E t L (/3'f ( r ~ ~ In (c;+k - .<c;'+k-l) ) 
k=O 
where a superscript e denotes variables associated with cntf<'pf<'I1curs: :1" is 
t l H ~ ~ entreprerwurs' discount factor, ce is entrepreneurs' consumption, E:: is t.ht' 
degree of consumption habit for entrepreneurs, aud r : ~ ~ is a scaling f a c t o r . ~ ~ ~
Given the utility function, the entrepreneurs' marginal utility of COIlSIllIlP-
tion is 
2 ~ T h f ' ' conditioll ·r < j => A ~ ~ > n. whpf(' A% i>' til<' Lagrang!' lIIultiplif'r Oil tlip b()rrowing 
con>'traint. implips that the borrowing ('onstraint i" binding. 
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(2.19) 
which expresses the marginal utility of consumption, / I , ~ , t ' ' in terms of lagged, 
current, and future consumption. 
The entrepreneurs' real budget constraint shows that the real total ex-
pense (LHS) is no more than the real total income (RHS), and is expressed 
as 
e ,e Rt - Ibe ,e ,e I" Ct + qh,t ~ t t + -- t-I S qz,t ~ t - I I + C]h,t ~ t - I I + )1 
'IT c/ 
(2.20) 
where he is production housing, C]z,/ is the real rental price of production 
housing, b ~ ~ is the volume ofloans taken from patient households, and l ; t , ~ t l l b7_1 
is the real total repayment for previous loans. We a..'isume that e n t r e p n ~ I H ' u r s s
do not own the profitable retail goods firms and thus do Hot f(,{·{'ive profit. 
In addition, we assume that domestic housing and production housing have 
a same price, and the transformation between them is costiess. 
Entrepreneurs take loans from patient households and use thdr produ('-
tion housing as collateral, thus their borrowing constraint is 
(2.21) 
which shows that the (gross) real ret urn of lending, ~ ~ b ~ , , is full.\-' s('cuf<'d h.\-' 
7rc ,t .. 1 
a fraction of the e x p e e t { ~ d d vahl(' of production housing, me E/ (qh,l+ Ih;'), whme 
m" is the loan to value ratio.2!J In another word, the borrowing constraint 
shows that the maximum volume of loans b positively related to th!' e X p { ' d l ~ d d
value of the c o l l a t ( ~ r a l . . This type of borrowing constraint ha..'i two featuf<'s: 
(i) the value of the loan to value ratio is fixed; and (ii) then' is no possihility 
of default because there is no a.."iYIlllIlctric information and agency prohklll 
in this model. 
\Ve obtain two first order conditions froIll tIl(' l'utn'pfl'lH'lIrS' utility m<tx-
2!J laroviPilo (2005) assumes that, WIWll borrowers rldault. 1f'IH\prs call rt'POSSPSS bono\\,-
( ' r ~ ' ' asset by paying; a proportional transational co"t. (1 - m") E/ ((/1','+lh;'). 
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imisation problem.3o First, the entrepreneurs' Euler equatioll is 
e E (:;e R t e ) \ (' 
Uc,t = t I) --Uc,t+ I + "'b,t 
IT C,t+ 1 
,12 
(2.22) 
where ' \ ~ , t t is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint>!l This 
non-standard Euler equation shows that the real price of bonds in tenus of 
the marginal utility of consumption at t is greater than the expected gross 
real return of bonds in terms of the discounted marginal utility of consump-
tion at t + 1, i.e., U ~ t t > Et (ee-.!!:L...,R U ~ t + l ) ' ' indicating that entrepreneurs 
, 7r c,t + 1 • 
should borrow more for current consumptioll.:tl There is, however, a llIar-
ginal cost of tightening the borrowing cOllstraint by holding Ol\(' 1ll0f(\ unit 
of borrowing, A ~ ~ t, where the borrowing constraint is tightpn by olle unit 
and the shadow price of tightening borrowing constraint by one unit is '\;;,1' 
Therefore, this intertemporal optimality condition implies that, given one 
more unit of borrowing, the marginal gain in terms of current comHllllption 
is equal to the sum of the marginal cost in terms of future consumption and 
the marginal cost of tightening the borrowing constraint>I;1 
Second, the equation that governs entrepreneurs' demand for production 
housing is 
which implies that the real house price in terms of the marginal utility of 
consumption at t is equal to the SUIll of three compon<\nt: (i) th<\ ('xpected 
real rental price of production housing in terms of the discollnted marginal 
utility of consumption at t + 1, (ii) the expected real house price (for resait') 
in terms of the discounted marginal utility of consumptioll at t + 1, alld 
;IIIThe entrepreneurs' utility maximisation problem i ~ ~ shown in Appl'll<iix, 
;IIThe Lagrange multiplier is the shadow price of tightening or l o o ~ t ' n i n g g tilt' budgpt 
cOllstraint by one unit. 
; I ~ ~ If the borrowing constraint is !lot hinding. tht' Lagrangp Illult iplil'r " a ~ ~ " Z('fO val lit'. 
i.e .. . . \ ~ ~ t = O. and we have a standard form of t he Euler "quat iOIl. It': I = ,j" ~ ~ /I': I + I' 
• (, ro,,111 f, 
;1;lln ('ontrast. a:.; lenders. pati('nt hOIl,;eholds' intertt'lllporal optilllality (,ondition i ~ ~ ill-
t<'rpreted as that. given one mort' ullit of saving. tht, ('ost ill tPrIll" of ('IIIT('nt t'Oll"ulllption 
is I'qllal to thp gain in terms of futllrt, c ( ) n ~ l l l 1 J p t i ( ) l l , ,
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(iii) the marginal benefit of relaxing the borrowing constraiut hy holding (HlP 
more unit of housing, A ~ . t m e e (qh,t, ~ : c , " " I ), where the borrowiIlg cOIlstraiut. is 
loosened by me (qh,' T ~ : c , ' ' T I) unit and the shadow price of loosening borrowing 
constraint by one unit is Ab,t. 
2.3.2 Goods production sector 
Intermediate goods firms In this simple DSGE model with entrepre-
neurs, the intermediate goods production demands lagged production hous-
ing as a factor of production, then the intermediate goods production fUIlc-
tion becomes 
(2.24) 
where ne,t is patient households' labour, h7-1 is entrepreueurs' productioll 
housing from the previous period, Ill! is the labour share of out.put, IIIl is tlH' 
housing share of output or the elasticity of output to hOllsing. 
The intermediate goods producers' real profit maximization probl<'lll 1)('--
comes 
where Z,l'k Yt+k is the real total revenue, V'tn,.,! is tIl(' real ('ost of patil'llt. 
households' labour, and q ~ , t h r - l l is the real cost of clltrPprPlwurs' produdioll 
housing. 
We obtain two first order conditions from the illterlllcdiat.<' goods firms' 
profit maximisation problem. Firstly, the equation that gOV<'fllS til(' illteflnl'-
diate goods firms' demand for patient households' labour is 
(2.2G) 
which indicates that the real wage of patient hOllsdlOlds' labour (i.('., tit!' 
real marginal cost) is equal to the marginal product of pat.i('Ilt itollst'ilOlds' 
labour. 
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Secondly, the equation that governs the intermediate goods firms' demand 
for entrepreneurs' production housing is 
(2.26) 
which indicates that the real rental price of entrepreneurs' production housing 
is equal to the marginal product of entrepreneurs' production housing>ll 
2.3.3 Market clearing conditions 
The loans market clearing condition is 
(2.27) 
which indicates that, in the loan market, the supply of loans froUl p a t . i ( ~ n t t
households is equal to the demand for loans from entrepreneurs, and thus 
total net saving is zero. 
The economy-wide resourep constraint or the goods markd. dparillg ('Oll-
dition is 
Yi = Ct + c ~ ~ (2.28) 
which indicates that final goods are consumed by both patient. households 
and entrepreneurs. 
To facilitate the summary of our model in the next section, w(' rep<'at the 
labour market clearing condition, which is 
Ht = n".t (2.29) 
which implies that the supply of patient households' labour is equal to t.h!' 
intermediate goods producers' demand for patient households' lahour. 
:11 v"e have entrepreneurs alld illtermediat(' goods production ill our Ill()ck!. It i ~ ~ t'CjlliVlI-
l,mt to combine them as in Iacoviello (2004). except having Ollt' mOrt' ( ~ q l l a t i ( ) l l l to (ksnih(' 
the T I l o v ( ~ m e n t t of rE'ntal price. 
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The housing market dearing condition is 
H = hi + h ~ ~ (2.30) 
which indicates that the fixed total housing supply H are divided into do--
mestic housing and production housing. Note that the purpose of housing 
is determined when it is purchased by consumer or by entrepreneurs, thus 
intermediate goods producers can only rcnt housing capital from ( ~ n t r q ) r ( ' '
neurs. 
2.3.4 Equilibrium 
An equilibrium is an allocation of prices (ITe,I' RI , Q,.,I, (jh,(' 1I't, Z" f't. q ~ , d , ,
quantities (ct, Uc,t. ht. yt, nt, nc,(' It. b" c7, l I ~ , t , , h;', b7, Ab,t)' and exogenolls 
stochastic process {Ac,1l jll uu,tl;:o satisfying equations (2.1) - (2.8), (2.lO), 
(2.12) - (2.14), (2.19) - (2.30), given the initial conditiolls for IT(',t-I, RI __ I , 
2.3.5 Calibration 
Here we calibrate parameters tha.t are rela.ted to entrepreneurs. \Vp set th(' 
entrepreneurs' discount factor to W = 0.98, whieh is cOllsistl'nt wit.h Ia-
coviello (2005). Also, we switch off the feature of COllSUlllptioll habit. hy 
setting E ~ ~ = O. In the intermediate goods production function, w(' sd. tlw 
income share of productioll housing to It" = 0.03, which is also cOIlsistCllt. 
with Iacoviello (2005). Following Iacoviello and ~ e r i i (2010), Wp sd t.lw loan 
to value ratio to me = 0.85, implying that the maximulll voluIlle of loalls is 
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85% of the expected value of e n t r e p r e l H ~ u r s ' ' production hOllsing. 
Entrepreneurs' preference 
The entrepreneurs' discount factor :3" 0.98 
The degree of consumption habit f' Cc () 
Intermediate goods production 
The income share of real estate /1." n.m 
The borrowing constraint 
The loan to value ratio m" 0.85 
2.3.6 Impulse response analysis 
In this section, we discuss the impulse responses of variables to various ('x-
ogenous shocks in the simple DSGE model with entrqlfl'IlPltrS. Similar wit.h 
the previous model, we consider a positive goods sector t . < ~ d l l l o l o g y y shock, 
a negative monetary policy shock, and a positive housing p r e f ( ' l " ( ' l l < " ( ~ ~ shock 
respectively. 
Goods sector technology shock Figure 2.7 shows th£' impuls(' r < ' s p o n s ( ~ s s
of variables t.o a on£' percent positive shock in goods sector tl'chnology with 
persistence of P,\c = 0.01. Similar with the result from t.11<' prf'vious 1Ilo(kl, 
the nominal interest rate and inflation dccrca'lc, whilt' output, patif'ut hOIlSI L 
holch;' consumption, and the real hOllHI' price increase. In t h ( ~ ~ hOllsiug lIlarkl't., 
the positive goods technology shock illCreH.'ies bot.h agents' demand for hOlls-
ing. The housing supply, however, is fixed, thus it. is not possibk for bot.h 
agents to have more housing. In Figuf(\ 2.7, we obs(lrv<' an increas(' ill pa-
tient households' housing and a decrease in entrepreneurs' housiug, i.('., a 
re-allocation of housing from e n t n ~ p r e l l e u r s s to patient houst'holds. This llIay 
suggest that the demand for housing from pat.ient households is stronp;t'r than 
that from entrepreneurs. One pOHHiblt' reason iH t.hat pati('ut. hOllHl'holds an' 
the owner of profit.able retail finns. I\Ieallwhile, although til<' rpal hous(' pri('(' 
is higher, til!' VOitllll(, of loans eleen'asps becausp til<' positivI' impact. of th(' 
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higher real house price is dominated by the negative impact of the !owpr ( ~ n n
treprcneurs' housing.:!':; !-.loreovcr, entreprelleurs decrea.'i(' t.heir ('0 llS 11 III pt.iol\ 
according to the optimality condition between commmpt.ioll and hOllsing. 
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses to a positive goods sector technology shock 
from the simple model with entrepreneurs. 
In Figure 2.8, we switching off the collateral effect to e x a l l l i I H ~ ~ how the 
dynamics of output is affected by setting the loan to vahw ratio to I ' : ( ~ r o , ,
me = 0, or by setting the volume of loan to a fixed level, b ~ ' ' = b' , givell it 
goods sector technology silOek. \Ve observe that output dpcreases fa.ster ill 
the model with collateral effect, because the fall in entreprelH'urs' production 
housing has a negative impact on output. Therefore, we ohserve the finan-
cial decelerator effect a.'> the VOhllllP of loans is reduced by t.he d(,(T('as(' ill 
entrepreneurs' production housing, although the real hOllse price is risillg.: lti 
:1;'We can also say that the lowpr e n t n ~ p r ! ' l I e u r s s housing is cf\llsl'd hy a lowl'r VOIIlIlH' of 
loans. Because model variables are deterlllined ~ i r n i l i t a l l e o l l s l y y in DSGE n10dpis alld t hp), 
interact wit h each ot hers. a dl'ar causality i ~ ~ difficult to ddirl<'. 
:1'iThe financial accPierator effect s u g g l ' s t ~ ~ that. in order to amplify nnd propal4atl' till' 
impacts of the shock. the borrowing constraint should hI' rPiaxpd. gin'lI till' high!'r rl'al 
lIou,;p prices. 
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Figure 2.8: Impulse response output to a positive goods sector technology 
shock from the simple model with entrepreneurs. The solid line is from 
the baseline calibration m e = 0.85, the dashed line is from the alternative 
calibration me = 0, and the dotted line is from bT = be. 
Monetary policy shock Figure 2.9 shows the impulse responses of vari-
ables to a one percent negative monetary shock with persistence of Purr = 
0.01. Similar with the results from the simple model, a negative monetary 
policy shock causes a lower nominal interest rate, a higher output, a higher 
patient households' consumption and a higher real house price. In the hous-
ing market, while both households demand more housing, reflected by a rising 
real house price, there is a re-allocation of housing from patient households 
to entrepreneurs, suggesting that entrepreneurs are more competitive in the 
housing market than patient households. One of the possible reasons is that 
pati nt households switch resource from housing sector to goods sector in or-
der to have a higher consumption. Therefore, the volume of loans increases 
as both real house price and entrepreneurs' produ tion housing are high r. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs incr ase their consumption because of a lower 
real interest rate and a higher housing. 
In Figure 2.10, we examine the impact of the collateral ffect given a 
goods sector technology hock. We observe that output takes I nger to return 
to its steady state in the model with collateral effect, because the rise in 
entrepreneurs' production housing has a further positive impact on output . 
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Figure 2.9: Impulse response to a negative monetary policy shock from the 
simple model with entrepreneurs. 
Therefore, given a monetary policy shock, we observe the financial accelerator 
effect , which amplifies and propagates the impacts of the shock. 
Housing preference shock Figure 2.11 shows the impulse responses of 
variables to a one percent positive housing preferenc shock with per istcnce 
of Pj = 0.01. In the simple model, only real house price r ponds to the hous-
ing preference shock. In contrast , other variabl s also l' spond to this shock 
in this model. A higher patient households' housing preference indicates a 
higher utility from housing, thus they demand more housing, while entrepre-
neurs is not affected as they do not gain ut ili ty from housing. Therefore, we 
observe an increase in patient households' housing and a decrease in ent re-
preneurs' housing, i.e., a transfer of housing from entrepreneurs to patient 
households. As the housing preference shock does not bring extra resource to 
the economy, patient households need to shift their resource from consump-
t ion to housing and entrepren urs hay more resour e for consumption by 
Chapter 2 50 
''''''' 
.. " 
'!-, - - - ! - - - + - - - - ! - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - ; - - - - - ; . . - ---t----
Figure 2.10: Impulse response out put to a negative mon tary policy shock 
from the simple model with nt r preneurs. The solid line is from the baseline 
calibration me = 0.85, the dashed line is from the alternative calibrat ion 
m e = 0, and the dotted line is from bf = be. 
selling housing. The total impa t on output is posit ive as the posit iv im-
pact of ent repreneurs consumption dominates th negative impa t of patient 
hous holds consumption. 
2.3.7 Sensitivity analysis 
In t hi section, we xamine how the impulse responses of variables are affected 
by changing the values of som parameters, given a posit ive goods ector 
technology shock. We first consider an alternative mon tary policy, and 
then examine various values of the loan to valu rat io. 
Alternative monetary policy rule Here we di cuss how the dyn mi s 
are affect d if th central bank reacts to inflation only by setting the weight 
co fficients on output to ¢y = O. Figure 2.12 show th impul r sponses of 
variable to a goods technology shock with persistenc of PAc = 0.01 under 
two differ nt monetary policy rul s. Similar with th r ::>ul ts from the simp! 
model, when th nominal intere t rat doe ' not adjust for outpu t, it d 
crease more in r pond to the negative inflat ion, thus the positiv respon . 
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Figure 2.11: Impulse responses to a positive housing preferece shock from 
the simple model with entrepreneurs. 
of output, patient hou eholds' consumption and the real house price are 
strengthened. There is, however, a big change in the housing market. When 
the central bank does not pay attention to output, the direction of housing 
movement is reversed: entrepreneurs' housing rises and patient households' 
housing falls. The possible r ason is that, given a lower real interest rate, 
patient households increase their current consumption and thus their com-
petitiveness in the housing market is weakened . As a result of the higher en-
trepr neurs' production housing and the higher r a l house price, we observe a 
higher volume of loans, which in t urn increases entrepreneurs' consumpt ion. 
Meanwhile, the higher entrepreneurs' production housing has a fur t her pos-
itiv impact on output. This is the financial accelerator effect, and we argue 
that, in the simple model with entrepreneurs, given a p sitive technology 
shock, the existence of this mechanism is sensitive to the parameter in the 
monetary policy rule. 
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Figure 2.12: Impulse responses to a po itive goods sector technology shock 
under the alternative monetary policy rule from the simple model with en-
trepreneurs. The solid line is from the baseline calibration cPy = 0.5 and the 
dashed line is from the alternative calibration cPy = O. 
Chapter 2 53 
Variation in the loan to value ratio Finally, we examine how the dy-
namics are affected by changing the value of t he loan to value ratio. Figure 
2.13 and Figure 2.14 show the impulse responses of variables to a goods tech-
nology shock with persistence of PA c = 0.01 for a higher loan to value rat io, 
mi = 0.95, and a lower ratio, mi = 0.75, respectively. 
The main impact of the change in the loan to value ratio is on the housing 
market . Theoretically, if the housing assets that borrowers are buying are 
constant, a higher loan to value ratio leads to a higher volume of loans. In 
our model, however, borrowers have less housing assets, thus a higher (lower) 
loan to value ratio implies a larger (smaller) decrease in t he volume of loans. 
Meanwhile, it increases (decreases) the transfer of housing from entrepreneurs 
to patient households. Besides, according to the optimality condition, the 
decrease in the entrepreneurs' consumption is strengthened (weakened) 
I 
e 9 10 
Figure 2.13: Impulse respons s to a positiv goods sector technology shock 
under various values of the loan to value rat io from the simple model with 
entrepreneurs. Th solid line is from the baselin calibrat ion m e = 0.85 and 
the dashed line is from the alternative alibration rn = 0.95. 
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Figure 2.14: Impul e r sponses to a positive goods sector technology shock 
under various values of th loan to value ratio from the simple model with 
entrepreneurs. The solid line is from the bas line calibrat ion m e = 0.85 and 
the dash d lin is from the alt rnative alibration m e = 0.75. 
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2.4 The simple model with impatient households 
In this section, we add another type of agents, impati('nt households, into 
the simple model. The similarity between impatient housPllOlds and entn'pw-
neurs is that both of them take loans from patimlt households and thus fa('(' 
a borrowing constraint. The difference, however, is that, while e n t n ~ p r m t e u r s s
demand production housing and rent it to intermediate goods finns, impa-
tient households demand domestic housing and ga.in utility from it, thus we 
refer this case as 'borrowing to live'. This type of agents are also cOllsidewd 
in Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and ~ e r i i (2010). 
2.4.1 Impatient households 
Impatient households are infinitely lived and of mccl.'mre onc. Similar with 
patient households, they COnSUlIle final goods, demand domestic housing, 
and supply labour. In the credit market, impatient house' holds aiso takl' 
loans from patient households and usc their domestic housing a.-; collateral. 
Compared to entrepreneurs, patient households do Hot acclllllula.te' factors 
of production, thus we may not. be able t.o discuss t.11I' financial acc('ll'J"ator 
mechanism in t.his model because t.he volume of loans is not diwctly link('d 
to output anymore. J ' 
Impatient. households also maximise lifetime ut.ility suhject to their bud-
get constraint and the borrowing constraint. Their lifetime utility functi()\l 
IS 
where a superscript i denotes variables a.'"lsociatml with impatient households: 
{3' is impatient households' discount factor, c; is impatient hOllsdlOlds' ("oil-
sumption, ~ ; : : is the degree of consumption habit for impatiellt households, r; 
:17 If we assllme that borrowers have a higher preference Oil hOllsing t han l e l l d l ' r ~ , , Wt' Iliay 
oiJsef\'p a feedback loop bet ween t he real housing pri('(' and t h!' ,'oll/I/Ie of luall";; h igllt'l' 
real hOl/se prices loo,;en the borrowing constraint, and lPad ttl a higlll'r vol 1/1/11' of loans, 
which ill turn raises tlw demand for hOllsing and the real hOlls!' pri!'t,,,; fllrtil!'r. 
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is a scaling factor, h ~ ~ is impat.ient households' domest.ic housing, n; is sup-
ply of impat.ient households' labour, and -+ is t.he Fisher ela."it.idty of labour 
"Y" 
s u p p l y . 3 ~ ~ For simplicit.y, we assume that impatient households' weight OIl 
domest.ic housing is same as patient household's, 
·i . 
J/ = Jt (2.31) 
Therefore, a housing preference shock will affect bot.h households' demand 
for housing. 
Given the ut.ility function, the impatient households' marginal utility of 
consumption is 
i _ ri 1 
uct - .' .' , ecl l 1 
t - CCCt _ 1 
(2.:32) 
which expresses the marginal utility of consumption l l ~ , 1 1 in t(mns of lagged, 
current, and future consumption. 
The impatient. households' shows that the real total expellse (LHS) should 
be no more than the real total income (RHS), and is expwssed CI."i 
(2.:33) 
where hti is the volume of loans taken frolll l ) a t i ( ~ n t t households, and Il , _ I h' tr",1 1 -- I 
is the real repayment for the previous loans. \Ve aSSUllH' that impatient 
households do not own the profitable retail goO(i:-; firms and thus tlH',Y do not 
receive profit. 
The impatient households' real borrowing constraiut IS 
(2.:34) 
which implies that t.he (gross) real return of borrowing, E/ ( . / ~ I . . I ) h;, is fully 
secured by a fraction of t.he expected value of domestic housing, 11/ i EI (qll,1 t 1 Ii; ), 
;'XTlw conditiun 3' < :1 ~ ~ A ~ ~ > O. whprt' A ~ ~ is the La!!;rHnp;t' lllllltiplil'I' Oil tlw \.oITo\\'inp; 
constraint. implies that the borro",inp; constraint is 
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where rni is the loan to value ratio. 
We obtain three first order conditions from the impatient households util-
ity maximisation problem.;l!) Firstly, the impatient households' Euler ( ~ q l l a a
tion is 
i (3i R t i i 
Uct = --'llct+1 + Abt 
, 7r ' , 
c,t+! 
(2.35) 
where Ab,t is the Lagrange multiplier 011 the borrowing constraint. The de-
scription of this equation is similar with that of entrepreneurs' Euler equation, 
i.e., given one more unit of borrowing, the marginal gain ill terms of current 
consumption is equal to the sum of the marginal cost in tertllS of futurt' 
consumption and the marginal cost of tightening the borrowing ('onstraint . 
Secondly, the equation that governs the impatient households' labour 
supply is 
(2.36) 
which implies that the marginal disutility of labour supply at t is equal t.o 
the real wage in terms of the marginal ut.ility consumption at t. 
Thirdly, the equation that governs patient households' demand for do-
mestic housing is 
(2.37) 
This is a non-standard form of housing d('mand equat.ion.1Il This equat.ion 
implies that the real house price in terms of the rna.rginal utility of consllIup-
tion at t is equa.l to the sum of three component; (i) the n m r ~ i l l a l l utility of 
domestic housing at t, (ii) the expected real house priee (for resale) ill t ( ~ r t I l S S
of the discounted marginal utility of consumption at t + 1, and (iii) th(' mar-
ginal benefit of relaxing the borrowing constraint by holding one lllOf(' unit 
f 1 . \ i i (qh t '-\11' c t , \ ) 1 1 l' .. I I o lOusmg, Ab,tm 'HI' , w lere t IP )orrowmg constralllt. IS ()()SCIH'( 
b i (% t ' [11' r t , I ) 't 1 tl l' 1 . fl' I I . ym 'HI ' UIll anc Ie s laC ow pnce 0 OOSt'llll1g t 1(' )OIT()WllI),'; 
:!'IThe impatient houspllOl(h' utility Illaximisation prohl!'nl is shown in App!'uclix. 
lOIf tlw borroing constraint is not binding, >';,,1 = 0, WI' 11l\\'!' tlH' stadnard fOl'lll ill' 
hOllsing demand equation, ll;·,tQh,1 = 'k + .j'u:·,/+lq",t+I' 
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constraint by one more unit is . . \ ~ , t ' '
2.4.2 Goods production sector 
Intermediate goods firms Since impatient households also provide lahour 
to intermediate goods firms, the intermediate goods production fuuction he-
comes 
Y. = A (n }"JJ-n (ni ) (l-n)JJ- .. te,l c,t e,1 ( 2 . ; ~ ~ ) )
where ne,t is the patient households' labour, n ~ . t t is till' impatient households' 
labour, /In is the labour share of output, n is the patient housdlOlds' sharp 
of labour income, and 1 - () is impatient households' share of lahour inCOlIH'. 
The intermediate goods firms' real profit. maximbmt.ion probkm heCOlIles 
where it Ye,l is the real total revenue, 11'/ !te,t is the rea.l cost. of p a t i ( ~ l l t t housl'-
holds' labour, and w : n ~ ~ t is the real cost of impatient how.,eholds' labour. 
-, 
\Ve obtain two first order conditions from the intermediate ~ o ( ) d s s firms' 
profit maximisation problem. Firstly, the equation that governs tlH' illtprllll'-
diate goods producers' demand for patient households' labour is 
(2.39) 
which indicates that the real wage of patifmt households' labour (i.e .. til{' 
real marginal cost) is equal to the marginal product of pati(mt. hOl\sdlOlds' 
labour. 
Secondly, the equatioIl that governs the intermediate ~ o ( ) d s s produ("('1"s' 
demand for impatient households' labour is 
. 1; 1/'; = (1 - tt) 11n--j-
Z/Tl r ,/ 
(2.Hl) 
which indicates that the real w a ~ e e of impaticnt households' labo\ll' is ('qual 
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to the marginal product of impatient households' labour. 
2.4.3 Market clearing conditions 
The loans market clearing condition is 
(2.41) 
which indicates that the supply of loans from patient households is equal 
to the demand for loans from impatient households, and thus tll<' total lIet 
savmg IS zero. 
The economy-wide resource constraint or the goods market dl'arillg COIl-
dition is 
Yt. = Ct + c; (2.42) 
which indicates that final goods an' consumed by both pat kilt households 
and impatient households. 
To facilitate the summary of this model ill the next section, we rl'pmt 
the market clearing conditioll for patient households' labour, 
The market clearing condition for impatient households' labour is 
(2.44) 
which indicates that the supply of impatient households' labour is ( ~ < j l l a l l to 
the intermediate goods firms' demand for impatient hOllscholcls' labour. 
The housing market clearing condition is 
(2.tS) 
which indicates that the fixed housing supply H are occupied hy hoth patiellt 
households and impatient hous('holds. 
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2.4.4 Equilibrium 
An equilibrium is an allocation of prices (7T e,h RIl (Je,1> qh,r, Wt, Zt, "1, q::;,I, II'!), 
quantities (Ct, ue,t. hI, Y;, nt, ne,l, fl, btl c ~ , , u;;,t, It;, T l ~ , , n ~ , , , , b;, A ~ , t , , j;), and 
exogenous stochastic process {Ae,t, jt, lln,d:o satisfying equations (2.1) -
(2.8), (2.10), (2.12) - (2.14), (2.31) - (2.45), given the initial conditions for 
ITe,I-I, Rt-t. Ct-\, d-\, h;'_\, b;_\. 
2.4.5 Calibration 
In the section, we calibrate the additional parameters in til(' silllPil' modd 
with impatient households. Following Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we set ttl!' 
impatient households' discount factor to ,B i = 0.97. Similar with patient 
households, the impatient households' labour schedule is also a..c.;sumed to be 
fiat, ' Y ~ ~ = 0.01. Besides, we also switch off the feature of COIlSUlllptioll habit 
for impatient households by setting :::: = O. In addition, similar with patient 
households, the impatient households' wight 011 housing is set to j' = 0.12. 
Impatient households' preference 
The impatient households' discount factor 
The inverse of the elasticity of labour supply 
The degree of consumption habit 
The weight on housing 
~ , ,
:" 
(),!)7 
(),01 
o 
0.12 
Secondly, in the intermediate goods production function, we aSSUllW that 
the patient households' share of labour income is n = 0.79, then the impatient 
households' share of labour income is 1 - a = 0.21. In addition, we set the 
loan to value ratio to m' = 0.85, implying that the maximulll volume of 
loans is 85% of the expected value of impatient households' d O l l H ~ s t i ( ' ' housillg. 
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These values are consistent with Iacoviello and l\;eri (2010). 
Intermediate goods production 
The labour income share of patient households It D.79 
The labour income share of impatient households 1 - n D.21 
The borrowing constraint 
The loan to value ratio fII,i 0.85 
2.4.6 Impulse response analysis 
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In this section, we discuss the impulse responses of variables to various ex-
ogenous shocks in the simple model with impatient households. Similar with 
the simple model, we consider a positive goods sector technology shock, a 
positive monetary policy shock, and a positive housing prderC'nce shock f"(L 
spectivciy. 
Goods sector technology shock Figurc 2.15 shows the impulse n'SI)(HlSl'S 
of variables to a one percent positive shock in goods sector technology with 
persistence of PAc = 0.01. Similar with the results from the simple Illo(h'l, 
the nominal interest rate and inflation decrea.'le, whilp output, patient \toust L 
holds' consumption, and the real house price increase. In til<' housing lIHtrk('f" 
the positive goods technology shock increases both households' demand for 
housing, but they cannot both have a high(lr housing due to a fixed hOlls-
ing supply. In Figure 2.15, we observe a re-allocation of housing from im-
patient households to patient households, sllggesting that the demand for 
housing from patient households dominates that from impatient hOllsdlOlds. 
As we discussed in the previous model, it lllay be possible that patient hOIiSt L 
holds own profitable retail firms. Meanwhile, although the real hOllS(, pric(' 
is higher, we observe a decrea..'le in the volume of loans lwntl1s(' t.!H' (>osith'<, 
impact of the higher real house price is dominated by til(' Iwgati\'(' illlpact of 
the lower impatient households' housing. Furthermore, s i l l c ( ~ ~ their hOllsiu!!; 
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has decreased, the optimality condition implies that impatient households 
decrease th ir consumption as well. 
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Figur 2_15: Impulse r ponses to a positive goods sector t chnology shock 
from the imple model with impatient households. 
By switching off the collateral effe t, Figure 2.16 shows that, ince impa-
tient households has a higher propensity to spend, a d crease in the volume 
of loans will have a negative impact on output. How ver, since impatient 
households do not accumulat factors of pradu tions, the decrcase in the 
volume of loans has little impact on the output from th .'econd quarter. 
Monetary policy shock Figure 2.17 shows the impu] of vari-
abIes to a one percent negative mon 
0.01. Similar with th results from the simple model, a negative mone-
tary policy shock causes a lower nominal int re t rat , a higher output, a 
higher pati nt households' can umption, and a highcr real h use pri . In 
the housing market, while both hous holds demand mol' housing, refle t d 
by th ri ing real hou pri e, ther is a re-allocation of housing from patient 
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Figure 2.16: Impulse response output to a positive goods sector technology 
shock from the simple model with impatient households. Th solid line is 
from the baseline calibration mi = 0.85, the dashed line is from the alterna-
tive calibration m i = 0, and the dotted line is from b ~ ~ = bi • 
households to impatient households, suggesting that impatient households 
are more competitive in the housing market than patient households. Sim-
ilar with the previous model, it is possible that patient households transfer 
resource from housing s ctor to goods sector. In addition, the volume of 
loans increases as both real house price and impati nt households' housing 
are higher. Furthermore, impatient households increas their consumption 
because of a lower real interest rate and a higher housing. 
Figure 2.18 shows that the dynamics of output do not has an obvious 
change when w switch off the collateral effect. Therefore, a higher volume of 
loans pushes output slightly since impatient households has higher propensity 
to consume. However, since they do not accumulate factor of production, the 
dynamics of output are not affected obviously. 
Housing preference shock Figure 2.19 shows the impulse responses of 
variables to a one percent positive housing pre5 ren shock with persist nee 
of Pj = 0.01. In the housing market, when both households have a higher 
preference on housing, the real hous price is pushed up and we observe a 
transfer of housing from patient hou eholds to impatient households, indicat-
Chapter 2 
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Figure 2.17: Impul e respon es to a positive monetary poli .y shock from the 
simple model with impatient households . 
• ~ , - - - - ~ - - - - 7 - - - ~ ~ - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - 7 7 - - - - ~ - - - . .
Figure 2.18: Impulse response output to a negativ mon ·tary policy shock 
from the simple model with impatient households. Th' solid lin is from 
the baseline calibration m i = O. 5, th dashed line i from t he alternative 
calibration m i = 0, and th dotted line is from bi = bi. 
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ing that impatient households ' demand for housing is stronger. Moreover, as 
the housing preference shock does not bring extra resource to the economy, 
impatient households need to reduce their consumption to purchase housing, 
while patient households shift their resource from housing to consumption. 
The higher impatient households' housing and the h i g g e ~ ~ house price lead 
to a larger volume of loans. Output decreases because the negative impact 
of impatient households' consumption is larger than the positive impact of 
patient households' . In sum, the positive housing preference shock leads to 
a re-allocation of housing from patient households to impatient households, 
higher house price, and a lower output. Therefore, compared to the previ-
ous model, a housing preference shock has different impacts on output (and 
consumption) . 
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Figure 2.19: Impuls response to a positive housing preferen shock frollJ 
the simple model with impati nt hou holds. 
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2.4.7 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we examine how the impulse responses of variahlps a n ~ ~ affpcted 
by changing the Values of some parameters, given a positive goods s('dor 
technology shock. We first consider an alternative monetary policy rule, and 
then examine various values of the loan to value ratio. 
Alternative monetary policy rule Hew we discuss the impact Oil the 
dynamics if the central bank reacts to inflation only by settiug the weight 
coefficients on output to rPy = o. Figure 2.20 shows that the impulse responses 
of variables to a goods technology shock with persistenc(' of PAl' = 0.01 
under two different monetary policy rules. Similar with the results from tIl<' 
simple model, when the nominal interest rate does not adjust for the higher 
output, it decrea<;es more to r e ~ " p o l l d d to the negative inflation. Therefore, 
we observe further rises in output, patient households' ('onslllllption, and the 
real house price. In the housing market, under givpu a l o w ( ~ r r n ~ a l l i l l t ( ~ r ( ' s t t
rate, patient households switch resource from housing sector 1,0 goods s ( ~ c t o r r
to increase current consumption. As a result, patient hOllseholds' housing 
increa'les less, and thus impatient households' housing and the' v o l u l l l ( ~ ~ of 
loans deerease less. Meanwhile, given their optimality conditiou, impatiput 
households' eousllmption decrea"es less a" wpll. In sum, this altprnativ(' 
monetary policy rule reduces t.he competitivlnleSS of patient. hous('holds ill 
the housing market, making impatient housPllolds less worse off. 
Variation in the loan to value ratio Xext, we examine how dynamics 
are affected by changing the V'alue of the loan to value rat.io. Figure 2.21 
and Figure 2.22 show tlw impulse responses of variables to a goods tedmol-
ogy shock with persistence of PAc = 0.01 givell a higher loan to vallI<' ratio, 
mi = 0.95, and a lower one, mi = 0.75, f('sp('ctiveiy. Till' main impact of 
a change in the loall to value ratio is OIl the housing lllark('t. \VI1('n illl-
patiC'Ilt households have less housing, a high('r (lowt'r) loan to value ratio 
s t n ~ n g t h e l l s s (weakens) the decrea<;es in tIl<' VOhUllC' of loans. l\lc'ilmvhil<" it 
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Figure 2.20: Impulse r ponses to a positive good s ctor t chnology shock 
under alternative monetary policy from the simple mod I with impatient 
households. The solid line i from the bas line alibrat i n ¢y = 0.5 and the 
dashed line is from the alternative alibration ¢y = o. 
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increases (decreases) the transfer of housing from impa tient households to pa-
tient households. In addition, similar with entrepreneurs, the decrease in the 
impatient households' consumption is strengthened (weakened), suggested 
by the optimality condition between consumption and housing. 
: j ~ - - - - - , , 1 :ic::------ l 
1 2 3 4 5 8 0 10 1 2 3 4 5 e 7 I) 10 
Figure 2.21: Impulse responses to a positive goods s ctor t chnology shock 
under various value of the loan to value ratio from the simple model with 
impatient households. The solid line is from the baseline calibrat ion m i = 
0.85 and the dashed line is from the alternative calibration mi = 0.95. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we discuss the dynamics of the real house price and the 
impact of credit market imper£ ctions in a simple DSGE mod I with a fixed 
housing supply. We consider various exogenous shocks and examine how the 
dynamics are affected by changing the values of sev ral parameter. 
Firstly, our con ider a simple DSGE mod I with sticky prices. Our llll-
pul e response analysi suggest that the real house pric r ponds posit ively 
to a positive goods sector technology hock or a negative monetary policy 
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Figur 2.22: Impul e res pons s to a po itive good sector technology shock 
under various value of the loan to value ra tio from th simpl mod I with 
impatient households. The solid line is from the baseline aJibra tion m i = 
0.85 and the dashed line is from the alt rnative calibration mi = 0.75. 
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shock, and is the only variable that responds to a housing preference shock. 
Moreover, given a positive goods sector technology, our sensitivity analysis 
suggests that, while the feature of consumption habit mainly affects consulllp-
tion and output, the dynamics of the real house price are affected largely by 
the feature of price indexation and the alternative monetary policy rule. 
Our second model considers both patient households and eIltrepWIlPurs. 
Entrepreneurs take loans from patient households using their production 
housing as collateral, and we refer this ea'le as 'borrowing to iuvest'. Our 
impulse response analysis suggests that (i) tlw financial accelerator effect is 
not observed given a goods sector technology shock, but appears giv(,Il a 
monetary policy shock; (U) a housing preference shock lpa<is to it <kcrea .. .,(' 
ill the volume of loans. Furthermore, given a goods sector tedmology shock, 
our sensitivity analysis suggests that (i) the alternative monetary policy rille 
reverses the dynamics: there is an increa"e in the volume of loans, thus w(' 
have the financial accelerator effect; (ii) a higher loan to value ratio strc'ngth-
ens the re-allocation of housing and leads to a larger decrease ill til(' vohunc 
of loans. 
Our third model considers both patient households and impatieIlt hous('--
holds. Impatient households take loans from patient households llsing their 
domestic housing a'l collateral, and we refer this case as 'borrowing to live'. 
\Ve find that the financial accelerator effect is not observ('d ill this Illodel. 
Our impulse response analysis suggests that (i) a. positive goods sl'dor tl'ch-
nology shock leads to a decrease in the volumes of loans; (ii) a IH'gatiV<' 
monetary policy shock lowers the volume of loans; (iii) a housing prd'erellc(' 
shock leads to a re-allocation of housing from patient hOllseholds to impa-
tient households and an increase ill the volume of loans. l\Iof('ovcr, giwll 
a positive goods sector technology, our s('nsitivity analysis s u g g ( ~ s t s s that (i) 
the alternative monetary policy rule weakens the re-allocatioll of housing and 
leads to a smaller d('crease in the volume of loans; (ii) a high('r loctll to vahw 
ratio strengthens the re-allocation of honsing and leads to a larg('r dpCl'eas(' 
in the volume of loans. 
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2.A Appendix to Chapter 2 
2.A.l Lagrangian program for patient household 
Patient households maximise utility subjcct to their budget const.raint., 
00 
max ElL 
c/,b/,nt,ht k=O 
2.A.2 Lagrangian program for entrepreneurs 
Entreprencurs maximise utility subject to their budget constraint and t.iH'ir 
borrowing constraint, 
2.A.3 Lagrangian program for impatient households 
Impatient households maximise utility subject to tlwir hudppt constraint and 
their borrowing constraint, 
. i i + Ii + t' W1+kTl t + k C/It.l+k 11_1+1.: J1+k 
.i I i II, - I . k I i 
-( I+k - (j1t,I+k ll+k - --)1 I' k 1T {" It"'. r 
+ \i ('JI)k (. ('Ih,t,I,kh;tk'lr,,t.I.k')' _/i.) Ab,t+k ,J III. a',k ) I t ~ · ·
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2.A.4 The stochastic discount factor 
From the patient households' Euler equation, the inverse of real interest r a t < ~ ~
at time t is 
E t (7f c,t+ 1) = Et (a I1c ,t+ 1 ) Rt ?Lc,t 
which is used to discount profit at time t + 1. Furthermore, t l l l ~ ~ inverse of 
real interest rate at time t + 1 is 
E ( 7fC,t+2) _ E (I]UCJ+2) t+1 -- - t+-1 ,J--RI+1 U(',I+I 
Therefore, the product of the inverse of real interest rate from period t to 
t + k is 
This is the stochastic discount factor. While we use l' to discount utility, 
we use At.t+k to discount profit in terms of utility. Xot(' that AI,f = 1. 
2.A.5 The aggregate nominal price level 
We know that a fraction () of retailers are not abll' to reset. price in ppriod 
t. But we know that, among these retailen" we know that a fract.ioll H of 
retailers reset their prices in period t - 1, i.e., a fractioJl () (1 - f)) of retailers 
use the optimal price from the previous period. Following the S a I l l < ~ ~ logic, W(' 
can rewrite the aggregate price in terms of the optimal price in period t - k, 
A: = O. 1. 2, 3 ... 
I 
pc.t ((1 - ()) (p;'t) 1-;: + 0 (1 - (j) ( p , ~ t - d d I - ~ ~ + ()"2 (1 - 0) ( p ( ~ t t -:.l) J ". + ... ) j" 
(Pc,t)l-o = ( 1 - ( ) ) ( p : ' t ) I - : : + e ( 1 - 0 ) ( p ( ~ t _ I ) J - ' + ( P ( l - O ) ( I ~ ~ t t :.l)J + .. . 
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Backward one period, gives 
Multiply both sides by B, gives 
( ) 1-10 B( B) ( * )1-< :.! ( B) (p. )1-0 3 ( ) (p* )1-., B Pc,t-l = 1 - Pc,t +() 1 - c,t-I +() 1 - f) c,t:.! + ... 
Then use (Pc,d 1-10 to replace all terms before t - 1 in the previous equation, 
gives 
(PC,d 1- E = (1 - B) (p(:tf- O + e (Pc,t_d l - C 
I 
Pr.,t [(1- B) (p(:tf- O + (}(Pc,t_d l - E ] I=< 
2.A.6 The steady state values from the simple model with entre-
preneurs 
In order to solve the model, we lwcd following steady stat(l ratios: q,t', I/I{, 
Ii!. ~ ~ ~ ~ .£ 2ll.!!: h' 
qh' YO' yo' YO' YO' h' 
From the patient households' Euler equation, the steady stat,(' vahl(' of 
nominal iuterest rate is the inverse of the' patient hOllseholds' discollnt factor, 
1 R=-j 
From the entrepreneurs' Euler equation, we have 
A ~ ~ = I L ~ ~ (1 - (l"R) 
This equation suggests that the borrowing constraint is binding sinC(' j" < 
3 ¢:> A ~ ~ > O. 
From the intermediate goods production demand for housing, \VI' hav(' 
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~ ~the steady state value of y , 
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From the entrepreneurs' demand for housing, we have the steady state 
value of 9h he and 9.=. Y q,,' 
q he q.he 1 
_h_ = Be • 
y . Y 1-(ae (1-rn)+mjJ) 
and 
qz 1 - (;3" (1 - rn) + mi1) 
= 
From the entrepreneurs' borrowing constraint, we have' the steady st.at.e 
, be be 
value of q"h P and y' 
and 
be be qhh" 
=----
Y qhh" Y 
From the entrepreneurs' budget constraint, we have til(' s t . < ~ a . d y y s t a t ( ~ ~ value 
of ~ , ,
c
e 
= q)/," (1 _ ~ ) ) fl' 
Y Y + /1 Y 
From the goods market clearing condition, Wp have the steady state valne 
of f, 
C ce 
- = 1--Y Y 
From the patient households' demand for housing, we haw til(' st('a<iy 
state value of ¥, 
qhh J C 
=---
Y 1- 3Y 
Combining the steady state vdlue of q;'.," and ¥, WI' itaw titl' stpad,v 
state value of ' ~ ~ , 
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2.A.7 The steady state values from the simple model with impa-
tient households 
In order to solve the model, we need following steady state ratios: ~ , , '11:.:", 
bi w'n' wn Y c h 
;;1, ~ , , 7' ;;r, &' hl-
From the patient households' Euler equation, the steady state value of 
nominal interest rate is the inverse of the patient households' discount factor, 
1 R=73 
From the patient households' demand for housing, we haw the steady 
state value of 'l.!!.!!:., 
c 
From the impatient households' Euler equation, we hav(' 
This equation suggests that the impatient households' borrowing constraint 
is binding since . . \ . ~ ~ > 0 ¢:} /J i < /3. 
From the impatient households' demand for housing, we havt' s t . ( ~ a d y y st.at.(' 
value of qc7' , 
qhh i j' 
c; (1 - (ji) - (1 _3; R) 7i 
From the impatient households' borrowing constraint, w(' have till' st.pady 
state value of bh' i, 'lh 
bi 1 
qhhi = m'R 
Combininrr the steady state value of ~ h ' 'I and '/hil' we hav(' til<' st.('ad.v h qh ('I , 
state value of !4, 
c 
c i q"hi d 
From the impatient household budget cOllstraint, we haw t.1ll' st.pady st.at(' 
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value of W l ~ ' ' , 
C 
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From the intermediate goods firms' demand for labour from impatient 
households, we have the steady state value of w ~ n i i , 
wini (l-n)Pn 
y Z 
Combining the steady state value of W ; ~ I ' ' and W ~ l l , , we have th(' steady 
y 
state value of i, 
c 
Y uln i Uhli 
ci =7/Y 
From the goods marker clearing condition, we have til<' steady state vahl(' 
of .E.-
e' , (' Y 
- = --1 ('i ci 
Combining the steady state value of q : ~ l l l , ¥and 7' we have tlw stl'ady 
state value of !f, 
hi ~ ~
r' 
h 'lh.!!.E.-
c c' 
2.A.8 The difference between sticky prices and flexible prices 
In models without sticky prices, the retailers' real profit. maximisatioll prob-
lem is 
where At t+k = Et (rjk- Ilc.,. k) is the stocha."itic discount. factor, which is IIsed 
" !.te,t 
to discount profit in terms of consumption, PW(',t is th{' !Iolllinal pric(' of 
intermediate goods, and 1 1 ) ~ c ' t t is the real pric(' of inteflllcdiat.(' goods, EV<'ry 
c,t • 
retailer is able to set a price P,:'t (.:;) to ma.ximise tht· expect.pd profits ill this 
period, by a."lslIlning the probability of fixed price to () = n, 
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Substituting the individual retailer's output, Y ~ + k k (.::), by t l l ( ~ ~ individual 
demand curve in the profit maximisation problem, we have 
The first order condition derived from the retailers' real profit max lIlll-
sation problem is the equation of the real optimal price, and it is expn'ssed 
[A Y. (Pc, r ~ ~] e 1.1 t P t ['. t 
Qc,1 = E c, I, (2.46) 
-1 I ()l-C E - A Y Pc,1 -
I,t t Pc.t 
Qc,t 
e Pwc,t (2.47) = ----
e - 1 Pc,t 
in which we define the real optimal priee as Q(',I = ~ ~ ' : : . . This l'quation illlplips 
that the optimal price set in period t depends on the real pric(' of interull'cliatp 
d P * - E P 41 goo S, c,t - E:-l we,t· 
Then nominal price level can also be writ t.en as 
( 2 . 4 ~ ) )
t.hus markup is fixed, 
Z _ Pc,l _ e t------
PWC •I E - 1 
and also the the real optimal price, 
Ptl 
ctcl=-' =1 
" p
c
•t 
In this case, we are not able to derive the New KeYIwsian C U f \ f ( ~ ~ that. liuks 
t he nominal variables to real variables. 
"If t Ill' monopolist ie l'ompetitiv(' firms an' intprtllPriiatp !!;ood:; firl\l:;. t III' opt illlal n;al 
pri('p will depends 011 t he real marginal ('osts. 
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Note that we still have a positive markup in the model since we have mo-
nopolistic competition. In contra.<;t, under perfect competition, the Pla.sticity 
of substitution between differentiated varieties is infinity, c = 00, thus the 
markup is one, Zt = 1. 
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3 An Examination of the Direct Effect and 
the Feedback Effect from the Variable Hous-
ing Supply 
3.1 Introduction 
The housing sector is important to the economy, but it has been ignored in 
business cycle analysis for a long time. A recent paper that treats hOllsing 
as alternative market goods is written by Davis and Heathcote (2005). Th('y 
consider a multi-sector model featuring hOllsing production. In tlwir reprl'-
scntative agents model, housing producers combine honsing capital and land 
to produce new housing, and households gain utility from both consllIllI}-
tion and housing. Their model can explain the dynamics of housing capital 
investment well but not the dynamics of the house p r i ( " f ~ . .
\Vhen researchers have raiscd concerns over credit market imperfections, 
an important reason for considering housing a..'l altematiw goods is that it can 
be used as collateral of loan in the credit market. Iamvidlo and Neri (2010) 
estimate a two-sector model featuring Ilominal rigidities awl credit mark('t 
frictions and they find that the main reason for tlw p<'rsistent incwas(' in 
house price is slow technological progress in new housing production. In their 
heterogeneous agents model, impatient households take loawi from patient 
households but they nel-xi to use housing as collateral beeauHc of credit market 
imperfections, thus their borrowing constraints are related to the value of 
their housing a..""''iets. 
Following this work, various versions of Iacoviello and ~ l ' r i i (2010) 1Il0 til' I 
have been widely used, such as Notarpietro (2007), Pari('s and Xotarpi!'tro 
(2008), Kalman, Rabanal and Scott (2009), Christensen et a1. (2009), S('llill 
and Walentin (2010), and, in particular, the settings of tlw honsing Illarkd 
are similar. We refer this setting a..'l 'the st.andard setting of ttH' housing mar-
ket', which assumes that every household trades hOllsing in a giv!'n period. 
\V<, cOllsider this standard setting in our lWllchmark model, which is a silllpit' 
OSGE model with the feature of sticky prices and hOllsing production. Aft!'r 
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introducing a new housing production, we are able to discllss tlw supply ship 
effect on the economy, i.e., the impact of a change in housing supply, includ-
ing both (i) the direct effect and (ii) the feedback effect. The direct effect is 
the impact of a housing sector technology shock, and the feedback effect is 
the impact of a change in new housing production, caused by other shocks, 
such as a goods sector technology shock or a monetary policy shock. 
Our impulse response analysis suggests that the magnitudes of both direct 
effect and feedback effect from new housing production is negligible to the 
economy. We argue that the standard setting of the housing market is the 
reason for our results. This standard setting assumes that every household 
trades housing in a given period, thus all housing is traded. As a result, 
the weight of new housing in the housing trading market is equal to the 
depreciation rate of housing, which is small. Therefore, the magnitu<in of ttl<' 
supply side effect is small. 
Next, we examine the U.S. housing sector using data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau for the period of 1968Ql - 2009Q4. We find that several steady state 
ratios from our benchmark model cannot meet their empirical targets. This 
inconsistency between the model and the empirical evidence motivates us to 
construct a new setting for the housing market, which is our first contribution 
in this chapter. After constructing the new setting of the houHillg markd, 
those steady state ratios from the model are consistent with their cmpirical 
targets. Moreover, from impulse response analysis, we find that the respOJls(' 
of the real house price to a housing sector technology shock is 60 times larger 
than that under the standard setting, implying that the standard setting 
largely underestimates the direct effect of new housing production on tIl<' n ~ a l l
house price. This result may challenge one of conclusions from Iacoviello and 
Neri (2010), i.e., the slow growth of honsing sector technology is the main 
cause of the persistent increase in real house price. Our chaph'r sugg<'sts 
that, when the impact of housing sector technology shock 011 the house price 
is properly estimated, the slow growth of housing sector technology I)(,COllWS 
less important to the persistent increase in real house prkps. ~ ( ' x t , , givpu a 
goods technology shock and a monetary policy shock, the fend back dfpd. of 
new housing production is also 60 times larger than that under the standard 
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setting. 
Our second contribution in this chapter is to introduce the f e a t u f ( ~ ~ of 
time to build to new housing production, while it is commonly a.'3sumed that 
a housing project starts and completes within one period in the literature. 
Our empirical analysis suggests that a housing project usually takes several 
quarters to complete, supporting the introduction of the time to build feature. 
The feature of time to build has been introduced to goods capital Kyd-
land and Prescott (1982) a.'3sume that an investment project takes four quar-
ters to complete, and they find that this feature is crucial to obtain a persis-
tent output movement. Gomme, Kydland and Rupert (2001) consider this 
feature for the production of market capital in a two-sector model and argue 
that this feature is essential for their model to match the cyclical properties 
of market and horne investment. Tsoukala.'3 (2011) considers a neoclassical 
investment-q model with features of time to plan and time to build for the 
installation of capital and show that cash flow may be important ( ~ v p n n cap--
ital markets are perfect and future investment opportunities are proP<'rly 
accounted for. His results suggest that investment ca.'ih flow sensitivities an' 
not the right framework to evaluate the credit market imperfections. 
For the first time, the feature of time to build is introduced to new housing 
production in this chapter. \Vhen we consider this feature ill the benchmark 
model, i.e., with the standard setting of the housing market, it does not 
have any obvious impact on the economy, because the small weight of Ile\-\' 
housing in the housing trading market. implies that a change ill lWW housing 
production has a negligible impact on the ('("onomy. 
In contrast, after constructing the new setting of the housing market, thl' 
feature of time to build has an obvious impact on the rea.l house price. This 
is because that the weight of new housing in the honsing trading market 
is more reasonable, thus a change in new honsing production will hav!' an 
obvious impact OIl the economy. One important implication of the featuft' 
of time to build is that, given a goods sector tocimology shock or a 1ll00W--
tary policy shock, the feedback effect of new housing production leads to all 
overshooting boha.viour for the real house price since (i) the respOIlS(' of lWW 
housing production ha..., an opposite impact Oil tlw n ~ a l l hOlls!' price against 
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the shock, and (ii) the feature of time to build delays this effpct while tlw 
demand side effect is diminishing. For example, in response to a positive 
goods sector technology shock, the real house price responds positively, but 
it falls shapely and becomes negative when new housing production begins 
to respond positively, before returning towards its steady state. 
3.2 The benchmark model 
Our benchmark model is a simple DSGE model with the feature of sticky 
prices and a variable housing supply. When we assume a fixed housing supply, 
we can only observe the demand side effect on the real hOllse price. Aft.er 
introducing a new housing production sector, we can discuss t.Iw supply side 
effect on the economy, i.e., the impact of a change in tlw hOllsing supply. 
The supply side effect includes (i) the direct effect, which is the impact of a 
housing sector technology shock on the economy, and (ii) the fl'edback I'ffmt, 
which is the impact of a change in new hOllsing production, callspd by other 
·1" shocks, such as a goods sector technology shock or a monetary pohey shock. -
3.2.1 Households 
Households are infinitely lived and of mea.'mre one. They COllSUIlH' final 
goods, and demand domestic housing and supply la.bour. They maximise 
their lifetime utility subject to their budget constraint. vVe a.'lSllllle t.hat. t.lH'Y 
own the profitable retail goods productioIls . .t:! 
Similar with the Chapter 2, the households' lifetimp utilit.y function is 
where E t is t.he expectation operator, :'1 is the households' discollut. fact.or, 
Ct hi households' consumption, Cc measures tht' degree of COIlSIllUpt.ioll habit., 
12Th{' feedback effect shows that the r r ~ s p ( ) l l s ( , , of real housp priC'P to all ( ' X ( ) ~ ( ' I I ( ' I I ~ ~ sho('k 
is w ( ~ a k e n e d d or strengthened by the respollse of new housing prOdlll'tiOIl, 
1:'Households are identical to patient housl'llOlds ill tht' silllpk OSCE lIIod.·1 ill tilt' 
Chapt!'r 2, 
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rc is a scaling factor, ht is domestic housing, nt is the supply of hOlls('holds' 
labour, _(In is the Fisher elasticity of labour supply, and j is the wdght OIl 
domestic housing. 
Given the lifetime utility function, the households' marginal utility of 
consumption is 
(:3.1) 
which expresses the marginal utility of consumption, 11e ,l, in terms of l a g g ( ~ < l , ,
current, and future consumption. 
The households' real budget constraint shows that the real t.ot.al PXj>PJlSP 
(LHS) should be no more than the real total income (RHS), and is I'xj>n'ssed 
as 
Ct + Kh,t + qh,tht + bt 
< (Rkht + 1- 8kh ) K ht - I + Wtnt + qht (1- J II ) h t- I + R t- 1 ht 1 + It 
, , I 7r c,t 
where qh,t is the real house price, bt is the volume of bonds purchased \II 
period t, Wt is the real wage rate, R t - l is the (gross) nominal i u t e n ~ s t . . rat.1' on 
the bond hold in period t - 1, ;re,1 is the (gross) inflation rate', and It is tl}(' 
real profit from retail goods firms. For the new housing production rPlatl'd 
variables, KII,t is housing capital, Rk:h ,/ is the real reutal price of housing 
capital, <Skh and c5h are the depreciation rates of housing capit.al and hOllsing 
stock respectively. Tho real prices of final goods, bonds, and housing capit.al 
are normalised to one. 
vVe obtain four first order conditions from the households' lifetime ut.ility 
maximisation problem. H The first three are discussed already in the Chaptt'r 
2, and they are 
(a.2) 
liThe households' Iltility maximisation problem is shown in Apppndix. 
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) 
qh,tUc,t = hi + dEt (qh.t+1 11('.t+l) (:3.4) 
Equation 3.2 is the intertemporal optimality condition that govprns the opti-
mal allocation of consumption over time. Equation 3.3 is the intratclllporal 
optimality condition that indicates how households make decisions about 
consumption and labour supply in period t. Equation 3.4 is the iutratclll-
poral optimality condition that describes an optimal allocation of resource 
between consumption and domestic housing in period t. 
The fourth first order condition is the equation that governs hOlls('holds' 
demand for housing capital, which is expressed H.'i 
(3.5) 
which implies that the real price of housing capital in t.erms of the marginal 
utility of consumption at t is equal to the sum of the expected real rental 
price of housing capital and the expected real priee of housing capital (for 
reselling undepreciated housing capital) in terms of the discounted margiual 
utility of consumption at t + 1. This first order condition is an i n t ( ~ r t e l l l p o r a l l
optimality condition that describes an optimal allocation of r e s o u r c ( ~ ~ betw('ell 
consumption and housing capital. 
3.2.2 Goods production sector 
Similar with the Chapter 2, in the goods production sector, we have thf('(' 
players: (i) final goods producers buy retail goods from individual rt'tail 
goods producers, and compose them into final goods, which are ready for 
consumption; (ii) retail goods producers (or retailers) buy int('l'lllcdiat,(' goods 
from intermediate goods producers, and differentiate the goods at JlO ('ost. into 
retail goods; (iii) intermediate goods producers combilH' goods s ( ~ c t ( ) r r t('dl-
nology and labour from patient households to produce iutermeciiat(' goods, 
which are then sold to retail goods producers. 
Chapter 3 
Final goods firms, retail goods firms, and intermediate goods firms 
All of firms were described in the Chapter 2 already, here we only list equa-
tions that are relevant to the equilibrium of this model. I ~ , , Thc first order 
condition derived from the retailers' real profit maximisation problem is the 
equation of the real optimal price, and it is expressed a.-; 
[ 
",",00 fiA ",. (Pe,t )-= Pwc,tfk 1 C ~ k = O O t,t+klt+k V-k P-k Q _ --E e,t. e," c,t - t \-". L 
c -1 L oo ekA Y. ( ~ ) ) '(PC,'fk-l) ~ ~
k=O t,t+k t+k Pe,t ,k Pc,t _I 
(3.6) 
in which we define the real optimal price as Qc,l = ; ~ : : : . .
Given the features of sticky prices and price indexat.ion, the nOlllillal price 
level can also be written as 
1 
P _ [0 ( l ~ ~ P ) \-t: (1 f:)) P' 1.-,'] r=< c,t - 7r c,l-\ c,t-I + - r,I (:t7) 
The real profit from retail goods firms is 
Pwc t ( 1), It = Yt - --' Yt = 1 - - } I 
Pc,I Zt 
which implies that the real profit is the difference h(·twecn t.he rml pric(' of 
final goods, which is normalised to OIle, and the real pric(' of illt,CrIlH'<iiat,(' 
P t goociH, ;;e, 
I(",t 
The intermediate goods production function is 
(3.9) 
where nc,t is households' labour, Ilrz is the labour share of out.put. TIl(' goodl'l 
sector technology, Ar,t, follows the st.ationary proceSH 
(:UO) 
The first order condition derived froIll the int('rnwdiat(' goods finus' rpal 
I" \\'e sUllllllarise all of equations that are n('edpd to sui\'(' t hl' llIod'" ill t 11(' !-it'd ion uf 
'EqllilibriulII' , 
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profit maximisation describes the intermediate goods producers' demand for 
households' labour, and it is expressed as 
(:3.11) 
which implies that the real wage of labour, i.e., the margiIlal cost of labour, 
is equal to the marginal product of labour. 
3.2.3 Housing production sector 
Housing firms Housing producers combine exogenous honsing s('d,or t,('ch-
nology and housing capital from households to produce new housing, which 
are then sold to households. We a.."lsumc that housing finns are perfectly COIll-
petitive, thus they make zero profit. In addition, w(' assllme Hexible pricps 
in this sector. w 
The housing production functioIl is 
(:3.12) 
where I Ht is new housing, K h,l-J is lagged housing capital, It" is tlH' h01lsing 
capital share of housing productionY The housing sector t('chuology, A",/l 
follows the stationary process 
( ; ~ . 1 3 ) )
Iii In t he perfect e o r n p { ~ t t itive housing market. firms product' at t Iw point WIH'rl' til!' 
marginal cost equals to the average total cost, fI;[C = ATC, Tlw short filII supply ('\ll'\'(' 
(the marginal cost curve above the average total ('ost cun'p) i:-. upwar<l-"lllpilll!;, I hilS H 
higher price (caused by a higher demand) lpads to a hi!!:her supply, Dut' to tht' dt'lIland 
shock is temporary, the price will fall ba('k. and the supply will also fall ha('k to tltl' oriJ,!;inal 
level. 
17For simplicity. we only consider hOllsing capital as t Iw prociul'l ion factor. alt hough WI' 
may Ileed ot her factors such as labour. land. internwc\iate input, 
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The housing producers' real profit maximisation prohlem is 
Xl 
JPax E t L At,t+k (qh,t+k I Ht+k - Rkh,t+kKh,l+k--I) 
h,t-i k=O 
where At,t+k is the stocha..<;tic discount factor, qh,tI H t is the real total revenue, 
and Rkh,tKh,t-l is the real total cost. 
The first order condition derived from this real profit maximisation de-
scribes the housing producers' demand for housing capital, and it is expressed 
as 
IHt 
Rkh,t = qh,tJ.lkh---;:;;--
I\h,t-J 
(3.14) 
which implies that the real rental price of housing capital, i.e., the marginal 
cost of housing capital, is equal to the marginal product of housing capital. 
3.2.4 Monetary authority 
Similar with the Chapter 2, the monetary authority Ilses till' nominal interest 
rate as a policy instrument to affect the real (,'ConOIllY. The monetary policy 
rule, which reacts to inflation and output, is 
R = (R )<1>, . .,.(.l-<I>r)d>rr ~ ~ ('''H,t ( Y) (1-(,>,.)<1ly t t-I "c,t Y (:3.15) 
where Rt - I is the lagged nominal interest rate, 7r,·,I. is gross inRatioll rat(" Yi 
is actual output, and Y is the steady state value of output., Or' (\" (by an' 
weights coefficients. The monetary policy shock, /lll,!. follows t.he stat.ionary 
process 
(3.16) 
The Fisher equation, which governs the relation b e t w p ( ~ n n til<' rpal iut.prest 
rate and the nominal interest rate, is 
rt=---
E t 7r,·,I+-1 
(3.17) 
which implies that the (gross) real interest rate, T't. is eqllal to til(' Ilolllillai 
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interest rate, R t , adjusted by expect()d inflation rate, E(rrc,l+l. 
3.2.5 Market clearing conditions 
Some clearing conditions were discussed already in the Chapter 2, hut here 
we list them to facilitate the summary of the model. The bonds market 
clearing condition is 
(3.18) 
which implies that (i) the aggregate saving is zero, and (ii) tlwre is no bor-
rowing between agents since we consider a model with representatiw appnts. 
The economy-wide resource constraint or the goods market clearinp; ('on-
dition is 
Yi = Ct + I K h,t (3.19) 
which implies that the total output from goods sector is divided into con-
sumption goods, whieh is consumed by h o w ~ e h o l d s , , and investment in the 
housing capital. 
Similar with the Chapter 2, the labour market clearinp; condition is 
(:L20) 
which implies that the supply of households' labour is equal to til(' i n t . ! ~ n l l P P
diate goods producers' demand for households' labour. 
The housing market clearing condition now becomes 
(3.21 ) 
which implies that the total supply of honsing, which is not f i x ( ~ d d <lU.YIIlOH\ 
is equal to the total demand for housing. 
Housing capital that is required in IH'W housing production is 11 durahl<-
asset and depreciates at a rate of Jkh • The equatioll that d ( ~ s c r i l ) ( ' s s its acclI-
UlUlation process is 
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which implies that housing capital iu the curreut period, /\,.,1, is the SUIll 
of undepreciated housing capital from the previous period, (1 - 6 kh) [{,.,I - I, 
and new investment in the current period, I /\h,t. 
Similarly, housing is also a durable assets and depreciates at a ratl' of I)". 
The housing stock accumulation process is 
(:t23) 
which implies that total housing stock in the current period, HI, is the sum 
of undepreciated housing stock from the previous p('riod, (1 - 6,,) HI I, and 
new housing in the current period, I HI. 
3.2.6 Equilibrium 
An equilibrium is an allocation of prices (71' c,1> R/, Qc,t, lJh,t. WI, Z" T'/l Rkll,/), 
quantities (et. Uc,b ht, Yt, nt, nc,t, II! bl! I HI! Ht, Kh,l, 11\'11,1), and p x o g ( ~ n O I l S S
stochastic process {Ac,t, Ah,h uR,d ~ o o satisfying equations (3.1) - (3.23) given 
the initial conditions for 71' c,t-I, Rt - 1 , Ct- h H I _ h K h,I-I' 
3.2.7 Calibration 
l\lost of parameters are calibrated in a way that is consistent with Iacoviello 
and Neri (2010). Some of them were discussed in the Chapter 2, but hef(' 
we discuss them again for convenience. For the household discouut. factor, 
we set /-3 = 0.9925 = 1.03-0.25, implying a steady state anllua.l real int('l'I'st 
rate of 3 percent. The households' labour schedule is assullled to 1)(' Ha.t, 
In = 0.01. Besides, we set the weight OIl honsing to j = 0.4, <I.'" this valw', 
together with the depreciation rates, allows our steady state ratios hit t.h!' 
sample average in the next section. In addition, we switch off til<' f(\atuf(' of 
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consumption habit by setting Cc = o. 
Households' preference 
The households' discount factor (3 0.9925 
The inverse of the elasticity of labour supply In 0.01 
The weight OIl housing .J 0.4 
The degree of consumption habit Cc 0 
Similar with the Chapter 2, the share of labour in the goods production 
function is set to J1 n = 0.65, implying that the steady state share of labour 
income is 65%. For the retail goods sector, we assume a steady state markup 
of 15% in goods sector by setting Z = l.15. For the degree of prices stickilwss, 
we assume that 25% of retailers are able to re-optimise their prices in a giwll 
period by setting () = 0.75, implying that price-setters can re-optimise tlH'ir 
prices once every 1 ~ 8 8 = 4 periods. In addition, we also switch off the f('aturt' 
of price indexation by setting L1r = o. 
Intermediate goods firms 
Labour share It" 0.65 
Retail goods firms 
The steady state gross markup Z l.15 
Tlw probability of fixed prices e 0.75 
The degree of price indexation /'1r 0 
In the housing production function, we set the share of hOllsing capital 
in housing production to I1kh = 0.1, implying that the st<'ady statf' sharf' of 
hOllsing capital income is 10%. The depreciation rate of housing capital is set 
to 6kh = 0.03. These values are cOIlsistent with Iacoviello and ~ < ' f i i (2010). 
The depreciation rate of housing stock, however, is set to 611 = 0.002, which 
is supported by our empirical evidence in the next section. This parau\('tl'r 
is usually set to 0.01 - 0.025 in the literature, for example, it is set. to (Ull 
in Iacoviello and Xeri (2010). One consequence of our ealibration is that tit!' 
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impact of new housing production on the real house price is weakPIwd. 
Housing production technology 
The share of housing capital J-lkh 
Depreciation rates 
The depreciation rate of housing capital rSkh 
The depreciation rate of housing stock c5h 
0.1 
0.03 
0.002 
!)l 
For the monetary policy rule, we set the weight coefficients to ()r = 0.6, 
¢rr = 1.5, and 1>y = 0.5, which are similar with Iacoviello and ~ e r i i (2010). Iii 
Monetary policy 
The interest rate inertia (P r 0.6 
The weight coefficient on inflation rjJrr 1.5 
The weight coefficient on output 0y 0.5 
As we focus OIl the impulse responses of model variabl('s to various t.('lllPO-
rary shocks, the autocorrelation coefficients of these shocks a.re set to 0.01. I!I 
Meanwhile, we set the standard deviations of all shocks to o.m. 
Autocorrelations of shocks 
Goods seetor technology [1.1<- D.O} 
Housing sector technology PAh lUll 
Monetary poliey PuFi O.OJ 
Standard deviations of shocks 
Goods sector technology a:\c (un 
Housing sector technology aA/r (un 
~ l o n e t a r y y policy (T"u 0.01 
1XThe estimates in Iacoviello and Neri (2010) for thes!' ("oefficiPIlt:-; an' (\. co, O.Gl. n ~ ~
1.36. alld 1Jy = 0.51. 
1'1\\'(, liS£' n.nI. instead of O. to facilitate :\latlab prograllls ill tIlE' flltlll'l' rl'';PatTli. 
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3.2.8 Steady state ratios 
When we calibrate the parameters, stpady state ratios of the model should 
be consistent with the sample average. The following table Slllllilulfies thl' 
sample average of the U.S. economy in the period 1947Ql - 2 0 1 1 q 4 . ~ ) 1 1 1
Interpretation Target 
Annual real interest rate 3% 
Consumption share 65% 
Non-housing investment share 11 % 
Housing investment share 5% 
Since we consider a closed economy and only have consumption and h(l\ls-
ing investment, we should target the modified ratios instead of these original 
ratios.iil The modified ratios are summarised in the following tabl!', awl w£' 
can sec that the steady state ratios from our benchmark Illod!'l an' dos£' t.o 
their targets."2 
Interpretation Expression Target SS Value 
Annual real interest rate R'" -1 3(;{, 3(ir· 
Consumption share ('/GDP' 92.6% 91.6(;{ 
Investment in housing capital IK,,/CDP' 0.4% O.Ge;{ 
Housing investment share qIH/GDP' 7% 7.7(;{ 
3.2.9 Impulse response analysis 
In this section, we discuss how model variables respond to variolls exo).!;t'1I0IlS 
shocks in the benchmark model. \Ve consider three types of shocks: a positivp 
housing sector technology shock, a positive goods sedor tpchuology sho('k, 
and a positive monetary policy shock. Recall that, after illtroducillg t.1H' 
;lIlSources: C.S, Bureau of Economic A n a l y ~ i ~ . .
rollfgoods capital is not cOlliiiderpd. the GOP is ('olllpoiiPd hy ('OnSlIlllptioll g()(j(b, ill-
vpstnwlIts in housing capital. and real valtlP of new housing. i ,p" G D pi c:. C + [[\'iL I- III H, 
!'llFrom Iacaviello and :"IIeri (2011). we infer that til<' rat io of ill\'piitnH'nt in g o ( } d ~ ~ ('apital 
to investrnpnt in housing captial b arollnd 43. 
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varied housing supply, we can discuss the supply side effect, which includes 
both the direct effect and the £ dback effect. 
Housing sector technology shock First, we di u s the direct effect of a 
variable housing supply. Figure 3.1 shows the impulse responses of variables 
to a one percent positive shock in housing sector technology with persistence 
of PAh = 0.01.53 A higher housing sector technology leads to a h h g ~ e r r new 
housing production, and thus a higher marginal product of housing capital. 
The high marginal product of housing capital impli a higher real rental 
price, thus a higher incom and a higher consumption. Meanwhile, the higher 
housing supply has a negativ impact on the real house price, and this is the 
direct effect from the housing supply on th real hous pri e. 
In particular, we notice that the impact of the housing ector technology 
shock on th economy is small. When new housing produ tion increases by 
1 %, th real house price decreases by 0.0015%, and th responses of other 
variable are even smaller. 
l FF l : : & , . . . - - - - - - -- l 
.. ~ ~ r .:.. --..... I . ~ ~ E, __ ~ ~ : ; ; ~ ~ : ~ ~
a .. • I to 2: to I: 
I 
.. N K-- I ]k---
2 .. • • 10 . . , , - ':----:----,----"0 '1" I .• 
Figure 3.1: Impulse response to a positve housing ct r tech logy ho k 
from the benchmark mod 1. 
~ : J J In a ll figur . impul r pon are m a ured a p rcentage d viat ion from t h t ady 
tate. and horizontal axe di play th number of quart r ' aft r th ho k. 
Goods sector technology shock and monetary policy shock 0Jext., 
we discuss the feedback effect from the new housing productioll giVt'll a. goods 
sector technology shock and a monetary policy shock respectively. F i g u n ~ ~ 3.2 
shows the impulse responses of variables to a one percent positive shock in 
goods sector technology with persistence of PAc = 0.01. A higher goods 
productivity leads to a higher marginal product of labour, thus a higher r('al 
wage and a higher real income. When households have a higher real income, 
they demand more consumption and housing, which leads to a higlwr [pal 
house price. Given the higher real hOllse price, new housing production 
increases and thus the marginal product of housing capital. As a result, t.ltp 
real rental price rise, and then leads to a higher investment in housing capital. 
In particular, this figure shows that the real house price positively n'-
sponds to the positive goods technology shock, but we know that the in<Tease 
of the real house price is weakened by the higher new housing production. 
Although this (negative) feedback effect is eutanglpd with tlw (positiv<') d(,-
maud side effect of the shock 011 the real house price, we ( ~ a n n infer that, wh('n 
new housing production increases by 0.08%, the feL'(iback dfed l < ~ a d s s to a 
0.00012% decrease in the real house price.:i-I Therefore, given a technology 
shock, the feedback effect on the real house price is only O.21j{ of till' total 
impact, which is 0.06%. 
Figure 3.3 shows the impulse n ~ s p O l l s e s s of variables to a 011(' 1 ) ( ~ I u ~ n t t pos-
itive monetary shock with persistence of PuR = 0.01. A posit.ive IllOlwtmy 
policy shock leads to a higher nominal intcrest rate and t.hus a hip;her real 
interest rate, which leads to a lower current consumption. The lowl'r ("011-
sumption causes a lower output and a lower ma.rginal product of labour, titus 
a lower real wage. As a result of the lower real income, housl'holds dl'lIland 
less housing, which leads to a lower real house price awl a lowl'r Ill'W housing 
production. 
Similar with the previous ca.<;e, there is a feedback d f < ~ c t t frolll w'w housing 
production to the real house price. This figure shows that th(' [('al lious(' 
'>I From t he direct etfpct. we know that. w Iwn lWW h O I l ~ i l l g g pro<illct iOll ilHT"Ho->"'" I ',Y I 'X. 
t he real hOllsing price decreases by O.0015'iC Therpforf'. wl1('n Ill'\\' hOll,.,ing prodllct iOll 
in(T<'asPs by 0.08%. it should lowl'r the real hOllsing pric(' by 1l.1l1l! "0iO IlS% O.OD!) 12';'. 
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses to a positve goods sector technology shock 
from the benchmark model. 
price negatively responds to the a positive mon tary policy shock, but we 
know that the deer ase of the real house pric is weakened by the low r new 
housing production. Although this (positive) feedback effect is entangled 
with the (negative) demand side effect of the shock on the real house price, 
using the same approach in the previous case, we can infer that, when new 
housing production decreases by 1%, the feedback effect leads to a 0.0015 1c 
increase in the real house price. 55 Therefore, given a monetary policy, th 
feedback effect on the real house price is also negligible, i.e., less than one 
perc nt (i. ., 0.2%) of the total effect, which is O. %. 
The standard setting of the housing market and the supply side 
effect From above analysis, we know that (i) the real hous ' pric r sponds 
negatively to a positive housing t chnology shock but th direct ffect of the 
housing supply on the co no my is negligible; (ii) the real hou e price responds 
positively to a posit ive goods sector technology shock and negatively to a 
~ ~ F r o m m th direct effect . we know tha t. when new hOll ing production incr ases by l o/c, 
the rea l housing price decrea e by O.0015o/c. Theref r . wh n ne w hOLi ing prod ll tion 
increa e by 1%, it hould lower th r a l hou ing price by O.OO \5<l ,1 'll = 0.0015%. 
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Figure 3.3: Impulse responses to a positve monetary policy shock from th 
benchmark model. 
positive monetary policy shock, and we can infer that th fe dback ffect 
from the housing supply is negligible as well, although the f edback effect 
is entangl d with the demand side effect. In sum, through n w housing 
production, the supply side effect on the real hou e price is not important at 
all. 
Before discussing the relation between the results and the model, we 
briefly describe the housing market in the b nchmark model. For the d 
mand side, every household enters the housing trading market in a given 
p riod. They sell their existing undepreciated housing and purchase the op-
timal quantity of housing according to their optimality condition. For the 
supply side, housing producers combine housing sector technology and hous-
ing capital to produce new housing, and the total housing supply includes 
both existing housing and new housing, according to the housing accumula-
tion pro ess. The housing market equilibrium condition indicat s that the 
demand for housing is equal to the supply of housing in a giv-n p riod. This 
setting of the housing market is widely used in the literatur and can b s en 
as a standard etting. 
We suppose that the tandard ett ing of the housing market i the reason 
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for our result that the supply side effect is small. This standard s ( ~ t t i l l g g as-
sumes that every household enters the housing market to chomlc the optimal 
quantity of housing in a given period according to their optimality coudit.ioll. 
This assumption implies that, in a given period, (i) the probability of trade 
is one, and (ii) all housing is traded. As a result, the weight of new housing 
in the housing trading market is small, Le., is equal to the depreciat.ion rate 
of housing stock 6h = 0.2%. Therefore, since exogenous shocks affect ll('W 
housing production but not existing housing, the magnitude of the supply 
side effect, including both t h l ~ ~ direct effect and t h l ~ ~ f l ~ e d b a c k k effect, is small. 
In the next section, we will show that several steady state values from this 
standard setting are not consistent with their empirical targets froIll tll<' U.S. 
housing sector, and we will construct a new setting for the housing markC't. 
3.3 An investigation of the U.S. housing sector 
In this section, we examine the U.S. housing sector using data frolll the U.s. 
Census Bureau for the period of 1968Q1 - 2009Q4. Firstly, we g('ncrate 
several empirical ratios and use them as targets for the steady st.ate ratios 
from ollr theoretical model. Secondly, we calculate the aV('rage length of a 
housing project. 
3.3.1 The empirical ratios 
Firstly, we generate several empirical ratios from the U.S. housing sector. \"Oe 
employ three quarterly series: (a) new housing sold; (b) existing hOllsing sold; 
(c) total occupied housing units. Combining these three quarterly s ( ~ r k s , , w(' 
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have following new quarterly series.;'u 
New quarterly series 
Total housing sold (d) 
X(lW housing solei 
Total 'HTupied h o u s i n ~ ~ units 
Total h o u s i n ~ ~ sold 
Total olTlll'ipd h O l l s i n ~ ~ unit>. 
:\" ('W h O l l s i n ~ ~ sold 
Total hOllsin sold 
Combination method 
(a) + (I» 
(a) / (c) 
(d) / (c) 
(a) / (d) 
Figure 3.4 plots the ratio of new housing sold to total occupied h o u s i l l ~ ~
units. This ratio was fluctuating between O.mH and 0.003 from 1 9 G ~ q 1 1 to 
2009Q4, and the average value of this ratio is 0.002, implying that, in a given 
quarter, 0.2% of total occupied housing is newly built. 
The ratio of NH sold to TOH units 
0 . 0 0 ~ 5 5 r-------- -----
0.001 r ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - --- --
0.0005 t-----
i 
o 1---
1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 199i 1998 100i 1008 
Figure 3.4: The ratio of new housing sold to total occupic'd hOllsillg ll11its. 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Figurp 3.5 plots the ratio of total housing sold to total occupied h ( ) u s i l l ~ ~
units. During 1968Q1 and 2009Q4, the minimum value of this ratio is 0.()()6 
and the maximulIl is 0.018. The average value of this ratio is 0.0115. This 
suggests that, in a given quarter, 1.15% of total o c c l l p i ( ~ d d housing is tra(lPd. 
Figure 3.6 plots the ratio of new housing sold to total housing sold. We 
interpret. this ratio as the weight of new housing in the hOllsing trading lIIar-
ket. This weight was between 0.2 to 0.25 before 1974. From 197-t to 2()()G, 
~ ' I ; ~ ' e e liSP thp series of total oCl'uplicd hOllsing units instead of til" s ( ~ r i i .. " of total hO\l!.,illg 
units because wp aSSlIl11P that all houtiing providp utility to hOllsf'hold" ill 01ll' ll\odf'!. ()lIr 
rl'Sltlts an' not afff'cted by the ('hoice of t h('se two sf'rips. 
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Figure 3.5: The ratio of total housing sold to total occupied housing units. 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau. 
this weight was fluctuating between 0.15 to 0.2. Since 2007, this weight has 
began to fall and was around 0.07 in 2009, reflecting a sharp dmT(,HS(' ill 
new housing production since the financial crisis. The averagp vahl!' of this 
weight is 0.172 over our sample period, implying that the averagp wdght of 
new housing in the housing trading market is 17.2% in a given quarter. 
The ratio of NH sold to TH sold 
0.3 • 
i O.H f.. - -.-----
0.15 \ 
0.1 t-
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Figure 3.6: The ratio of new hOllsing sold to total housing sold. Sources: 
U.S. Census Bureau. 
Here we summarise above empirical ratios in the following tah!P: ill a 
given period, (i) 0.2% of occupied housing units are new hOllsing, (ii) 1.1 ;j!X 
of total occupied housing units are traded, (iii) 17.2% of tnukd housing 
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is new housing. They are the targets of the steady state ratios from our 
benchmark model. Firstly, a."i we calibrate the depreciation rate of hOllsing 
stock to bh = 0.002, the steady state ratio of new housing to total housing 
meets its target. Secondly, since it is been a."isllmed that all honsing is tra(kd 
in a given period, the ratio of total housing sold to total housing is always 
equal to 1. We are not able to re-calibrate any parameter to allow this ratio to 
hit its target. Thirdly, because of the same reason that housing sold is equal 
to total housing, the ratio of new housing sold to total housing sold is always 
equal to the first ratio, thus this ratio cannot hit its target either. Owrall, 
while the first ratio can hit its target, the second and third ratios cannot IlH'(·t 
their targets in the benchmark model. The inconsistency between tlw steady 
state values and the empirical ratios motivates us to construct a. )l('W setting 
for the housing market by introducing the possibility of trading housing. 
Description 
~ t ' W W hnll!'.ing sold 
Total O{TlIpj('ri hOlll'\lng l l n i t ~ ~
Total hOIlSill).\ suld 
Total Il('Cllpil'd hOllsillg ullits 
:\'PW hOl1!-.iul{ sold 
Tot al hOllsin ' suld 
Target SS value 
0.002 0.02 
0.0115 1 
0.172 0.002 
3.3.2 The feature of time to build 
Moreover, we examine the length of time required to complett' a housing 
project. In the U.S. housing sector, there are two stages for a housing project: 
(i) from authorisatioIl to start; and (ii) from start to completion. lloth stagt's 
take time. The following table shows the time r e q l l i n ~ d d for thes(' two stpps 
respectively, for a building with one unit. The average time is n,s lllonth for 
the first step and 6.2 months for the second step. These facts support. liS to 
consider the feature of time to build in new housing production, mth('r than 
using the assumption that a housing project is started and complC't('d withiu 
one period. In general, we assume that a housing project takes 4 p('riods to 
complet.e, i.e., 12 months, since (i) building with OIle more uuit takps loug('" 
at both steps, (ii) it also takes SOUlt' time from completiou t.o sold, G.G llIollths 
on average. Therefore, our empirical analysis m o t . i v a t l ~ s s us t.o int.ro<il)('(· ti\(' 
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feature of time to build with a 4-pcriod lag into new housing production. 
Description Duration 
From aut.horisat.ion to start 0.8 mouth 
From start to completion 6.2 months 
From completion to sold 5.6 months 
3.4 The benchmark model with the new setting of the 
housing market 
In this section, we construct a new setting of the housing ma.rket that allows 
the steady state ratios from our model to be consistent with their empirical 
targets. This is our first contribution in this chapter. 
3.4.1 The probability of trade and the optimal housing 
In order to construct the new setting of the housing markd, we i n t . r o d l l C ( ~ ~
the Calvo (1987) assumption to the household sector. Calvo ( l 9 ~ 7 ) ) a.'iSIIIlJeS 
that only a fraction of firms can TPSpt their priem; in a given pnriod. This is 
a common assumption for the feature of sticky prices ill DSGE models. In 
our model, we assume that households can enter the housing trading market 
with probability 1- >'s in a given period.;;7 Let h ~ ~ dcnote the optimal housing 
demanded by households who arc able to trade in period t. 
Then we update the housing stock accllIllulation process and the ('(l'lilib-
riUIll condition in the housing trading market.·J '" Firstly, th(' housing stock 
acculllulat.ion process becomes 
;.7In particular. if we set )... = o. we havp the stanciard ~ ( ' t t i n l ! ; . . i.p .. I'\"pry h ( ) I I ~ l ' h ( ) l d d ('an 
trade housing in a given ppriod. Bf-sid!.'s. if WP Sl't ).." = 1. "wry hOIlSl'h,}ld ("lIllllot tradp 
housinl!; in his/her lifetime. 
"xCal\'o(19/Si) rOllsiders the profit maximisation problelll for a firlll who is ahl,· to ... 'sl"t 
p r i C l ~ . . and then produce the aggregatp price using the p r o b a b i l i t ~ · . . Silllilarl,l'. WI' ~ " " ' I ' '
tllf' IItility maxilllisatiolJ problem for a hOllsphold who i ~ ~ able to tradl'. and tl\l'lI 11,,(, th,' 
prohability to obtain the aggregatp housing using t he housing H("('lllllulat iOll p n ) ( ' , · ~ ~ . .
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where h; is the optimal housing, and (1 - As) h ~ ~ is the total optimal housing 
given only a fraction (1 - >'s) of households can trade. This equation implies 
that the total housing stock in period t, HI-! is composed by (i) the undepre-
dated housing from t - 1 held by the fraction of households that are unahl(' 
to trade, As (1 - t5h ) Ht-I! and (ii) the optimal housing held by the fraction 
of households that are able to trade, (1 - >'s) h;. 
The equilibrium condition in the housing trading market is 
In period t, households enter the housing trading market with probability 
(1 - >'s). They sell their existing undepreciated housing purchased from pn-
riod t - 1, (1 - t5h ) H t - h and demand optimal housing, h;. T l \ l ~ n · f ( ) n ' , , this 
equation shows that, in the housing trading market, the total dCIlIaJld for 
housing is equal to the total supply of housing, which is C O l l l p ( ) s ( ~ d d hy IInd( ..... 
predated existing housing, (1 - A .• ) (1 - t5h ) HI-I, and new housing, I fit.:'!! 
We can rewrite this equilibrium condition as 
which shows that, in the housing trading market, the dmnalld for !l('W housing 
is equal to the supply of new housing, as the differcnc(' b e t w ( ~ e n n the optimal 
housing, h;, and u n d ( ' p n ~ e i a t e d d existing housing, (1 - (ih) HI -I, is the demand 
for new housing, given that a fraction (1 - >.,,) of householdH can trad(,.tiil 
C,!'lf we combine these two equat ions. we obt <lin t hp standard forlll of t It{' 1 t ( ) I I ~ i l l ~ ~ stol'k 
aCCllfl1ulat ion process 
lill At steady state. new hOllsing production i ~ ~ positive as { ' x i ~ t i l l g g hOIl"illg i:i dq>fI'l'int illg. 
In the log-linearbed form. we consider the HPighbollfhoo<i arollnd t Iw "t{'aeiy ~ t a t l ' . . Bilt 
we acknowledge the possibility of negative llew housing production ill f('ality. 
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3.4.2 The optimality condition between housing and consumption 
The second modification is in the households' lifetime utility maximiHatioll 
problem. We modify the households budget constraint and obtain an up-
dated intertemporal optimality condition that governs households' demand 
for housing. When a household enters the housing trading market and de-
cides the optimal housing h*, he must take into account the possibility of 
trade and no trade in the futureYI 
The first order condition derived from the updated households' lifetime 
utility maximisation problem is 
or 
jt 
hi 
. 1 
+PA8Jt+l-, * + (1- As) d (1 - 8h ) Et ((]h,t+I11.".t+l) 
Lt 
'2 :.!' 1 '2' :.! + r ~ ~ AsJt+'2 h* + (1 - As) As r3 (1 - 6h) E t ((]/t,t+'2 l1c,t+'2) 
I 
:3 'J 1 :.! ,'J • '\ 
+8 A ~ j t + 3 - , ,* + (1 - As) A8 3' (1 - 6h)' Et (If/t,t+:Jllc,t+:J) 
Lt 
+ ... 
00 , 00 
"'" \k.:)kJt+k ""'( \) \k0k+l (1 r )k+l E ( ) lfh,tUc,t = LA,.I) h* + L 1- A" AsU - °h I 'ih,t+i.:tl I/",/t-kt I 
k=O t k=O 
or ill recursive form 
1 
-Rlt +R2t hi' , 
= jt + As/3RJ,t+l 
= (1 - As) 3 (1 - 8h ) E, (qh,/+l'llc,t+l) + As ,1 (1 - ( 11 ) RVt1 
which implies that the real house price ill tenus of the marginal ut.ility of ('Oll-
Ii I ThE' updatpd households' lit ility maxirnisat ion probll'lTl is shown in t lw A pJll'ltcli x, 
Importantly, the bond;, market dearing condition Iweds to bl' I'!'('onsidl'r!'d, If WI' il""IIIIIC 
that households belong to a family or assurnp a perfect insu!'Hnc(' llIark!'t to maintain a 
same consumption l e \ ' l ~ l . . the bonds markpt c\paring condition ('an bold, 
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sumption at t equals to the sum of the marginal utility of hOllsing at t + k, 
k = 0,1,2, ... , and the expected real house price (for resale) ill terms of the 
discounted marginal utility of consumption at t + k, k = 1,2, ... , taking the 
discount factor and the probability of trade into account. This intratempo-
ral optimality condition describes an optimal allocation of resource hetween 
consumption and domestic housing, and links the real house price to the op-
timal housing, rather than the total housing stock in the standard setting of 
the housing market. 02 
3.4.3 Calibration 
In the new setting of the housing market, the probability of no trade, \" is thl' 
only new parameter we introduce. In order to make the ratio of total honsing 
sold to total housing hit its target, we set this parameter to A,. = 0.000;'), 
which means that 99.05% of households do not trade housing in a given 
period. Therefore, the probability of trade, 1 - A, .. is D,0095, implying only 
0.95% of households enter the housing trading market ill a given period. This 
calibration implies that each household can re-enter tliP housing market OIl<T 
over 105 (i.e., is equal to 1 ~ A ' . ) ) quarters, i.e., 26 years interval. Mpl1nwhile, 
we keep the depreciation rate of housing stock at 6h = 0,002. 
Households preference 
Probability of no trade 
Probability of trade 
Depreciation rate 
The depreciation rate of housing stock 
0.9905 
n,OOHS 
() ,O()2 
li21f WP assume the propability of trade to one. A" == 0, til(' fin;t order ('()1I<iit ion lH'('ollH'S 
the standard form in the benchmark model. 
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3.4.4 Steady state ratios 
Here we discuss the steady state ratios. Firstly, by seWnp; the depredation 
rate of housing stock to Ih = 0.002, the steady state ratio of new housinp; sold 
to total housing, [HI H, is consistent with its empirical value, 0.002. Sec-
ondly, if we set probability of trade to 1 - As = 0.0095, together with tlw elf'-
preciation rate, the ratio of total housing sold to total housing, (1 - A,,) It· I H ) 
can meet its target, 0.0115. Thirdly, given the probability of trade and tIu' 
depreciation rate, the steady state ratio of new housing sold to total housing 
sold, [HI (1 - As) h*, can also hit its target, 0.172. Therefore, our new set-
ting allows these ratios to hit their targets simultancollslyY:1 In parti(,ular, 
the weight of new housing in the honsing trading market is 17.2%" much 
higher than that in the standard setting, 0.2%. 
Empirical ratios Expressions 
1 ~ 1 1 = 6h [lPW hOllsinM ~ o l d dtotlll h l l l l , i n ~ ~
tot al hOllsiIlg ~ ( } I d d
totlll h O l l s i n ~ ~
IU'\\' housing :-.old 
total hOllsin sold 
(I-;;lh" = <5h + (1 - As) (1 - 6h ) 
Targets 
0.002 
O.(Hl5 
O.l72 
SS Values 
O.O()2 
0.011;) 
0.172 
Meanwhile, we also need to check whether other steady state ratios IlH'('t 
their targets. Similar with the benchmark model, when WI' spt tlu' (IPpn'cia-
tion rate to 8h = 0.002, we still need to set the honsing pn'fl'n'IlCe to j = O.·t 
to allow the following steady state ratios close to their targets, which aw 
the sample averages between 1947(J1 and 2011Q4 from the U.S. llllf(,all of 
Economic Analysis. 
Interpretation Expressions Targets Values 
Anuual real interest rate R4 -1 3% : ~ < ; { , ,
Consumption share clGDP' 93% 92.2% 
Investment in housing capital [KIIIGDP' 0.3% O.G1Yc 
Housing investment share qIHIGDP' 7<;{ 7.2% 
li;!\f t1w first and seronrt ratios hit their targl'ts. thl' third ratio will do SIl as \\'pl!. 
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3.4.5 Impulse response analysis 
Housing sector technology shock Figure 3.7 shows the impulse r('-
sponses of variables to a one percent positive housing sector technology shock 
with persistence of PAh = 0.01. From the lower-left pand, we can see that 
the response of the real house price under the new setting (dashed line) is 
much larger than that under the standard setting (solid line). Precisdy, whell 
new housing production increases by 1%, the real house price decreases by 
0.09%, which is around 60 times larger than that under the standard set-
ting, 0.0015%, implying that the direct effect of a variable housing supply 
on the real house price is largely underestimated undm the standard setting. 
This result may challenge one of conclusions from Iacoviello and Neri (2010) 
that the slow growth of housing technology is the main caUS(l of the lwrsis-
tent increase in the real house price. Our results suggest that, if the impact 
of housing sector technology on the real house price is properly nwasllfPci, 
the rise in the real house price may not he' mainly contributed by thl' slow 
growth of housing technology because an increase in the housing t(leimol-
ogy has much larger impacts on the real house price. l \ 1 e a n w h i l ( ~ , , frolll tl\(' 
upper-right panel, consumption increases less as households shift resourC(\ to 
the housing sector because of a higher real house price. 
Goods sector technology shock and monetary policy shock Figur(' 
3.8 shows the impulse responses of variables to a one percent positivI' goods 
sector technology shock with persistence of P.-tc = 0.01. SiJl(·p WP know that 
the feedback effect is negligible in the benchmark lllodt'l (solid l i I H ~ ) , , til(' dif-
ference between these two lines approximates the magnitude of the b·dback 
effect. We can see that, under the new setting (dashed liw'), the f('('dhnck 
effect has an obviolls negative impact on the rea.l house priet'. [\{O[(' precis('ly, 
given a positive goods sector technology shock, whenn('w honsing productioIl 
increa.qes by 0.08%, the feedba.ck effeet. lea.ds to a O.0072<'Yc ( \ ! ~ ( " [ ( ' a s l ~ ~ in tlH' 
real house p r i c e Y ~ ~ Therefore, the feedba.ck effect is a.round 12% of till' total 
iilFrom the direct dfect. WI' know new how,ing prodllctioll i n < T ( , l b ( , ~ ~ h\' I'!.. til(' ['pal 
hOlN' pri('(' decrea"es hy 0.09%. Therpfore. whl'lI IIPW housillp; product iOIl illcJ"('<I"P"; hv 
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Figure 3.7: Impulse responses to a positive housing sector technology shock. 
The solid line is from the benchmark model and the dashed line is from the 
benchmark model with the new setting of the housing market. 
impact, 0.06%. 
Figure 3.9 shows the impulse responses of variables to a one percent pos-
itive monetary policy shock with persistence of PuR = 0.01. Similar with the 
previous case, the difference between these two lines also approximates the 
magnitude of the feedback ffeet. Under the new setting (dashed line), the 
feedback effect also has an obvious impact on the real house price. Morc 
precisely, giv n a positive monetary policy shock, wh n new housing produc-
tion decreases by O.lo/c, the feedback effect leads to a 0.09% rise in the real 
house price.65 Therefor, similar with the previous case, the fe dback effect 
is around 11% of the total impact, 0.8%.66 In sum, under the new setting of 
the housing market, the feedback effeet is around 60 tim s more than that 
under th standard setting, implying that the feedback effect of a variable 
0.08%, it hould lower the real hou e price by O . 0 9 ~ ~ . 0 0 % % = 0.0072%. 
65 From the direct effect. we know new housing production increa by l o/c, t he rea l 
house price d creases by 0.09o/c. Therefore. when new housing production incr a s by 
1 ~ . . it should lower the real hou e price by O . 0 9 ~ : : % % = O.09o/c. 
GOFor both ca e, under tandard sett ing. the ~ ~ edback effe t is les t han one p rcent (i.e .. 
0.2%) of the tota l impact. 
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Figure 3.8: Impulse responses to a positive' goods sector technology shock. 
The solid line is from the benchmark model and the dashed line is from the 
benchmark model with the new setting of the housing market . 
housing supply on the real house price is also largely underestimated under 
the standard setting. 
3.5 The feature of time to build 
While it is commonly assumed that a housing project is started and om-
pleted within one period. Our previous empirical analysis suggests tha t a 
housing project takes several quarters to complete. Therefore, in this s -
t ion, we relax the standard assumption and consider the feature of time to 
build for new housing production. The featur of time to build has been 
introduced to goods capital in Kydland and Prescott (1982) , Wen (1998), 
Tsoukalas (2010), but this is the first tim it is u d 'for new housing produc-
t ion in our chapter. We will consider this featur to the benchmark mod I 
and t he ben hmark mod 1 with the new setting of the housing market re-
spectively to di cuss its impact on the dynamics , 
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Figure 3.9: Impulse responses to a positive monetary policy shock. The solid 
line is from the benchmark model and the dashed line is from the benchmark 
model with the new setting of the housing market. 
3.5.1 The feature of time to build for investment 
The feature of time to build was originally introduced to goods capital. In 
a standard setting without this feature, a investment project tak s only one 
period to complete. As a result , the capital stock accumulation process is 
K e,t = (1 - 6) K e,t- l + [Ke,t 
which shows that investment at period t, [Ke,t , becom s productive capital 
at period t + 1, with a I-period lag. 
After introducing the feature of time to build, the investment project 
takes more than one period to complete. If we assume a J -period lag in the 
investment project, the capital stock accumulation pro ess becomes 
K e,t = (1- 8) K e,t- l + [Ke,t-(J- l ) 
which shows that investment at period t - (J - 1), [Ke,t- (J - I) , becomes 
productiv capital at period t + 1, aft r J periods. 
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3.5.2 The feature of time to build for housing production 
In the literature of DSGE models with housing, it is commonly assumed that 
a housing project is started and completed within one period. The standard 
housing production function is 
which implies that a housing project, I Ht, is initiated and completed in 
period t, using housing sector technology in period t, Ah,t, and housing capital 
from period t - 1, Kh,t-l. 
Then we introduce the feature of time to build to new housing produc-
tion. ti7 If we assume a J-period lag in new housing production, tlw simplest 
case is to assume that housing has been built at t - .I and becomes availablp 
in period t. The sequence of this approach is that: (i) at period t -.I, housing 
producers built new housing using housing capital Kh,t-I-J; (ii) at period t, 
housing producers make new housing available in the housing trading lIlar-
keto This new feature affects two equations in the model: (i) til(' housing 
production function, and (ii) the housing producers' demand for housing 
capital. 
Firstly, the housing production fUllction becomes 
which implies that the new housing aV'd.ilable in period t, I H" is built using 
the housing sector technology from period t - .I, A",t-J, and tit(' housing 
capital froIll period t - 1 - J, Kh,t-l-.J. 
Secondly, the housing producers' real profit maximisation problt'Ill is 
00 
ipax Et L At,t+k (qh,t+k I Ht+k - Rkh,t+kKh,t+k .. 1) 
h,/-l k=O 
where CJh,tIHt is the real revenue and Rkh,tKh,t-1 is the real ('ost ill lwrio<i 
Ii. Actually. we can introdllce this ff'atllre twin'. i.e .. for housillp; ('apital and hllll,;ill)!, 
production fPspectively. 
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t. Without the feature of t.ime t.o build, t.he difference between tlwm is tll!' 
profit of the housing projects initiated at period t. In cont.rast, given tht' 
feature of time to build, the profit of a honsing project that starts at. period 
t is the difference between it.s real fut.ure revenue, qh,t+.J1 Ht+.J, and its real 
current cost, Rkh,tKh,t-l. 
The first order condition derived from this real profit maximisation de-
scribes the housing producers' demand for housing capital, and it. is expressed 
as 
where At,t+.J is the stochastic discount factor, which is used to discount profit 
in terms of utility. This equation implies that the real rcnt.al price Rk/I,/ is 
equal to the expected marginal product of housing capital, which (kpI'lIds 
on the future real house price qh,t+.J. Besides, this equation also implies that. 
housing producers are concerned with the profit over each project, instead of 
the profit over each period. 
3.5.3 Impulse response analysis for the benchmark model with 
the feature of time to build 
First, we consider the feature of time to build in the benchmark Illodd. VVI' 
consider a 4-period lag in new housing production since the empirical data 
suggests that it usually takes 4 quarters to complete a housillg proj<,d. 
Figure 3.10 and 3.11 shows the impulse responses of variabks to it olle 
percent positive goods sector technology shock with persistcnce of P,lc = (J,O 1 
and a one percent positive monetary policy shock with persist.('w·C' of [i" II = 
0.01, respectively. \Ve can sec that tlw feature of time t.o build <1m's not 
have any obvious impact on model variables except new honsing procilld.iou. 
This is because the weight of new housing ill the housing tradiug markl't is 
negligible, i.e., 0.2<.K, in the standard sE't.ting, thus a ( ~ h a l l g ( ' ' ill u('\\' housing 
production has no obvious impact. on thl' economy. 
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Figure 3.10: Impulse responses to a positive good sector technology shock. 
The solid line is from the benchmark mod I and the dashed lin is from the 
benchmark model with the feature of tim to build. 
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Figure 3.11: Impulse responses to a positive monetary policy shock. The solid 
line is from the benchmark model and the dashed lin is from the ben hmark 
model with the feature of time to build. 
3.5.4 Impulse response analysis for the benchmark model with 
the new setting of the housing marke t and the featur of 
time to build 
Then we add the feature of time to build into the ben hmark model wit h the 
new s tting of the housing market. We also consider a 4-period lag in new 
housing production. 
In the new setting, the wight of new housing in the housing trading 
market is around 17.2%, thus a hang in new housing production hav a 
larger impa t on the real hou e price. Figure 3.12 and 3.13 hows the impul. e 
responses of variables to a one p rcent positive g ods sector technology shock 
with persistence of PAc = 0.01 and a on percent positive m netary policy 
shock with persistence of Pu R = 0.01, resp ctively. Recall that, in th model 
without the feature of t im to build, the feedback ffect has a larger impact 
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on the real house price under t.he new setting (dotted line) than that uuder 
the standard setting (solid line), and the difference b e t w ( ~ e n n thcHe two lilH's 
approximates the magnitude of the feedback effect. 
After introducing the feature of time to build, together with the new He't.-
ting, the dynamics of the real house price (dashed line) haH changed. We' can 
see that the feedback effect on the real house price iH delayed while t l H ~ ~ <10-
mand side effect of the shocks is diminishing, thus the feedback effect iH more 
obvious. Therefore, one important implication of the feature of t.ime to build 
is that, given a goods sector technology shock or a mOlwt.ary policy shock, 
the feedback effect leads to an overshooting behaviour for til<' f('al hOIlH(, 
price. For example, the real house price reHpondH positively to til(' goods 
sector technology shock, but it falls shapely and becomeH negative wh(lJl lH'W 
housing production begins to respond, before returning towards its Htpa<iy 
st.ate. This is because that (i) new housing production rcspondH pOHitiwly 
to the goods sector technology shock and this higllPr housing supply ha.s 11 
negative impact on the real house price; and (ii) the f{'at.ure of tilll(' t.o build 
delays this negative feedback effect while the positive dC'lIlrtml side e f f ( ~ c t t is 
diminishing. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we introduce new housing production int.o t . l u ~ ~ modd, h('IlC(, 
we can discuss the supply side effect, which includes both til{' dir('ct ('ff('ct 
and the feedback effect. 
Our impulse response analysis suggests that the magllit.ud('s of tlws(' two 
effects from new housing production are negligible to the (,(,OllOIllY. \\'1' sup-
pose that the standard setting of the housing mark('t is thE' f('il.'';Oll for our 
results. This standard s('tting assumes that, in a given period, ('wry hous('-
hold enters the housing market., thus all house is traded. Consl'qul'ntiy. I.hl' 
weight of new housing in the housing trading markd. is equal to t.1l(' dpprl'ci-
at ion rate of housing, which is small. Therefore, the magnit.ude of the suppl.\" 
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side effect of new housing production, including the dired effect and till' 
feedback effect, is small. 
);ext, our empirical analysis shows that several steady state ratios froIII 
the benchmark model cannot meet their empirical targets. This failure mo-
tivates us to construct a new setting for the housing market. As our first 
contribution in this chapter, the new setting of the housing market allows 
that (i) the steady state ratios from the model to be consistent with their 
empirical targets, and (ii) the supply side effect of new housing productioll 
on the real house price to increase by 60 times. 
Our second contribution in this chapter is the introduction of tlw tilll<' 
to build feature in new housing production. This feature is also sllpport('d 
by our empirical evidence. One important implication of the fC'atun' of tiuw 
to build is that, given a goods sector technology shock or a IIlo11dary policy 
shock, the feedback effect leads to an overshooting behaviour for till' real 
house price because the response of new housing production brings an OPP(}-
site effect on the real 40use price against the shock, and the feat un' of tim(' 
to build delays this effect while the demand side effect is diminishing. 
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3.A Appendix to Chapter 3 
3.A.1 Lagrangian program for household in the benchmark model 
The benchmark model in this chapter is a simple OSGE model with thp 
feature of sticky prices and a housing production. households maximise thpir 
lifetime utility subject to their budget constraint, 
3.A.2 Lagrangian program for household in the benchmark model 
with a new setting of the housing market 
The following table summarises the utility and the budget ("Oustmillt ill P('-
riod t + k, k = 0,1,2, ... , if the households ean t.rade in period t. Aftpr 
eombining these expressions, we obtain the lifetime utility function and tI\(' 
contemporary budget constraint. 
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Period t prob of trade 1 prob of IlO trad(' () 
utility In h ~ ~
budget constraint q",1 (1 - 6,,) H t- 1 - q " , t h ~ ~
Period t + 1 prob of trade 1 - As prob of no trade -\, 
utility In h;+l In(l-6,,)h7 
budget constraint q",t+l (1 - 8,,) h; - q",t+lh;+l q",I+l (1 - 6h) h; - qh,f+1 (1 - 8'1) h; 
Period t + 2 prob of trade As (1 - As) 2 prob of no tra<i(' A,. 
utility In h;+2 ( - )2 I * III 1 - 6" I, 
budget constraint Qh,t+2 (1 - 6h)2 h; - q",t+2h;+2 fjh,t+'2 (1- 6,,)2 h; -ljh.t+'2 (1 - 6,,)'2 Ii; 
...... . ..... . ..... 
Period t + k prob of trade A ~ - l l (1 - As) 1 k' prob of no tnt( (' As 
utility In h;+k In (1 - 6,,)k It; 
budget constraint qh,t+k (1 - 6h )k h; - lJh,l+kh;+k - )'" I • (1 -)" I • f/h,l+k (l -?J" 1/ - 1J1t,It-k - I'" I, 
The households maximise their lifetime utility subject to tiwir budgd 
constraint, 
:xJ 
max ELL 
Ct .ht .Ttt,h; ,Kn,t k=O 
3.A.3 Steady state ratios for the benchmark model 
In order to solve the model, we need following steady state ratios: ~ ~ awl 
r:. 
(' 
From the households' marginal utility of eommmpt.ioIl, we have 
1 
Il" = -
(' 
Chapter 3 12() 
since r c = II-I;? . 
-ute 
From the households demand for housing, we have tlw st{'ady stat,(' valu(' 
f 9lJ!. o c' 
qhh .J 
--
C 1-,3(1-6/t) 
From the housing market clearing condition, we have 
h=H 
Thus we have the steady state value of %':1, 
From the housing capital accumulation process, we have the s t ( ~ a d y y s t a t < ~ ~
value of If!, 
IH _ 
-=6" H 
Combining the steady state value of ¥ and I / ~ / , , we have the st,(\ady s t a t { ~ ~
value of qh lH , 
c 
q/tIH qhH IH 
=----(' (: H 
From the households' demand for housing capital, we have the steady 
state value of Rklt , 
R 1 - ,J (1 - 6 kit) 
kh = 1-3 
From the housing producers' demaiHi for housing capital, we have th!' 
steady state value of q ~ . [ [H , 
"kh 
= 
Kkh Ilk" 
From the housing capital accumulation proC('SS, we have til(' steady statl' 
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value of & Kh' 
IKh _ .. 
-- - ukh 
Kh 
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Combining the steady state value of qit and !.Jf;:, we have the steady Htate 
I f '1h.!.!l vaueo IKh ' 
qh IH = qhIH IIKh 
IKh Kh Kh 
Then combining the steady state value of 9 h c ~ ~Hand qh lll we haY(' tlw 
IKh ' 
steady state value of I ~ h h , 
From the goods market clearing condition, we have the steady statp vahi(' 
of r. 
c' 
y = 1 + IKh 
C C 
3.A.4 Targets for steady state ratios 
Here are the target steady state ratios from Iacoviello and :'\'eri (2010). 
Interpretation Expressions 
Annual real interest rate R4 - 1 
Consumption share clCDP 
Business Investment share (I K(. + I Kh ) I G D P 
Housing investment share qI HICDP 
Housing wealth qHI (4· CDP) 
Business investment in non-housing sector Kel (4· G DP) 
Business investment in housing sector Kltl (4· CDP) 
Value of land PII (4· CD?) 
Targets 
3l){ 
G7 l/;' 
27 lX 
GlX 
l . ; ~ G G
2.05 
0.04 
0.:) 
where the GDP is composed as G D P = r + I K,. + I Kit + IJh J 11. VV(' ('all 
derive the ratio of investment in goods sector to iuvpstuwut ill hOIlHing H('ctor 
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1\ 
from this table: & = 8kc Kc = 8 k C ~ ~ = 0 . 0 ~ 5 . 2 . 0 5 5 ~ ~ 43. 
IKh 8kh K " 8 k h ~ ~ 0.0.1.0.04 
Our targets from empirical data are 
Interpretations Targets 
Annual real interest rate 3% 
Consumption share 65(Yc) 
Non-housing investment share 11 % 
Housing investment share 5% 
Since we do not have goods capital, we replace CD P by CD P' = (. + I fi" + 
qhl H. Now we produce the steady state ratios that need to be consistcnt wit.h 
the sample average from data. Given the ratio of investment in goods se('tor 
to investment in housing sector is 43, we know that the share of investllll'llt 
in housing sector is 11% * 414 = 0.25%. 
The revised targets for the GDP-related steady st.at.e rat.ios a n ~ ~ ohtaiIwd 
as 
c 
= CDP' 
c CDP _ ~ ~ * 1 _ ( ~ o / r r
CDP CDP' - 0.6;) 0.7025 - 92.;) r 
IKh 
CDP' 
l ~ ~ CDP 1 0 
CDP CDP' = 0.0025 * 0.7025 = OAYc: 
qhIH 
CDP' 
(j}JH CDP = 0.05 * 1 = 7% 
CDP CDP' 0.7025 ( 
SI'IICl' CDP' = 0.65%+0.25%+5% = 7() 2t;()1, 
• .. CD? 0.65%+11%+5% . viC. 
Revised targets for steady state ratios are 
Interpretations Expressions Targets 
Annual real interest rate R4 - 1 3(,Yr 
Consumption shaw cjCDP' n.Go/r 
Business investment in housing sector I ]\hjCDP' 0.4% 
Housing invest.nwnt. sham q I H / C D P' 7o/r 
The consumption t.o GDP ratio is 
_(_: _ = l/ CDP' = 1/ (1 + lfi" + qll/H) 
CDP' c (' (' 
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The housing capital investment to GDP ratio is 
= -----
CDP' c CDP' 
The value of new housing to GDP ratio is 
qhIH qhIH c 
=----
CDP' c CDP' 
3.A.5 Steady state ratios for the benchmark model with the new 
setting of the housing market 
From the housing trading market clearing condition, we have 
IH 15 11 
- - - ~ - = = - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - ~ ~(1 - As) h* 6h + (1 - A,.) (1 - 8,,) 
which is the ratio of new housing to total traded housing, 1.<'., the weight. 
of new housing in the housing trading market. If we a.ssllme that every 
household can trade, (1 - As) = 1, thus the weight of IU'W hOllsing in t.h!' 
housing trading market is equal to the depreciation rat.e of housillg, ~ / ! ! = 8". 
From the households' demand for housing, we haw 
If we a.,<;sume that every household can trade, (1 - A,.) = 1, t.h(' st.paeiy st.at.!' 
of t.his equation becomes qhllch* = 1-,3(L8
h
)' which is ('xactly same with t.hat. 
in the standard setting of the housing market. 
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4 Adaptive Learning and Heterogeneous Ex-
pectations 
4.1 Introduction 
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have h()(m widely 
used in academia and the central banks for macroeconomic ana.lysis. Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003, 20(7) pro-
vide examples of medium-sized DSGE models. These DSGE models a.re huilt 
on the hypothesis of rational expectations, which assUIlleS that ag(mts haV(' 
full information about the economy, i.e., they know the structure of the tflH' 
model and the values of the model parameters, and use them to form ex-
pectations for the future. Therefore, agents are able to form beliefs that 
are consistent with actual outcomes. Slobodyan and Wouters (2012) a.rgue 
that the assumption of rational expectations is too strong aud lIlodels ull(kr 
rational expectations find it difficult to capture the persist.euce of lIlacroecn .. 
nomic variables. As a result, researchers Heed to use highly pprsistcnt shock 
or add other features, such 8." consumption habit and price indexation, t.o 
capture the persistence of macroeconomic variables in models under rational 
expectations. 
The adaptive learning mechanism, an alternativo way of forecasting th(' 
future, is discussed by l\larcet and Sargent (1989a, 198!)b), Evans aHel Honkapo .. 
hja (1!)!)9, 2(02), but they pay attention to the convergence of the Illodds 
to the rational expectations equilibrium. They describe the' main i<i('a about 
the assumption of adaptive learning: agents do not necessarily have full in-
formation about the structure of the true model and the values of the model 
parameters, thus they need to use their experience to fOn'cast t.he futur<', awl 
then make adjustments when they realise their mistakes. 
Since this alternative was suggested, the q u a n t i t a t i v ( ~ ~ illlportaH(,l' of til<' 
adaptive learning I l l ~ ' C h a n i s m m in business cych' ftuetuations has IWPll (iis('usspd 
in the context of DSGE Illodels. Milani (2007) provides the first. ( ~ x a l l l p i < < of 
using Bayesian methods to e s t i l l l a t ( ~ ~ a DSGE model uuder adaptivp karuin).!. 
by considering a constant learning algorithms, which gives all (·qual wl'ight 
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to newly observed data, and a correct learning model, i.e., agents are ahl(' to 
include correct endogenous state variables in the forecasting equatiolls. In 
his article, the gain coefficient and structural and policy parameters of the 
economy are jointly estimated. He finds that the adaptive leaming mecha-
nism can represent a potential single source that can brings persistpllce to 
economy, and some features, such as consumption habit and price in<l<'xa-
tion, become reductant that are usually required under rational expectations 
to match the inertia of macroeconomic variables. Slobodyan and Wouters 
(2009) evaluate the empirical relevdnce of the adaptive leaming mechanism ill 
an estimated medium-scale DSGE model. They find that their model under 
adaptive learning with a correct learning model fit the data b e t t ( ~ r r than the 
model under rational expectations. In partieular, if the set of v a r i a b h ~ s s used 
in the forecasting equations is limited to a list of observed macro-variables, 
i.e., using a small learning model, their model can explain the data h(,Upr 
than that with a correct learning model. Overall, the adaptive leaming lll('("h-
anism adds additional persistence to the model but it does not systcnmtieally 
change the estimated structural parameters in the DSGE model. 
The success of the small learning models is abo I - i h a f l ~ d d by othPf rp-
searchers. Williams (2003) assumes that learning agents know the struct.ure 
of the economy and also observe the exogenous processes, i.t'., tht'y use a ('01'-
rect learning model. In this ca.'Ie, he finds that the adaptive leamillg llH'dm-
nislIl does not have obvious impacts on tlw volatility and the pprsist.pJl("(, of 
economic variables. When he, however, assumes that, agents do not. know til(' 
structure of the economy and only select several important ('collomic indica-
tors to generate and update their heliefs, i.e., using a sIllall learning lllodd, 
he fimb that the adaptive learning mechanism ha." much greater propagatioJl 
effects on model variables, and leads to higher volatility aud persist(mcp. Tlw 
empirical relevance of small learning model is also examined. Adam (2()05) 
finds the dynamics correlations of output and infla.tion ma.tch til<' U.S. data 
well when agents use a small learning modd. Eusepi and Prestoll (2011) also 
consider a small learning model in their specification to explo\"(' tilt' adaptiw 
learning mechanism as a source of economic fluctuatiou. Th(''y nlld t.hat, 
under a.daptive learning, the volatility of output is comparahk t.o that. uud!'r 
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rational expectations, but with a standard deviation of technology shock that. 
is 20% smaller. Meanwhile, the adaptive learning mechanism provid('s mow 
volatility in investment and hours. Motivated by the success of the slllall 
learning model in their previous papers, Slobodyan and Woutns (2012) ex-
plore this issue further in an estimated medium-seale OSGE model. They 
assume that learning agents consider AR(2) learning models and their reslllts 
suggest that the model with adaptive learning can improve the empirical fit 
of the model. They also suggest that expectations based on small forecasting 
models are supported by the survey evidence on inflation expectations. 
In our chapter, we discuss the impact of the assumption of adaptive learn-
ing in a two-sector DSGE model with sticky prices, hOllsing production, the 
new setting of the housing market, and the feature of time to build. The 
main features of our adaptive learning mechanism are following: (i) we IIS(, 
random data that are generated under rational expectations to form initial 
beliefs; (ii) we cOllsider a constant gain learning algorithm; (iii) w(' liSP It 
simple AR( 1) learning model, which is motivated by the success of tht' sIllall 
learning model. Our contributions to this literature are: (i) the dynallli<-
impacts of the AR( 1) learning model are explored; (ii) the int,pradioll Ill'-
tween the adaptive learning mechanism and the feature of time to build is 
discussed. After writing the Nottingham Learning Toolbox, we find that th(' 
adaptive learning mechanism largely amplifies and propagates tlH' impact of 
a goods sector technology shock on the economy. \Ve suppost' t.hat tllP am-
plification and propagation effect added by the adaptiVt' lparnillg IlWChallislIl 
reflects from higher weights on lagged endogenous and pxogellolls variables ill 
the aetuallaw of motion compare to the rational expectations 1II0d<'1. l\I('fUl-
while, the adaptive learning mechanism enlarges t.he impact of the tilll(, to 
build feature on the real house price and makes this variabl(\ ( ~ x h i h i t t mon\ 
obvious cyclical behaviour. 
The sensitivity of the dynamics to the initial beliefs and fht' updating 
algorithms under adaptive learning is a.<;sessed by Care('}es-Pove<!a and Giall-
llitsarou (2007) in an univariate forward looking linear mo(h'I. TI1('), ("ollsid<'r 
three ways of initialbdug initial beliefs: one t.hat. uses randomly g('IH'ratt'd 
data, one that is ad hoc and another t.hat lIses all appropriatl' dbtrihll-
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tion. They also discuss three algorithms: recursive lea..qt squares, stochas-
tic gradient, and constant gain learning. They find that the behaviour of 
macroeconomic variables depends on both the initial beliefs and the learning 
algorithms. In particular, for the constant gain algorithms, they find that 
the value of the gain coefficient is crucial for determining the dynamics of 
the system. 
For the same purpose, we carry out a sensitivity analysis to check for 
the robustness of our results. While our results are generally robust, we 
emphasise the following findings. Firstly, we find that the shapes of im-
pulse responses heavily depend on the values of initial beliefs, implying that 
we should consider average initial beliefs, instead of particular initial be-
liefs when we make comparisons between impulse respomms from rat.ional 
expectations and adaptive learning models. These results also imply that, 
under adaptive learning, given a same exogenous shock, the respons(> of til(' 
economy depends on the previous economie conditions, while models 1111<1l'r 
rational expectations always produce exactly same responsos. till Secondly, 
using the forecasting errors to update current beliefs through t l u ~ ~ updating 
process is a fundamental step in the adaptive learning mechanism. Thl' vaillP 
of the constant gain coefficient that are commonly used in the literature is 
betwL'Cn 0 - 0.05. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that, when tlH' valu<' 
of the constant gain coefficient is within this range, the fOf('('Hsting errors 
do not have obvious impacts on the dynamics, In contra.o.;t, if we consider 
larger values, 0.1 and 0.2, i.e., agent.s a..<;sign more weights on f<'C('llt dat.a, tlw 
forecast prrors have obvious impacts OIl the dynamies. 
Furthermore, while there is only one type of agents ill the modds UIl-
der rational expectations or adaptive learning, it is more realistic to aSSUllH' 
that we have both types of agents simultaneously, and this ca.<;(' is r < - f ( ' r n ~ d d
to a..<; heterogenous expL'Ctatiolls, There are several works that consi<i('r till' 
interaction between rational agents and non-rational agents ill OSGE mod-
els. Branch and McGough (2009) derive aggregate IS and AS relat.iolls that. 
HHFor example. the growth of CDP is on its Ion!!: run trend in 2002 and 20()(;, hilt <til 
identical monetary policy !;hock will have differpnt impact IwtwP('n th('sf' two y,'ar,., IH'l'allS(, 
households have different ('xppctat ions format ion. 
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are consistent with heterogeneous expectations from micro-founded Illodels. 
In addition, they discuss the impact of heterogeneolls expectations on the 
determinacy property of their model. In their setting, adaptive agents use 
constant beliefs to form expectations, and rational agents are partially ratio-
nal, i.e., they do not know the existence of adaptive agents. ti !) By taking one 
step further, Branch and McGough (2010) consider the dynamic effect of het-
erogeneous expectations in a DSGE model. The bounded rational agents use 
regression methods to obtain the coefficients, which are constant over time. 
Rational agents take bounded rational agents' beliefs into account. The solu-
tion of the model is called a restricted perceptions equilibria. They find that. 
heterogeneous expectations can amplify and propagate tlw effect. of shocks 
on model variables. Besides, they find that an increa..,(' ill tlw proportion 
of bounded rational agents magnifies the propagation effect under the as-
sumption of heterogeneous expectations. Fuster, Laibson and r..ll'Jl(If'1 (2010) 
also consider the dynamic effect of heterogmlPous expectations ill a DSGE 
model. In their setting, rational agents form tlwir expectations b<l.<.;('d UpOll 
the RE model (referred to as rational expectations), while intuitivp ap;t'llts 
form their beliefs using misspecified intuitive model (referred to as intllitiw 
expectation). The weighted average of the two is called na.tural ( ~ x p e ( ' t a t . i o n s . .
They show that, under intuitive expectations, the model varial>lPs ("an d('vi-
ate from steady state at long horizons. In their model, the hdiefs of intllitiw 
agents are constant as they arc not adjusted by the fo[pca,<.;tinp; ('rwrs, and 
rational agents are not fully rational since they do not know the existence of 
intuitive agents. 
In the second half of this chapter, wp will discuss t.he impact of heterog('-
nco us expectations with rational agents and learning ap;cnts. In our S('ttillg, 
the learning agents behave exactly the same way a,.., described hpfo}'('. l\1(,Hn-
while, we consider two types of rational agents: (i) partially rational ag('llts, 
who do not know the existence of learning agents; (ii) fully rational ag!'nts, 
who know the existence of learning agents and take h ~ a n w r s ' ' l)('li!'fs int.o ItC-
@The bounded rational agents use kt+ 1 = (tJk, to fort'cast t hp forward vllrinl,\P". Th,' 
C ( ) ( ~ t f i d p n b b are cOllstant over time. but pxpectations dumgp wlH'1l ~ : , , dHllIg"S. III cOlltrast. 
tlH' Ieaflling <t!l;ellts liSP kt+l = <1Jt _ 1k t • ill which till' bPlil'fs <;')1-1 an' tilllt'-mryillg. 
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count. Our contributions to this literature are that (i) we consider leaming 
agents under heterogeneous expectations, and (ii) we compare two cas!'s of 
heterogeneous expectations, i.e., one with partially rational agents and one 
with fully rational agents. We obtain two findings from our impulse reS!>OWiC 
analysis, given that two types of agents have equal weights. Firstly, the r('-
sponses of variables from heterogeneous expectations are larger than those 
from rational expectations, implying that the adaptive learning mechanism 
also has amplification and propagation effects when only a fraction of popu-
lation is learning agents. Secondly, although two types of agents haw equal 
weights, the impulse responses from heterogeneous expectations a.n' lIluch 
closer to those from rational expectations than those from adaptiV<' ieaming. 
This indicates that, while the adaptive learning mechanism adds amplifica-
tion and propagation effects on the economy, the existence of rational agents 
largely weakens these effects. The economic implication of til(' s(,("()lld find-
ing is quite interesting: when rational agents h e h a v ( ~ ~ like learning ag!'llts in 
order to push up asset prices for profits, the volatility of til(' ('conoJllY in-
creases a great deal. 70 Thirdly, when rational agentli are fully rational, til(, 
adaptive learning mechanism has a larger amplification and propagatioll ('[-
fect on the economy than when rational agents are partially rational. TIl(' 
economic logic is that, if rational agents are fully rational, they silould know 
how learners' beliefs affect the economy, and thus rational ap;{'lIts' hdit,fs will 
have further impaets on the economy. In our sensitivity unalysili, w(' cOllsi<i('r 
various compositions of agents, and Wp find t.hat t.hp adaptive leamillg !Iwch-
a n i ~ . ; y n n has a larger amplification and propagation effect WhPll til<' proportion 
of learning agents is higher. In addition, regardless of the compositions, fully 
rational agents always bring larger amplification and propagat.ion ('ff!'cts on 
the economy than partially rational agents. 
711 A quotf' from the Citigroup·s then-chief executive. Chuck Prill(,(': whill' til<' 11I1I"i(' i" 
playing. you have to dance. Large IlUsiness{)s arp more likely to 1)(' rational than hOIl"dluld" 
b()CURSI' they have more information and are ablp to analys!' it. How('ver. tllP)' llIilV I",lra\'(' 
likl' learning agents in order to obtain profit. 
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4.2 The adaptive learning mechanism 
First of all, we discuss the assumption of rational expectations and tlw as-
sumption of adaptive learning in a context of a log-linearised OSGE model. 
4.2.1 DSGE model in a matrix form 
In general, a log-linearised OSGE model can be sl1mmari:-led as 
(4.1 ) 
and 
(4.2) 
The vector k contains endogenous variables, including state variables ( t h ( ) s ( ~ ~
appearing with a lag), forward variables (those appearing with It lead), and 
static variables.' I ~ 1 a t r i c e s s aI, a2, b are the model paralll('ters. The V('c-
tor ::: contains exogenous variables, which follow an AR( 1) process with an 
iid (0,0- 2 ) disturbance Ct. The matrix of constants, p, ('an b ( ~ ~ S ( ~ e l l l a.s til<' 
growth rates of these exogenous variables and the matrix of I:1lltocorrdat.ioll 
coefficients, p, describes the persist.cnce of t.hese exogl'IlollS variableH. Tlw 
solution of the model is expressed as 
which describes how the current endogenous v a r i a b } { ~ s , , kt, n ~ H p ( ) l l d d to l a ~ ; g < ' d d
endogenous variables, kt - h lagged exogenous v a r i a b l < ~ s , , :::/--1, awl (,lll'rclIt 
exogenous disturbances, Ct. The matrices of codlidellts T and Van' dNiVl'd 
from the matricps of the model parameters, (ll, {/2, b. 
71 St a t ! ~ ~ variahles and forward variables ('ollid intl'rs('d. 
Chapter 4 
4.2.2 The assumption of rational expectations 
In DSGE models, rational expectations (RE) usually is a standard assllIlll}-
tion. This assumption implies that agents have full information about the 
economy, i.e., they know the structure of the true model and the value of 
the model parameters. Therefore, without exogenous dist.urbance, t.hey can 
form beliefs (or expectations) that are consistent with actual outmllles. We 
refer this type of agents to as 'rational agents'. 
Before solving the model, rational agents need to form beJids ahout tit!' 
motion of variables. Assume that rational agents form such bel ids 
where c P ~ - l l arc the coefficients in rational agents' beliefs. For simplicity, 
we also refer it to as beliefs directly. This is known CI." th(' p('rcpiwd law 
of motion (PLM), which describes how variables hehave in ratiollal agl'lIt.s' 
beliefs. If we forward this PLl\l one period ahead, we have a matrix equatioll 
that describes how rational agents form beliefs about forward variahles kif I, 
where E; denotes the expectation operator under ratiollal I'xj>p(·tations!:' 
Then by plugging these beliefs into the matrix equation 4.1, wp call solve tit(' 
DSGE model and its solution is 
This is known as the act ual law of motioll (ALM), and T ( ( / ) ~ ~_ I) a.nd V (i);' I) 
are the matrices of coefficients in ALl'v1. The actual law of 1IIOt.iOIl (it>scrih('s 
how variables behave in reality given rational ag(mts' bdiPfs. TI\(' (>ro('('SS 
of transforming PLM to ALM, Lp., from ( / ) ~ ~-1 t.o T ( ( J ) ~ _ _ 1) and \. ((I);' _ I ), is 
known as mapping. 7:1 
Under rational expectations, rational agent.s call form hdh.fs that an' 
72L'nder rational expeerations. tlw PL\I is constant o\,pr tillll'. thlls \\"(' 1111\'" , . . ) ~ ~ c.o;- \. 
7:IOot h PL:\I and AL\1 are ('ollstant o\'er tiIll(' under rational ('xppctatioll", 
Chapter 4 1:32 
consistent with the actual outcomes, i.e., ¢ ~ _ I I = T ( ¢ ~ ~ __ I). III ot.her words, 
without exogenous disturbance, the economy behaves in the s a l l l ( ~ ~ way that 
rational agents perceive. Therefore, rational expectations is a c o l l V e l l i l ~ l l t t but 
strong assumption. 
4.2.3 The assumption of adaptive learning 
Under the assumpt.ion of adapt.ive learning, agents do not have full infor-
mation about the economy, i.e., they do not know the structUf(' of t.h(' tnH' 
model and the value of the model parameters. Therefore, tlH'Y are Hot abl<' 
to form beliefs that are consistent with actual outcomes. Instead, w<' assulll<' 
that they use historical data to form their beliefs, and t.hen make updatl's 
using the forecasting errors at the end of each period, thus their belil{s an' 
time-varying. We refer this type of agents to as 'h'aming agents', and \VI' 
suppose that the a<.;sumption of adaptive learning is llIOf(' rpalistic than til<' 
a.ssumption of rational expectations. 
Generating the initial beliefs Here we discuss how learning ag{'(lts form 
their beliefs under the a'lSUmptioll of adaptive loarning. \ V ( ~ ~ aSSllll1<' that 
learning agents believe that the forward variable is a linear fUlIction of til<' 
model variables. They use historical data and simple regressioll llH'tho<is t.o 
estimate the coefficients, and then use the coefficients to forlll t.heir init.ial 
beliefs. 
At the beginning of period t, learning agents need to form ('xl)('ct.ations 
for forward variables k t + l • They have informa.tion up to t - 1, i.p., data froIll 
T = 1, ... , t - 1, t.hus they estimate the initial beliefs, ( / ) : ~ ~ I' Ilsing til<' ()f(iillary 
lea-;t square method7 ! 
The values of the estimated eodficieut.s, 0; -I' which minimis!' tiu' <'rror, an' 
given by t.ll!' least squares formula, ( t > ~ _ 1 1 = (L:::: .1:;-1.< ,).12.::::: .r, .. ,k,. 
710ur n ~ s l l l t ~ ~ arc not a f f { ~ ! " t f ' d d if WI' indll<if' a ( " o l l ~ t a n t t tt'rrll. 
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The inclusion of variables in the independent vector, .l:t-2, dopends OIL the 
model specification, which will be d i s c u s s ( ~ d d later. 
After obtaining the coefficients, learning agents combine them wit.h laggml 
endogenous and exogenous state variables to form tlw perceived law of motion 
Then we forward it one period ahead to obtain the matrix equatioll that 
describes how learning agents form expectations for forward variablps, k, + I ,/.-, 
where E: denotes the expectation operator under adaptive ll'amillg. Tll('l1 
by plugging these beliefs into the matrix equation A, we call solve till' DSGE 
model and its solution is 
This is the actual law of motion (ALl\l), and T (o! _ I) and \. ((.'J: . dan' the 
matrices of coefficients in ALM. The actual law of motioll dl's(Til)('s how 
variables behave in reality given learning agents' b ( ~ l i d s . .
Since learning agents do not have full informat.ioll about the eCOllOlll.V 
under the assumption of' adaptive learning, they an' llot able to form bdids 
that are consistent with actual {)utcOllH'S, i.e., tPL 1 1= T ( ( ~ ~ ~ -1)' This impiil's 
that the econolllY behaves differently with what loarning agents p('rc('iv(" and 
forecasting errors arc generated. 
Updating the beliefs One important featurE' of tIl(' adaptive kal'lling 
mechanism is the updating proeess. As we discussed hd'on', il'amillg agl'llts 
70' At the hl'ginning of pl'riod t. Xt is Ilnknown. thlls w(' do not 11';(' F/I.·/ 1-1 ('.;.1'/ ~ i l l ( ' t ' '
rf>; is obtained aftf'r knowing Xl' which r e q l l i n ~ s s t h(' ('xp('(' I alions abollt I.: t t I. A [,.,n. \\'(' do 
:l 
\lot IIS(' Etkt + I = (Q; -I) .rl-l as t hI' walised \'fIllIP. k t C .r, ,.,lIolI[d hi' dilkn'1I1 wil II I Ill' 
I l'xpp('tl'd valliI'. r!J t _ 1 Tt_I' 
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use the estimated coefficients, ¢ ~ _ I ' ' to form expectations for forward van-
ables, kt+ l • After the actual value is realised, learning agents notice that 
there is a difference between the actual value and the expected value, and 
the difference is known as the forecasting error. Learning agents partia.lly U H ( ~ ~
the forecasting error to update their beliefs, using the recursive least squarf'S 
formula 
Rt = R t - I + 9 ( J ; t _ I X ~ _ 1 1 - R t - I ) 
¢ ~ ~ ¢:_I + gR-;-I Xt - 1 (k t - . r : _ I ( j ) ~ _ I ) )
where R t is the second moment matrix, i.e., Rt = gE:="l"i-,'<_" y is tltl' 
gain coefficient, and (kt - : r ; ~ _ 1 1 ¢ ~ _ I ) ) is the foreca.'iting error tPfllI.7!i TIl<' 
learning agents usc this recursive least squares formula as the upciatillg ('qua-
tions since it describes how the estimated coeffieil'llts are updated if w(' have 
one more new observation and thus one more ll<'W foreca.'itillg error, 
An interesting point in the aciaptive learning mechanism is that thl' CI\f-
rent values of endogenous variable, kt, is unknown at t.he beginning of p<'fiod 
t, and they are affected by learning agents' beliefs about. the forward tl'flnS, 
kt+ I. Once the current values, kt. are realised, h ~ a r n i l l g g agents will use t hp 
forecasting errors, i.e., the d i f f e r e n c ( ~ s s between tlw actual values and tlt(' h(,--
lids, to update their beliefs, which in turn a f f ( ~ c t t the vahws of ('Wiog!'1I0UH 
variables in the future. Therefore, there lllay be a feedback e f f ( ~ c t . . bpt.wpell 
the beliefs and actual outcomes, as they reinforce each othl'L 
The learning algorithm The value of the gain coeffidpnt is crucial for 
the adaptive learning mechanism. On the one hand, if we have it w('ursiw 
least square gain, 9 = t -\, w h e f ( ~ ~ t is t h ( ~ ~ total Humber of obs('rvatiolls over 
time h o r i ~ o n , , we have a recursive least squares learning algorithm. (11 this 
casp, learning agents do not discount past data. They giVt' ('qual w('ight t.o 
each observtl.tion, and thus the weight on newly o b s ( ~ r v e d d data is dl'<Tt'a.'iillg 
as the total number of obsprvations increases. TIlPr<'fof(', tIl(' {'ff('('( of ('111'1'<'111 
,liThe dprivation of t1lf' rpcllrsive Ipast '-quan's j<lrlllllia is shown in till' Appl·ndix, 
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forecasting error vanishes in the limit. 
On the other hand, if we have a constant gain, 9 = r, where c is a COll-
stant, we have a constant gain learning algorithm. 77 In this case, learning 
agents discount past data and continually pay equal attention to rIPwly ob-
served data. Therefore, current forecasting errors matter for learning a g ( ~ n t s ' '
beliefs even in the limit. In particular, this algorithm represents a SilllPlP 
way to apply the learning mechanism if agents are concerned with pot<mtial 
structural changes at unknown dates. 
Model specifications Here we discuss the model specifications, i.t'., which 
variables should be included in the independent vector, .r, when Ilsing r('gres-
sion methods to form initial beliefs or update existing bdids. 71'> On the one 
hand, if we assume that agents know the structure of the trut' modd hut not. 
the vdlues of the model parameters, they will know which v a r i a h h ~ s s an' stat(' 
variables. Therefore, they can select correct endogenous statl' \'ariahl('s t.o 
form and update their heliefs, and we refer this ca.'ie to a.<; tlH' ('OlT('ct lerlming 
model. 
On the other hand, if we assume that learning agents do not knO\v the 
structure of the true model, they will not know which variahks an' state 
variables. Therefore, learning agents will select important variahl('s, accord-
ing to their judgements, to form and update their helids. At OlH' extrell\(" 
learning agents include all variables in the regression to forlll awl updat(' I)(\.. 
lids for eaeh variable, and we refpr this case to a.'i the full learning lllod('l. At 
another extreme, learning agents only include its own lagged t('flllS to form 
and update beliefs for each variable, and we refer this cast' to as tIl<' AR( 1) 
learning model. In the middle between these two extr<'llH'S, It'Hflliug a , g t ~ l l t . s s
lllay consider several important economic indicators, such as iuflation, til(' 
nominal interest rate, ontput, to form and updatE) b d i ( ~ f s s for each variabl<\ 
and we refer this ea.'ie to a.'i the sIllall learning l11o<iC'I.'!J 
"The constant gain algorit hms. which is widdy Ilsl'd now, is rpf'!'IT!'d n" ' p ( ' r " i ~ t " l \ t t
l('arning dynamics' in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). 
' ~ I n n our chapter. we aSS1Ime that agpnts art' not able to o b s ( , f \ ' ( ~ ~ tllf' vahlP "I' I'X()gl'1I01l" 
varia hll'';. 
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4.2.4 Impulse response analysis 
In this section, we examine how the assumption of adaptive learning a f f { ~ d s s
the dynamics of the economy, by comparing the impulse responses from ratb-
nal expectations and adaptive learning respectively. We build our analYHis on 
two models from the Chapter 3. The first one is the benchmark model with 
the new setting of the housing markeLl'll) The second one is the benchmark 
model with the new setting of the housing market and the feature of time 
to build, as we also examine the interaction between the adaptive leaming 
mechanism and the feature of time to build. 
Initial beliefs, learning algorithm, and model specification The 
Hhapes of impulse responses depend on learning agents' init.ial belipfs, which 
in turn are determined by the sequence of randomly generated data_ I II our 
sensitivity analysis, we show that the impulse responses from partkular illi-
tial beliefs are not representative, and thus it is misleading to ("olllpan' tlu'lll 
with those from rational expectations. In order to overcome this problelll, we 
calculate average initial beliefs using 100 sequences of randomly getH'rat.ed 
data and then produce impulse responses.tll 
As we are convinced that the recent observatioIlH haw' lllOW valuahlp 
information to forecast the future than historical onCH, wo use the eOllstallt 
gain learning algorithm. In this algorithm, learning agents discount past data 
and rely more on recent observations. Another reason for using this algorithm 
is that learning agents acknowledge the exiHtence of structural breaks. 
For the model specification, we consider an AR(l) learning Illodel, par-
tially motivated by the successful of small learning model in t l l < ~ ~ litprature. 
We are also convinced that ordinary households use simple t('cillliqu{'s, rat.lH'1' 
than sophiHticated models, to foreca."it the future. The AR( 1) karuiug lllOdl'l 
Evans and Honkapohja (2001), 
xliThe benchmark model i ~ ~ a two-sedor DSGE model with the fpattln' of "ticky p l ' i ( ' . ~ " "
and housing production, 
X1To examine whether the average initial belids that WI' Wi!' i ~ ~ rqlr<'''PlItlllivl', WI' ('Olll-
pare it with that produced u ~ i n g g another 100 sequences, and WI' find that tlH',Y mt' ('Ol\"i,.,-
« ~ n t t , 
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is the simplest learning model, in which learning agents form bdiefs for pach 
forward variable by including its own lagged terms only. 
The time sequence In the first 40 periods, we g e n e r a t ( ~ ~ random data 
under rational expectations since learning agents need it to g e l l e r a t ( ~ ~ tlu'ir 
initial beliefs. We set the values of variables to :-o:cros in period 41 and t l H ~ ~
shock is realised in period 42. Given learning agents' initial beliefH, variables 
start to respond to the shock according to the actual law of motion in period 
42. However, learning agents are not able to update their beliefs in period 
42, since variables have zero values in the previous period. From period 
43, learning agents begin to adjust their beliefs at the end of each p('rind 
using the forecasting errors, and then the updated beliefs are Ils('d at th!' 
beginning of subsequent period. Under adaptive learning, both PLM and 
ALM are time-varying because of the updating process. 
Calibration After introducing the a,.<;8umption of adapt.ive \('arning, we 
need to calibrate the gain coefficient. Its value, h o w e V ( ~ r , , varies across t.ll<' 
literature.1l2 Williams (2003) considers various vd.lues for til(' gain c ( ) d f i c i ( ~ l l t , ,
9 = [0.1,0.05,0.03], and argues that the way of forming expectatiolls ha," 
greater impacts. Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) show that the 
gaiu coefficient has large impacts all the evolution of variables, by c(HlHid('ring 
the values of 9 = [0.02,0.2,0.4]. Slobodyan and Wouters (2009a) (lstilllatl' 
a mediurn-si:led DSGE model, and they calibrate this paraIlll'tpr as !J = 
[0.01,0.02,0.05]. Milani (2007) estimates a DSGE model under tIll' adaptiV<' 
learning mechanism, and the estimated value of this paralllpter iH ( ) . ( ) U ~ : 3 . .
Eusepi and Preston (2011) calibrate this parameter by minimising thl' Slllll-
of-Hquare distances between the model implied volatility of HP-<ktn'lHl('d 
output and the first autocorrelation coefficients of output growth alld til<' 
corresponding data moments, and this procedure gives a gaiu of O.002!). III 
~ ~ S l o h o d y a n n and Wouter (2009) s u g g e ~ t t that. for a constant gain blruing witli til<' gain 
paranlf'ter g. weight of a data t periods ago is given Wi g(! -- g)'. This wt'iglit d(,tTt'II"!',, 
by 50% in T = - ~ ~ ;:::: 0.69 periods. In(1-g) 9 
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sum, according to the literature, a reasonable range of this parameter is 
between 0.01 and 0.05. For the baseline calibration, we set q = fl.02G, which 
produces similar results of using rolling window of 40 observations, i.e., 10 
years period for quarterly data. In our sensitivity analysis, we e x a . l l l i f l ( ~ ~ tlw 
impact of the gain coefficients on the dynamics by considering various va.lues, 
g = [0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2]. 
In addition, as we have added two f f ~ a t u r e s s to incroasp the internal per-
sistence of our model, we need to calibrate the relevant parameters. For 
the degree of consumption habit, the value varies in the literature, e.g., 0.63 
ill Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), 0.39 in Smets and. Wouters 
(2003), 0.7 in Srnets and Wouters (2007). We set the degree of consumption 
habit to Cc = 0.32, which is consistent with Iacoviello and Neri (2010). F'or 
the degree of price indexation, the value also varies in t.he lit.erature, e.g., 
1 in Christ.iano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), 0.48 in Smet.s and Wouters 
(2003), 0.24 in Smet.s and Wouters (2007). We set the d ( \ g r e ( ~ ~ of price j J l ( I ( ~ x x
at ion to lrr = 0.69, which is also consistent with Iacoviello and Xeri (201O).I\:l 
Impulse responses from the benchmark model with the new setting 
of the housing market First, we consider tlw a d a p t i v ( ~ ~ l('arning mpdHt-
Ilism in the benchmark model with the new setting of the honsing market 
(NHl\1). Figure 4.1 shows the impulse responses of variabl<'s to a OIW lwr-
cent positive goods sector technology shock with persistcllce P.1e = o.m. \V<-
can observe that the responses of variables under adaptivp leal'llillg (da. .... hed 
line) are much larger than under rational expectations (solid lin!'). For ex-
ample, the responses of consumption, real house priee, new hOllsing prodll<'-
tion increase by around 40%, 70%, 100% respectively. This impli('s t.hat tilt' 
adaptive learning mechanism largely amplifies and propagates till' ('ffp(ts of 
a goods sector technology shock to the economy.KI 
X:IO Uf sensitivity analysis. which is lIot included in this chaptpf. s h o w ~ ~ that tl)(' f ' ~ a t l l n ' '
of price indexation is important for the adaptive learning IIll'ChHnislll to ha\'(' amplification 
and propagation dfects on 1Il0dd variables. 
' ~ ' T h e e irnpube r e s p O W i f ~ S S from adaptive iI'arnin)!; arc o b t a i l l l ~ d d in \\at lab ""ill)!; tIll' '\ot-
tingharn Learning Toolhox. Tlw impulse f(,SPOllS!'S from adaptivl' Il'arnillg an' lIot H\'Hil-
ahlp in Dynare. since there is no updating pro('('ss in this platfoflll. i.I' .. tlil' copfficil'lIh 
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Figure 4.1: Impulse responses to a positive goods sector technology shock 
from the benchmark model with NHM. The solid line is from rational exp c-
tations, and the dashed line is from adaptive learning. 
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Impulse responses from the benchmark model with the new setting 
of the housing market and the feature of time to build Next, we 
consider the adaptive learning mechanism in the benchmark model with the 
new setting of the housing market (NHM) and the feature of time to build 
(TTB) , in which there is a 4-period lag in new housing production. Figure 
4.2 shows the impulse responses of variables to a one percent positive goods 
sector technology shock with persistence PAc = 0.01. Similar with previous 
model, we can observe that the responses of variables under adaptive learning 
(dashed line) are much larger than that under rational expectations (solid 
line) . In particular, we notice that the response of real house price increases 
by around 90%, higher than that in the previous model. 
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Figure 4.2: Impulse responses to a positive goods se tor technology shock 
from the benchmark model with NHM and TTB. Th solid lin is from 
rational expectations, and the dashed line is from adaptiv 1 arning. 
are constant over time in Dynare. 
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The interaction between the assumption of adaptive learning and 
the feature of time to build We have shown that the adaptive learning 
mechanism has an amplification and propagation effect on the real h o w , ( ~ ~
price in both models. However, the responses of the real house price are 
different between these two models, and we suppose that til(' d i f f e r e n ( " ( ~ ~ is 
caused by the introduction of the time to build feature in the s(lcond lllodd. 
Figure 4.3 shows the impulse responses of the real house price to a one per-
cent positive goods sector technology shock with persistcnee PAc = 0.01 from 
both models. Firstly, we discuss the difference caused by the two alterna-
tive assumptions, rational expectations and adaptive leaming, within each 
model. In the benchmark model with NHM, the response of the real hOllse 
price under adaptive learning (thin dashed line) is 70% larger than that 1111-
der rational expectation (thin solid line). Similarly, in the benchmark mo<ipl 
with ~ H M M and TTB, the response of the real hOllse pricl' llud('r a d a p t i v ( ~ ~
learning (thick dashed line) is 90% larger than that u n d ( ~ r r ra.tional exp('("-
tation (thick solid line). These results suggest that the a<iaptiw l"ctmillg 
mechanism largely amplifies and propagates the ( ~ f f e c t t of exogenous shocks 
to the real house price. 
Then we discuss the changes caused by the feature of time to build, giVl'Il 
rational expectations and adaptiv(' learning resppctiveiy. Under rational I'X-
pectations, compared with that from the benchmark lUod!'} with l\"HI\I (t.hill 
solid line), the response of the real house price from the hl'lIchmark mod"l 
with :\,HM and TTB (thick solid line) decrea.'ies more slowly lH'forc lIew 
honsing production begins to respond in period 47, hut f a . ' i t c ~ r r a f t e r w a r d s . ~ : ) )
Finally, under adaptive learning, compared with that froUl Ul!' belldullark 
model with NHM (thin dashed line), the response of the real hous(' price from 
the benchmark model with ~ H M M and TTB (thick dashed linn) is aroulld 10% 
higher at the peak, decreases more slowly before new housiug productiou bl'-
gins to increase. After period 47, the real house p r i c ( ~ ~ d('crerl..'i('S fw.;t('r 1Il1<i('r 
adaptive learning and is around 8% lower at the though than that uIHiI'r 
rational expectations. These suggest t.hat t.he featnre of tiUl(' to build af-
fects the dynamics of real house price by delaying the llegatiV(' impact frolll 
~ ; ) T h i c k k solid line is ~ ) p l o w w thin solid line after ppriod 47. 
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new housing production, and its impact is enlarged by the adaptive learning 
mechanism. 
In sum, we have several important results: (i) regardless of the feature of 
TTB, the adaptive learning mechanism amplifies and propagates the effect 
of the goods sector technology shock to the real house price; (ii) under both 
rational expectations and adaptive learning, the feature of TTB modifies 
the dynamics of the real house price; (iii) th adaptive learning mechanism 
amplifies the effect of the feature of TTB on the real house price, which 
displays obvious cyclical behaviour. 
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Figure 4.3: Impulse responses of real hou ing pri e to a goods sector tech-
nology shock. The thin solid line is from b nchmark mod I with NHM under 
rational expectations, the thin dashed lin is from benchmark model with 
NHM under adpative learning. The thick olid line i from b nchmark mod I 
with NH f andTTB under rational expectations, and the thick dashed line 
is from b nchmark model with NHM and TTB under adpative learning. 
A discussion about the amplification and propagation effects from 
the adaptive learning mechanism Here we di uss the r asOllS why th 
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adaptive learning mechanism can provide amplificatioll and propagat.ioll ('f-
fects on the economy. Recall that the actual law of motion is 
which shows that the current values of endogenous variablPs, k/, dq)('lId 
on the lagged values of endogenous and exogenous variables, k/_ I aud :::1-1, 
and the current values of disturbance terms, Ct. Tho matriccs of coefficieuts, 
T (4)t) and V (9/), indicate the weights 011 these two COmpOlH'nts respedivdy. 
Meanwhile, the exogenous variables have following p r o c ( ~ s s ( ' s s
Zt = PZt-1 + C/. 
In our impulse response analysis, we set the starting v a l \ l ( ~ s s of variahl<'s 
to ,,;eros in period t, thus kt = 0 and Zt = O. AsslllIlc tha.t the init.ial b('lids 
are given a,.,> 9/. \Vhen the shock is realised in period f + 1, t.h!' evolutiOllS of 
variables are expressed as 
and 
kt+1 T (9 t ) (kl,Zt)' + V (91) Cltl 
V((/J/)CI+I since k t = 0 and:::, = () 
C/+l since :::t = 0 
which show that the V'cLhws of endogenous variables at f + 1, 1.:/ + I, ckp<'lId Oil 
the values of disturbance t.erms a.t t + 1, s/ t I, toget.her with til(' weight, \. (<.',/). 
A high('r value of ,/ ((/)1) indicat.es a larger init.ial r('spous(' of variabks. 
If til(' exogenous shock is realised in period t + 1 and dOl'S not ha\'t' allY 
persistpuce afterwards, the disturbance terms in sub:·;equ('llt pl'riods an' Zl'ro, 
i.e., C/+i = 0 for i = 2, ... , 00, awl thus the evolutiolls of varial>lt's ill I)('riod 
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t + 2 are expressed as 
and 
kt+'l = T (<I>t+1) [kt+1' Zt+d' + V (<1>/+1) Eft:.! 
= T (tPt+1) [kt+1, Zt+d' since Ett-:.! = 0 
= T(ri>t+1)[V(1:>t)CI+l,Et+1]' 
PZt+1 sinee Ct+2 = () 
We can see that the magnitude of the impulse respOIlS('S in period t + 2 
actually depends on T (<I>t+ 1) and V (91)' If we take V (</)/) as gi yen, a high(\r 
value of T (<I>t+1) indicates a larger response in period t + 2. 
As we have different actual laws of motion under rational expectatiolls 
and adaptive learning, we suppose that the shapes of i l l l p l l l s ( ~ ~ r(81)(Hl8(\S are 
determined by the matrices of coefficients, T (</)) and V (I»). Hen\ w(' takp t.Iw 
real house price as an example. Figure 4.1 shows that, ('om pared with t1mt 
under rational expectations, the real hOllS£' price rpspOluls ll'ss in tlw tirst 
period (period 42), and then begins to cat.ch up ill the seC'ond period (pl'riod 
13) and achieves a higher peak lator under adaptiw learning. 
\Ve starts from period t + 1. Under rational expectations, t l ) ( ~ ~ Illotiou of 
variables is 
Under adaptive learning, the motion of variable is 
\Vp infer that, given a same disturbance term, til<' H ~ a l l hous(\ pricl' n\spowis 
1(,8s under adaptive learning in period t + 1 hecausp the w('iglit. Oil dist urhaue!' 
term is lower under adaptive learning, i.C'., V ( , ' J ~ ) ) > V (I):). 
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In period t + 2, under rational expectations, the motion of variahles is 
Under adaptive learning, the motion of variable is 
Given V ( c t > ~ ) ) > V ( c t > ~ ) , , the real house price responds more under adaptive 
learning in period t + 2 only if T ( c t > ~ + l ) ) < T (ct>:+l)' i.e., the actual law of 
motion has a higher weight on the values of lagged endog(mous and exogenous 
variables under adaptive learning. 
Here we summarise the reasons for the different respons('s of til(' [('al hOllS!' 
price under rational expectations and adaptive learning. Undpr adapt.ive 
learning, learning agents' perceived law of motion is generatpd usiug historical 
data, and this may mean that the actual law of motion has a rplat.iwly 
higher weight on the lagged variables, T (ct>;+i), and a relatively low!'r wight. 
all the contemporary disturbance term, V (¢;+J As Wp dis(,IIHHl'd allow, 
this is why the real house price responds less ill the first pla(' .. , and t1WlI 
catches up and reaches a higher peak. Therdof{\ since it mak!'s t.iu· lIlotiOll 
of variables to rely more on lagged variables, the adaptive learning Ilu·('hallislll 
has amplification and propagation effects on the economy. 
4.2.5 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we carry out a sensitivity analysis to check tlw robustllcss 
of our n ~ s u l t t that the a d a p t i V ( ~ ~ learning mechanism have Clmplifi('atioll awl 
propagation effects on the economy. We use the bt'udllllark modd with tilt' 
new setting of the housing market and the featuw of tilll!' to build. \\'I' 
will examine how the impulse rc:sponses are affectl'd by various "<LitH'S of 
particular initial beliefs and the constant gaiu coefficient. 
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Particular initial beliefs Here we discuss why we consider average initial 
beliefs, instead of particular initial beliefs that are obtained from a particular 
sequence of randomly generated data. Figure 4.4 shows the impulse responses 
of variables to a one percent positive goods sector technology shock with per-
sistence PAc = 0.01, given 20 particular initial beliefs. We can observe that 
the responses of variables varies a great deal, indicating that the initial 1)('-
liefs, which are determined by the sequences of randomly generated data, are 
crucially important for the shapes of impulse responses. The first implica-
tion is that, given a same exogenous shock, the economy evolves diversely 
given different history under adaptive learning. In contrast, under rational 
expectations, we always obtain same impulse responses regardless the his-
tory. The second implication is that it is misleading to compare the impulse 
responses from adaptive learning using particular initial belief.., with those 
from rational expectations, as the particular initial beliefs are not represen-
tative. To overcome this problem, we calculate average iuitial belh'fs Ilsing 
100 sequences of randomly generated data. 
The constant gain coefficient Then we examine how the impulse f('-
sponses are aff£'cted by various values of the gaiu coefficient. Firstly, we 
consider values, g = [0,0.01.0.05], that are close to our baseline calibratioJl, 
9 = 0.02:).110 Figure 4.5 shows the impulse responses of variables to a OIH' 
percent positivp goods sector technology shock with persistence PAt. = 0.01. 
We can observp that the magnitude of the amplification and propagatioll d-
fect from thf' adaptive learning mechanism is positivply related to t.1l(' vahl<' 
of the gain coefficient, but it is difficult to observe the ciifferencp alllong HIP 
impulse respOllSt'S from these ca..,es. This suggests that, when its value b 
within a rangl' of 9 E [0.0.05] that widely used in the literature, tliP ("OIlstaIlt. 
gain coeffieit'nt does not have an obviolls impact on the shapes of impuls(' 
responses, implying the foreca.-;ting errors t.hrough the updating pro<'t'SS play 
a minor role in th(' adaptive learning mechanism. 
~ t i \ V h i l e e 9 = 0 illlplip:-; no updat ing proce:-;,-. 9 = [0.01.0.025, 0.05j approxilllatp:-; 2.') ,vI 'a!',.;. 
10 years. 5 yt'lUS rolling \ \ ' i l l d o \ \ ' ~ ~ rpspf'ctivPiy for quarterly data. 
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from the benchmark m d 1 with NHM and TTR The solid line is from 
rational expe tations and the dashed line is from adaptive learning. 
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Chapter 4 
Then we examine the impact of the gain coefficient with larger vahlPs, 
9 = [0.025,0.1, 0.2].1l7 Figure 4.6 shows the impulse responses of variahks tll 
a one percent positive goods sector technology shock with persisteJl('(' iJ,1<- = 
0.01. The figure shows that, when 9 = 0.1, which approximat('s 2.G Yl'Clrs 
of rolling window, the response of consumption is amplified by around I G(;{ 
more than that in the b ~ " e l i n e e calibration, 9 = 0.025. \Vhen 9 = 0.2, which 
approximates 1.25 years of rolling window, thp responses of conslunption and 
real house price are amplified by around 50% more than that ill the ha.'i!'liIlI' 
calibration, 9 = 0.025, and the cyclical behaviour of real hOllse price is ilion' 
obvious. Therefore, the shapes of impulse responses are affeeted a !?:reat d('al 
if the gain coefficient h ~ ' l l a relative larger value, 9 = [O.l. 0.2]. III othN 
words, when learning agents give relatively larger weight. 011 tlw fOf('ea.'itillg 
errors, the updating process will have obvious impacts on t,}l(' dynallli('s of 
the economy. 
4.3 Heterogeneous expectations 
In this section, we consider the assumption of h e t e r o g ( ' J l ( ~ O I l S S expe'datiolls, 
which assunws that there are both rational a!?:cnts and learnillg agents ill til«' 
economy. In our setting, learning agents hehavp in the salllP way 1I.'i dC'sni\wd 
in the previous section: they use randomly gerH'rated data to forlll illit ial h('-
liefs, a constant gain algorithm to update beliefs. and all AR( 1) I l ' i l l ' l l i l l ~ ~
model. Meanwhile, we consider two types of rational agellt.s: (i) part iall.\' 
rat.ional agents, i.e., they do not know the (lxistencc of learuillp; ag('llts; (ii) 
fully rational agents, i.e., they know the existence of lparning a.gc'nts awl tak" 
learners' beliefs into account. Our contributions to til<' literatuJ'(' of hd('rug( .... 
neous expectatiolls are: (i) we consider learning ag<'uts IIl1dpr IH'i.t'rogC'IH'oIlS 
expectations; (ii) we compare two cases of heterogelleous exp('ctatiolls, i.('., 
one with partially rational agents and one with fully ratiollal agt'llts. 
1<7 We supposp that g = 004. which approximates 2.5 quarters r o l l i l l ~ ~ window. is "H) 1111')2;" 
to consider. as learning agl'nb are not likely to us!' a very short histroy. i.t' .. It's" t hllil 0111' 
year. If we consid('r ~ l I c h h value. Wf' art' abk to show that t h i ~ ~ ('optfici"nt ha,. alar)!," illlpact 
Oil dynamics. COllsistfmt with C a r ( ' ( ' I ~ ~ s - P o n ~ d a a and Giannitsaroll (2007). 
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4.3.1 Homogeneous expectations and heterogeneous expectations 
Under homogeneous expectations, a DSGE model can be sUIlllwlrised into a 
general form as 
and 
Zt = f..l + PZt-l + Ct 
in which the vector k contains endogenous variables, and matrices (J I, 0'2, II 
are the model parameters. The vector z contains exogenous s t a t ( ~ ~ variahlps, 
which follow an AR(l) process with an iid (0, (72 ) disturbance ct. 
Let E[ and E ~ ~ denote expectation operators under rational ('xp('datiolls 
and adaptive learning respectively. When we have both rational agPllts awl 
learning agents in the economy, we denote the weighted aggregat(' expecta-
tion operator as Ef = nE; + (1 - 0.) EL where n is the proportion of ratiollal 
agents, 0 S 0. S 1.1l1l Substituting the weighted aggregate expectatioll o(l<'r-
ator, Ef, in the equation 4.1, our model becomes 
kt = a1Efkt+1 + a2kt-l + bZt - 1 
kt a\nE;kt+ 1 + {1J (1 - n) E:kt+ 1 + 1I.2kt-\ + !JZt.\ 
and 
Therefore, both rational agents' and learning agents' ('xpectatiolls an' n'-
quired before solving the model. 
4.3.2 The first case of heterogeneous expectations: partially ra-
tional agents 
Firstly, we assume that rational agents are partially rational, L('., t1H'Y kllow 
the structure of the model and the values of the model p a r a l l l e t ( ~ r s s but do not 
SN At two e x t n ' l l l e ~ . . we have rational expectat ion,; if all agents an' rat jonal n g ( ' n t ~ . . I! I. 
and adaptive learning if all agents are learning agents, n = o. 
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know the existence of learning agents. In this case, rational agent.s helieVI' 
that everyone is rational in the economy, and thus they form beliefs that. an' 
consistent with the solution of the model under rational expectations. They 
cannot realise their mistakes and make adjustments, thus their heliefs a n ~ ~
constant over time. Meanwhile, learning agents use historical data. to form 
their initial beliefs and then update their beliefs using the forecasting I'frors 
at the end of each period. lS !) 
We express rational agents' beliefs as E[kt+l = (It [kt, z,]" and II'Clmiu)!; 
agents' beliefs as E:kt+l = ¢ ~ _ l X t . . After plugging these two ('xpressious iuto 
the model, we have 
and 
While rational agents' beliefs, ¢{, are constant over time, learning al.!;Pllts' 
beliefs, ¢ ~ , , are time-varying. After solving the model, i.e., t r a n s f ( ~ r r the PPf-
ceived law of motion to the actual law of motion, we know how the eCOUOlllY 
responds to exogenous shocks. 
4.3.3 The second case of heterogeneous expectation."l: fully ratio-
nal agents 
Secondly, we a8sume that rational agents are fully rational, i.1'., tlH'Y kllow 
the existence of learning agents and also take learners' beliefs iut.o aC("()llut. 
Learning agents behave in a same way deseribed in the preViOlll-i c a l - i ( ~ . . Al-i 
fully rational agents take learners' beliefs into account, tll<'Y call fOfm h(%'fs 
that are consistent with actual outcomes. 
The time sequence is following: (i) in the initial period, l!'aruiul?; agl'nts 
use historical data to form their initial beliefs; (ii) at tlw ('nd of mch sl\hs(I-
quent period, learning agents update their beliefs using the forecast.iug <'rl'Ors 
~ ! ) B r a n c h h and ~ I c G ( ) u g h h (2009.2010) cOllsider rational agellts alld tilt' ot 111'1' typf' of 
agents t hat use fixed beliefs. 
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through a constant gain algorithm; (iii) at the beginning of each I)('riod, ra-
tional agents take learning agents' beliefs into account, and th('ll fOrIn bl'lkf" 
that are consistent with actual outcomes. Since learning agents' hdids an' 
time-varying, rational agents' beliefs are also time-varying.!)11 
We express learning agents' beliefs a.'l E: kt+ 1 = ¢ ~ ~ -I [ A ~ / ' ' ~ t ] ' . . Aft!'r plllg-
ging this expression into the model, we have 
and 
Zt = f1 + PZt-l + Ct 
After transferring the perceived law of motion to the actual law of motioll, 
we know how the economy will respond to exogenous shoeks. 
4.3.4 Calibration 
Under heterogeneous expectations, we need to calibra.te the proportion of 
rational agents, n. Similar with the gain coefficient, we calibraW it ill a way 
that is consistent with the literature. Fust.er, Laibsoll and t-.lencit'l (2010) 
assume that rational expectations and iut.uitive expectatiolls (\.1'1' ('qually 
w e i g h b ~ d , , i.e., n = 0.5. Branch and McGough (2009) cOllHidel' various valtll'S, 
n = [1,0.99,0.9,0.7], to examinp the determinacy propertios of thdr 1Il0th'1. 
Branch and McGough (2010) also usc various values, n = [n.l. 0.:3, n.;), 0.7. O.!)]. 
to show that a decrease in the proportion of rational a g ( ~ n t H H magnifil's t.ht' 
model's propagation mechanism. Therefore, as there is IlO convincillg I'llIpil'-
ical evidence to calibrate this parameter, we set it to n = 0.5 ill tIll' 1>a.";('lilll' 
calibration, implying that a half of the population i:.; rational ag('llts alld th(' 
other half is learning agents. 
'I°For compariool1. Branch and ~ l c G ( ) l l g h h (2010) a ~ S l l l l l ( , , that t hI' lllodl'l h a ~ ~ a ( ' ( ) l l ~ t t alit 
solution. which is refern'd to as rcstrictpd perceptions eqllililJria. 
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4.3.5 Impulse response analysis 
Here we compare the impulse responses from heterogeneolls pxppctatiolls 
with those from rational expectations and adaptive learning. We wm a v ( ~ r a p , l ' '
initial beliefs, which are obtained from 100 sequences of randomly gp[lI'rat,pd 
data. Figure 4.7 shows the impulse responses of variables t,o a or)(' P('I"CPllt 
positive goods sector technology shock with persistence PAc = (Ull, g i v ( ~ 1 1 1
n = 0.5, i.e., 50% of the population is rational agents. Firstly, the impllls(' 
responses from heterogeneous expectations are larger than that from ratio ... 
nal expectations, for example, consumption responds arollnci 8% more, and 
real house price responds around 6% more. These results imply t.hat. t.lw 
adaptive learning mechanism a l ~ o o have amplification and propagatioll df('cts 
when only a fraction of the population is learning agents. S ( ~ ( , o l l d l y , , wl\(,11 
two types of agents have equal weights, the impulse responses from lwterogo ... 
neous expectations are much closer to those from rational expectations. This 
indicates that, while the adaptive l('arning mechanism adds amplification alld 
propagation effects to the economy, the existence of rational agPIlts wl'ak(,lls 
this effect a great deal. This r('sult suggests that, if ratiollal ag('Jlts bdlavp ill 
the same way as learning agents, the volatility of tll£' eCOllOIllY will illCTPa:.;(' 
a great deal. For example, agents may want to push up t.he asst'ts prices ill 
order to obtain profit even if they know there Illay be a bubhlt·. 
Thirdly, we also notice that there are differences bdwl'PlI t.1l(' i/llpllls(' 
responses from two ca.'ies of heterogeneous expeetatiolls. Ttl!' comparisoll 
results show that, when rational agents are fully rational (dot, ... da."h iiJl('), 
the adaptive learning mechanism has a larger amplification and propa),!;at.ioll 
effect than when rational agents are partially ratioual (dotted line). Th(' ('("t)o. 
nomic logic is that, if rational agents know the existence of iearnill),!; agt'Hts 
and take learners' beliefs into account, they will know how learners' l)('iids 
affect the economy. Given this knowledge, fully rational agcnts [OrIll 1)('-
liefs that have further impacts on the economy. Here we use all I'xlUnpl(' t () 
illustrate our argument. Assume there is no exogenous shock at. IH'riod I. 
Learning agents expect that the real hOllS!' price will ill<Tf'a."ip by 10% ill l\!'xt 
period according to their historical experience. III the fin;t cas(" partially m ... 
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tional agents do not know the existence of learning agents, and they cxp 't 
no change in the real house price. Therefore, the actual change in th r al 
house price should be positive, as learning agents increase their demand for 
housing. In contrast, in the second case, fully rational agents know l aming 
agents's beliefs, and also know the positive impact of these beli fs n t it real 
house price, thus they form beliefs that are consistent with actual chauge in 
the real house price, which is positive. In other words, fully rational agents 
also expect an increase in the real house price in next period. As a re ul t, 
we can infer that the actual change in the real house pri 'e is larger in tIp 
second case than in the first case, since the demand for hou ing is high ' I' in 
the second case, i.e., both fully-rational agents and learning ag nts demand 
more housing. 
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Figure 4.7: Impulse responses to a positive goods se tor te hnolo y hock 
from the benchmark model with NHM and TTD. given n = 0.5. Th 'olid 
line is from rational expectations, and the dashed line is from adaptive I '1U'1l-
ing, the dotted line is from the first case of HE, and the da.: h-dot lin is from 
the second case of HE . 
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4.3.6 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we examine how the impulse responses from Iwt.C'rogew'olls 
expectations are affected by a change in the proportion of rational ag!'lIts. 
We consider two alternative values, 0 = [0.2, 0.8]. Also, wn dis(,uss t.lip 
difference between the first case of HE, i.e., partially rational agents, awl till' 
second case of HE, i.e., fully rational agents. 
Figure 4.8 shows the impulse responses of variables to a Ollt' pt'rcc'lIt 
positive goods sector technology shock with persistence ()A(' = (Un, giV<'1l 
n = 0.2, i.e., 20% of the population are rational agents. We obs('rvp that. 
the impulse responses froIll heterogeneous expectations ar(' larger thall that. 
from rational expectations, for example, both consumption and the real hOlls(' 
price respond around 30% more. As expected, we observe that the i l l l P l l l s t ~ ~
responses from the second case (the dash-dot line) responds around 1 ()IYc IllOrt' 
than than that from the first case (the dotted line), 
Figure 4.9 shows the impulse responses of variables to a OIl1' p ( ~ r c ( , l l t t
positive goods sector technology shock with persistence P.k = (Ull, givplI 
n = 0.8, i.e., 80% of the population is rational agents. We obs<'l'vp that. t.hc' 
impulse responses from heterogeneous expectations an' quite' similar with 
that from rational expectations. Togother with previous results, w(' call ar-
gue that the adaptive learning mechanism has a l a r g ( ~ r r alllplificatioll and 
propagation effect when the proportion of learning agents is higil(,f, Bt'sid('s, 
the difference between two eases (Le., the first ca..'le wit.h partially rational 
agents and the second case is with fully rational agents) is small, hilt. WI' ('lUI 
still observe that the impulse responses from the secoud Ca.'lP rl'spoud lI\ort' 
than that from the first case. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we discuss the impact of t.he adaptive l c ~ a r n i n ~ ~ llledJallislll, 
which is an alternative way to form expectations for the futlll'(" ill it t.\vo-
sector DSGE model with the new setting of the housing lIIarkd alld t\t(' 
feature of time to build. The main features of our adaptivp it'aruillg Illl'('\t-
Chapter 4 157 
Figure 4.8: Impulse responses to a positive goods e tor t chnology h k 
from the benchmark model with NHM and TTB, giv n n = 0.2. T h s lid 
line is from rational exp ctations, and the dashed line i from adaptiv I 'arn-
ing, the dotted line is from the first case of HE, and the dash-dot lin is from 
the second case of HE. 
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anism are the followings: (i) we use random data that are gellerated I l l l d ( ~ r r
rational expectations to form initial beliefs; (ii) we consider a collstant gain 
learning algorithm; (iii) we use a simple AR( 1) learning model, which is mo-
tivated by the success of small learning model. Our contributions to this 
literature are that we consider the dynamic impacts of the AR( 1) learuilll!; 
model and discuss the interaction between the adaptive learning 1 I l ( ~ C h a l l i s l l l l
and the feature of time to build. Using the Nottingham Learning Toolbox, 
we find that the adaptive learning mechanism largely amplifies awl propa-
gates the impact of a goods sector technology silOek on the economy. \V(' 
suppose that the amplification and propagation effect added by the aciaptiw 
learning mechanism is because we have higher weights on laggpd endogenous 
and exogenous variables in the actual law of motion than those from rati(}-
nal expectations. Meanwhile, the adaptive learning mechanism e n l a r g ( ~ s s the 
impact of the feature of time to build on the real house price and l I l a k ( ~ s s t.his 
variable to exhibit more obvious cyclical behaviour. 
Next, we carry out a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of ollr 
results. We find that the shapes of impulse responses heavily d ( ~ p p n d d 011 t.he 
values of initial beliefs, implying that we should consider average initial 1)('-
liefs, instead of particular initial beliefs when we make comparisoll bptW('('ll 
the impulse responses from rational expectations and adaptiV<' htrtling. 13('-
sides, our sensitivity analysis suggests that, when the valtw of (·Ollst.allt. I!;aill 
coefficient is relatively small, 0 - 0.05, t.he forecasting (,ITO},S do lIot Iim'(' 
obvious impacts on the impulse responses. In eontra..<.;t, if we ('ollsi<i('r larl!;pr 
V'cllues, 0.1 and 0.2, implying that agents a..'lsign higlwr wpights Oil }'(,(,I'llt 
data, the forecast errors have obvious impacts. 
Last, we consider the c1ssumption of heterogeneous pxpl'datiolls, i.t·., 
there are both rational agents and learning agents ill the ('('Ollomy. Lt'rtmill).!, 
agents behave ill the same way as described before. l\leanwhilt', WI' ('ollsid!'}' 
two types of rational agents: (i) partially rational agents, i . ( ~ . , , t1wy do lIot 
know the existence of learning agents; (ii) fully rational apputs, i .('., Uu'.v 
know the existence of learning agents and take learners' ht'liefs into fH,(,OIlIlL 
Our contributions to this literature are: (i) we ('ollsid('r It'arniug ag!'uts 1111-
der het.erogeneous expectat.ions; (ii) we compare two ('ast's of ht'U'rol!;t'ut'olls 
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expectations, i.e., one with partially rational agents and OIW with fully ra-
tional agents. We obtain two findings from our impulse f('SPOIIS(' ctllalysis, 
given that two types of agents have equal weights. Firstly, the fPSPOIlS('S of 
variables from heterogeneous expectations are larger than that frolll ratio-
nal expectations, implying that the adaptive learning mechanislIl also ha .... 
amplification and propagation effects when only a fraction of thl' population 
is learning agents. Secondly, when two types of agents have equal w('igltts, 
the impulse responses from heterogeneous expectations are milch dos('r to 
that from rational expectations than that from adaptiwl learning. This ill-
dicates that, while the adaptive learning mechanism adds amplification and 
propagation effects on the economy, rational agents may play role of f(lciucillg 
economic volatility. Thirdly, when rational agents are fully rational, i.e., tlu'y 
know the existence of learning agents and take learners' beliefs into accollllt., 
the adaptive learning mechanism ha.'i a larger amplification and propagation 
effect on the economy than that wlwn rational agents are partially rat.ional. 
The economic logic is that, if rational ag(mts afP fully ratiollal, thl'Y will kllow 
how learners' beliefs affect the economy, and thus rational agl'nts' bdh'fs will 
have further impacts on the economy. This result holds in the sl'lIsit.i\'it,v 
analysis. 
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4.A Appendix to Chapter 4 
4.A.l The recursive least squares learning algorithm 
In fitting the equation kt = ¢t_IXt-1 + et-I using data T = 1, ... , f. TIIP valtH' 
of the coefficient ri)1 which minimises the error is given by til<' least. sqwlfI's 
formula 
tPt = t X i _ I X ~ _ I ) ) -I t ;Ci-1ki 
1=1 i=1 
If we consider matrix form, then k t - I is m * 1, Xt-I is n * 1, ~ I ) I I is 111 * fl. 
Remember in econometrics, if the model is Yt = !3x t + E: t. t = 1. .... n, t h!' 
~ ~ "n OLS estimator for 3 is 3 = ~ ; ; I I X t ~ t t
1.::::1 X t 
Here we derive the recursive form for the OLS estimator. Let 
t 
St = L X i - I X ~ _ 1 1
;=1 
and we have that 
Then we can write 
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rPt t X i _ l X ~ _ I ) - 1 1 tl;i-l k i 
i=1 i=1 
t 
(St)-I 2: Xi-l k i 
i=1 
t /-1 I-I 
- (Str l 2:;r;i- Iki + (St-Ir l 2: Xi- l k i - (St-d -\ 2:.l:i \ki 
i=1 i=1 i=\ 
t I-I 
9t-l + (St)-1 2: :Ei-1ki - (St_d- 1 2: :Z:i_Ik j 
i=1 i=1 
t-I /-1 
= cPt-l + (Sd- 1 Xt-Ikt + (St)-1 2: Xi_Ik; - (St- d -I L '/', IA-, 
;=1 i",1 
t-I , /---1 
cPt-1 + (St)-1 Xt-lkt + (St)-1 L Xi-1k i - (Sr}--l ;5/ L .r; lk, 
i=1 1-·' ;. I 
~ ~ ¢H + (S,)-' "HI.; + ( S ~ ~ , , - 1) (S,_,) ' ~ ~ .L, ,k, 
. ,St-l Xt-lX;_l 
smce St = St-I + ;1:t-I:E I_ 1 --+ -., - 1 = - s ' thus 
... t • t 
Now we have a recursive form, but SOIlle s t £ ~ p s s a f ( ~ ~ wquifl'd to oht.aill a 1!;1'1I1'rai 
form. 
To write the above RLS algorithm as it usually apppars ill tlu' a<iaptiv(' 
learning literature, we can define R t = SI/t. Using tlw definit.ioll of HI, W(' 
get 
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and the recursion becomes 
and 
1 -I ( I ) 
cPt = ¢t-I + tRt Xt-l k t - ;/:1-11)t-1 
which is the recursive least squares learning algorit.hm that apP(lars ill our 
chapter. 
4.A.2 The Matlab files in the Nottingham Learning Toolbox 
• model.m: rewrite the DSGE models into a form t.hat. (,Illl b(' applipd til 
this toolbox. Unlike Dynare, we cannot writp the lllocit'l dirt,ct.ly i llt 0 
the l\1atlab, we need to rewrite the lIlodel using the lag dUllllllY lIl!'t hod 
before applying it to the learning toolbox, 
• newsolab.m: solve the model 
• pvalue.m and VIllap.lll: rewrit(, the solutioIls ill It Illort' fri('lul\y wa,\' 
for (i) comparing with Dynare results and (ii) facilitat.ing followillg 
programs 
• L E A R J \ I ~ G . l \ l : : defines the setting for lea.rning, e.g., shock s('(t'\{'l\(· ... 
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number of periods for the simulations, initial periods, gain c ( ) e f f i d ( ~ n t . , ,
choice of small models. 
• IRF _RUN _ RE.M: produce impulse responses funetious under rational 
expectations 
• IRF RUN AL.M: produce impulse responses fuuctions ulldt'r adap-
tive learning 
• IRF _RUN _ HETER01.M: produce impulse respouses fuuctions un<i('r 
heterogeneous expectations with partially rational agents 
• IRF RUN HETER02.M: produce impulse responses fUllctiolls undl'r 
heterogeneous expectations with fully rational agents 
• IRF _DO __ PLOTS.M: plots the results of impulse respOllses fllll<'t.ions 
• IRF _ DO _ PLOTS _ CR4.M: plots the results of impulsl' fPSPOllS(,S func-
tions for chapter 4 
• INI BEL.m: generate initial beliefs and second 1ll0Ill('Ut. mat.rix 
• INI_BEL_DO _AVERAGE.m: generate averag<' init.ial h('lil'fs and av-
erage second moment matrix 
• hpf.m: applies the Rodrick-Prescott filter to a s('ril's, wit.h UP parallll'-
ter lambda_hp. 
• IRF STATISTICS.M: summarise the statistics of impuls(' respOIIS('S 
functions 
4.A.3 The solution method in the Nottingham Learning Toolbox 
The classification of variables \-Ve classify the variabl('s iut.o s('v('ral 
group according to the Dynare User Guide . 
• static v a r i a b l t ~ s : : variables that have t terlll. 
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• purely predetermined variables: variables that have t - 1 term or haY!' 
both t and t - 1 terms 
• purely forward-looking variables: variables that have t + 1 term or have' 
both t and t + 1 terms 
• predetermined and forward-looking variables: v a r i a b h ~ s s that haY!' hoth 
t - 1 term and t + 1 or have t, t - 1, and t + 1 terms 
• state variables: variables that have t - 1 term. 
Rewriting and solving the model The Nottingham lea.rning; toolbox 
uses the Klein solution method, thus we need to rewrite our mo<il' IIsing; th(' 
lag dummy method. We define :1: as 
Xt [Zt-I, kt-I,A:t , It,vtl 
Xt+1 [zt, kt, kt+l' It+I' Vt+d 
where z is exogenous variable, k is state variable, I is forward variahl(', and 
v is static variable. Note that (i) the state variable appears twice, awl WI' 
refer the first group as dummy variables, (ii) if a variable ha.s bot.h t - 1 awl 
t + 1 terms, we treat it as state variable. 
Before solving the model using the Kleiu method, we 11('(,<1 t.o writ (' it illto 
following form 
AA * .['1+1 = BB * :1:t 
From the Klein method, the solution form is 
and 
Zt-I)=pp* 
k t - I 
( 
kt ) 
It = FF * 
Vt 
Zt-2 ) 
A:t - 2 -
ppii PP12) * 
pp21 pp22 
Zt-I 
) = ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
.f 131 
I.f12 ) 
ff22 * 
I.f32 
:;1-2 ) 
k, -2 
:;, I) 
k, _I 
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then we arrange the solution as 
k t 
Zt-I pp21 pp22 0 0 () 
Zt - 1 
k t 
kt - I ffll ff12 0 0 () kt .. 1 
= Pbar * kt - I * kt -I ft ff21 ff22 0 0 () ft-I ff31 ff32 0 0 () f/I Vt 
Vt-I v/ I 
Note that (PP21 pp22) is same as ( f fll f f12 ). We can COlli pan' th(' 
values in Pbar with the solution from Dynare to check the accuracy of til!' 
model file in Matlab. 
Generating initial beliefs For learning agents, we generatp initial h('lipfs 
P hi using randomly generated dat.a, 
We need t.o fit Phi in K K, which is a matrix eOllsist('ut wit.h .l', tlll'lI WI' 
have 
Zt Zt-I 0 0 0 () () 
k t kt - I 0 () 0 0 () 
kt+1 =KK* k t , where KK = () () phi phi lilt i 
ft+1 ft 0 0 phi phi phi 
Vt+1 v/ 0 0 phi phi plti 
then we can replace t + 1 terms. 
For the part.ially rational agent.s in the first case of h e t . e r o ~ ( , l l P O I l S S ('XP('C'-
tations, we assume that they use solution under rational e x p ( ~ c t . a t i ( ) l l S S 1I .. "i tlll'ir 
initial beliefs. Here we transfer the solutioll UUdl'f ratiollal exp('(tatioll PIHlr 
to partially rational agents' belief LL, which is also a. matrix c()llsistmt wit h 
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Xt. 
Zt Zt-l 0 0 0 0 0 :;;, I 
kt kt- 1 0 0 0 0 0 k, I 
kt+l = LL* kt - f fll * P 0 ff12 0 0 * k, 
ft+l ft f f21 * P 0 ff22 0 0 I, 
Vt+l Vt 1131 * p 0 1132 0 0 I', 
where we need to add p since Zt = PZt-l. 
Rational expectations and adaptive learning After writing the ll1()(ip) 
using the lagged dummy method, we can solve this model under ratioua.) 
expectations and adaptive learning respectively. We need to write the llIo<ip) 
into 
M M * [z(, kt • 0, 0, 0]' + MAl M * [0,0, k/j-I. f,+I. 1'/ t-d' 
= N N * [Zt-1, k t - 1 , kt, Jt, vtl 
where Al M M represents the expectational terms 
Under rational expectations, the matrices of thp eo('fficiellts for tht' 1I11)(h" 
to be solved are 
AA AIM+MMM 
BB NN 
Under adaptive learning, the matrices of the coefficients for thl' 1110(1<-) 1.0 
be solved are 
AA AIM 
B B = N N - A!1\J M * K K 
Chapter 4 1 GH 
- - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Heterogeneous expectations Under heterogeneous expectatiolls, w ( ~ ~ rt'writl' 
the model into a more general form as 
MM * [Zt, kt, 0, 0,0], + M M R * [0,0, kt+I' itt I , lil+d' 
+M M L * [0,0, k:t+l , ft+l, Vt+Il' 
= NN * [Zt-l,kt-l,kt,ft,Vt] 
Actually, given this general form, we can solve the model under ratiollal 
expectations, adaptive learning, the first ca.<;e and the s ( ~ c o l l d d c a . ' i ( ~ ~ of lH'tl'fO-
geneous expectations. 
If we want to solve the model uuder rational expectations, thp mat riel's 
of the coefficients for the model to be solved are 
AA = Ml'vI + NIMR + MML 
BB NN 
If we want to solve the model under adaptive learning, till' matri(,es of 
the coefficients for the model to be solved are 
All 1\1.\/ 
B B = N N - AI M R * K K - AUf L * K K 
If we want to solve the model under the first C!:l.'le of hetc\rog('Il(\OUS ('x-
pectation, the matrices of the coefficients for the model to bt' solved ar!' 
All !vI M 
BB = NN-AIAIR*LL-MAIL*KK 
If we want to solve the model uuder the second case of hd.!'rog(,lI('oIiH 
expectation, the matrices of the coefficients for the model to 1)(' HolYI'd an' 
llll MM + MAIR 
BB NN - AIML * KK 
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5 A Discussion of the Default Rate and the 
Loan to Value Ratio 
5.1 Introduction 
The assumption of perfect credit market is cOIIllllonly used in DSGE models. 
Recently, however, researchers have raised concerns over the feature of ('[('elit. 
market imperfections, as they suggesterl that (i) it is consist.ellt. with [('alit)' 
and (ii) the interaction between crerlit limits and asset prices has important 
impacts on dynamics. 
The seminal work by Bernallke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) introducps 
the costly verification problem (or the agency problem) to producprs of filial 
goods in a DSGE model. They successfully show that credit markt't i l l l p ( ~ r r
fections can amplify and propagate the impacts of shocks to thl' ('COIlOIllY, 
and they refer this feature a." the financial accelerator mechauism. AllotiH'r 
closely related work by Carlstrom and FUerst. (1997) also ('ousidprs a ! It 'ht 
contract problem, but in a model with flexible prices. TllPY assUIlH' that. 
the agency problem applies to producers of investment goods, who produ('I' 
capital directly from output goods. Their credit mechanism call ('xplain t l j ( ~ ~
output movement in reality. 
The agency problem has heen introduced to the housing Illarket by Aoki, 
Proudman and Vlieghe (2004), and they show that this mechanism ftlllplifi!'s 
and propagates the effL>ct of monetary policy shocks on h o u s i l l ~ ~ im!l'stlllt'llt, 
house price and consumption. They, however, keep the dofault. ratl' ('OJlsl.1L1l1 
when they solve their model. Besides, they a."sume that credil, ull('oJlst.raitwd 
households (lenders) rent housing from homeowners (1)orro\\'('[s), who takl' 
loans to purchase housing. Because homeowners are the only agents t.hat 
are buying housing, a higher demand for housing in an ('collolllic IIplufII 
implies that a higher volume of loans is guaranteerl. l \ l o r ( ' o v ( ~ r , , lftcovil'llo 
and l"eri (2010) also discuss the impacts of the cwciit. markd. imp!'I'fp!'l.iolls 
on the housing market. In their model, impatient hOllsl'llOlds t.akl' loans 
to purchase housing, and they need t.o provide collatpral 1)('Callst' ()f ('J'('dil 
m a r k t ~ t t imperfections. Hence, h o u s i n ~ ~ also plays It ro\!' of ('ollal.<'ral, awl I hI' 
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borrowing constraint is related to housing values. In their Illocipl, howev!'r, 
the debt is fully collateralised, and there is no possibility of default. TIH',Y 
calibrate the loan to value ratio using the empirical value, but we suppm;(' 
that, in the model without the possibility of default, the appropria.t,(' loan to 
value ratio should be fixed at one. 
In this chapter, we introduce the agency problem into the housing markd, 
and we are interested in the dynamics of the default rate and the loan to vahl<' 
ratio. In particular, we assume that an idiosyncratic silOek affects tltp hOlls-
ing assets directly. Specifically, the value of housing assets can he affect I'd hy 
many possible random events, such as building a new school and discoV('rilll!; 
natural resourcesYl Meanwhile, we assume that both lenders and borrow-
ers can purchase housing. Our impulse response analysis shows that, givIHI 
a positive goods sector technology shock, the default rate exhibits counter-
cyclical behaviour, which is consistent with our empirical ana.lysis. The loall 
to value ratio, however, is also countercyclical, while our £'mpirical a.nalysis 
suggests procyclical behaviour. The reason for this is that, in an ecoJlomic 
upturn, credit constrained households have less housing in the housillg mar-
ket, thus the volume of loans they receive also decreases, Imuling to a fall ill 
the loan to value ratio. Therefore, the inconsistency between the resll)t frolll 
our model and empirical evidence suggests that, in the future research, \\'(' 
need to improve the model in a way that allows credit COm-it rained h()ust'holds 
to obtain more housing in an economic upturn. 
Next, we discuss the implications of introducing a time-varyillg 1lU'1l.1l ()f 
the idiosyncratic shock, by assuming that idiosyncratie shocks that aw a!>m:p 
steady state mean to the housing assets are more likely to walis(' ill aJl ('("1)-
nomic upturn. For example, government invests more ill illfra.'itru('tllrt' alld 
education when the economy is booming, causing positive impl\('t Oil hOlls(' 
price in more regions. Faia and r..lonacelli (2007) also discuss this f('atllf<" 
based on the agency problem framework of Carlstrom and F\l('rst (HHJ7), III 
order to generate a countercyclical premium on external fillal}('(', t l \ ( ~ y y lillk 
the mean of the idiosyncratic shock to aggregate total factor productivity. 
HI For example. Bl'siey and \Iuller (2012) di;;clIss the impact of \'io\('IJ('I' Oil !tOilS\' pri("'''' 
in Northern Ireland. 
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In our chapter, we illustrate that, when the mcan of the idiosyncratic shock 
is time-invariant, the structure of the model implies a positive relation 1)('-
tween the default rate and the loan to V'dluc ratio, thus if w(' can improve tlIP 
model to have a procyclical loan to value ratio, the default rate will Iwcolll<' 
procyclical as well. Therefore, in order to overeome this co-moveIllent. and 
to have both a procyclical loan to value ratio and a countercyclical default 
rate, as suggested by data, we should consider a time-varying mean of tllP 
idiosyncratic shock. 
5.2 Empirical analysis 
In this section, we examine the cyclicality of several housing market variahles 
compared to U.S. real GDP using a sample period 1973Ql to 201OQ4. Figun' 
5.1 and Figure 5.2 show that both mortgage loan amount and housing vahl<' 
display pro cyclical behaviour, and their volatilities are higher than that of 
real GDP. Figure 5.3 shows that the loan to V'dlue ratio is also procydiml, 
implying that the mortgage loan amount is more procydical than tIl!' housing 
value.92 Meanwhile, the volatility of the loan to value ratio is less than that of 
real GDP and the average loan to value ratio is 75% over HlP sCllllpl(' P!'rio<i. 
Finally, Figure 5.4 shows that the Illortgago delinquency rat!' wa . .., not dosd.v 
related to real GDP before tho 19808. From 1985, howt'vPr, this rat(' hll . .., 
exhibited countercyclical behaviour. In particular, the d ( ~ l i l l q \ l ( \ I l < ' Y Y rat.I' 1111 • .., 
increased sharply during the financial crisis, startillg from 2007. l\Imllwhilt', 
the foreclosure rate has a similar pattern, but with a lower ratp. Overall, a 
procydical loan to value ratio and a countercyclica.l ddillqueucy rat(' (or a 
countercyclical foreclosure rate) are two facts that we attempt. to r('pro<iw·(' 
from our model. 
!l2The loan to value ratio is a ratio of Inortg;ag;p loan anHlllnt to hOllsing; ",11111'. 
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5.3 The Model 
In this chapter, we use a DSGE model with sticky prices, ('fl'tiit Illarkl'! 
imperfections, and housing production. The credit market is subjPct. t.o It 
costly state verifieation problem for housing mortgages. In particlllar, w(' an' 
interested in the dynamics of the default rate and the loan to valul' ratio. 
To begin with, we briefly describe all of agents in t.he lllode\. C n ~ d i t . . ("()lI-
strained households consist of homeowners and renters. HOlllPoww'rs buy 
housing using down payment of their own and loans from financial illt('fIllP-
diaries, and then rent it to renters. The reason we separate t.hese hOl1s('hol<ls 
into two agents is that we need to avoid the conflict between the risk \I<'U-
tral borrowers in the debt contract problem and dw risk averse COIlSl1l1H'rS 
in the utility maximisation problem. Financial intermediaries takt, d£'posits 
from credit unconstrained households and provide loans to credit constrainpd 
households. In the supply side, we have a goods production sl'd.or, which 
includes final goods firms, retail goods firms, and intermediate goods firms. 
Besides, we also have a housing production sector. Finally, t l \ l ~ ~ lllondary 
authority uses the nominal interest rate as a policy iustrument. to atf('('t, t hI' 
real economy. 
5.3.1 Credit constrained households 
Credit constrained households are infinitely lived, IllPHsure ow' alld ('ousist 
of homeowners and renters. On the one hand, homeowners buy houtiiup, us-
ing down payment (net worth) and loans froUl financial intt'rtllPdiarips, n'lIt 
housing to renters, and transfer a payment to rent()rti. On t.Iw ot.l\l'\" Imlld, 
renters consume final goods, supply labour, rent housing frolll hOIllPOWllt'rs. 
and receive a payment transferred from homeowners. Xott' t.hat. f('lIt. awl 
transfer payment can be seen as internal flows of funds wit.hin ('\"('tiit. ('011-
strained households. 
Homeowners' decisions on default and non-default At tIlt' \)('gillllill1-', 
of period t, h o n u ~ o w l l e r s s take loans from financial iut,t'rIlu'<iiari('s, t.oppt.\U'r 
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with down payment (or net worth) of their own, to buy housing, which is 
rented to renters within the period. The borrowing equation shows that til(' 
volume of loans is the difference between the real value of housing a.ssds awl 
the down payment, 
(G.l) 
where qh,t is the real house price, q h , t h ~ ~ is the real value of hOllsing assl'ls 
that homeowners are buying, n w ~ ~ is the homeowners' down payulPnt, and II:' 
is the volume of loans taken from financial intermediarins. 
In the beginning of period t + 1, homeowners need to repay til(' loans 
taken in the previous period. Since housing is depreciating at a rat(' (5", 
the undepreciated housing assets own by the homeowner are (1 - 15 h) "r. w(' 
assume that an idiosyncratic shock, Wt+}, with a time-invariant mean, W,," 
affects the undepreciated housing assets, thus the real idiosyncratic va.hw of 
undepreciated housing assets is Wt+lqh,t+l (1 - Sh) h ~ . .
In this model, default is a steady state phenomenon, a .. " homeowners <,etJ\ 
default if the value of collateralised assets is less than the loan repaYlllI'lIt. 
Therefore, lenders provide the loans with a contractual (gross) intt'J"{'st mtt', 
RI,t. which is higher than the riskless (gross) interest rate, H" to ("owr th"ir 
loss from default. Hence, the real repayull'ut for the loans t a k ( ~ 1 1 1 ill I)('riod f 
is ~ b ~ , , where Ticl+1 is the (gross) inflation rate. 
rr c,t I 1 ' 
\\<1lCIl we combine the real idiosyncratic value of Iludepn'('iat!'d itollsilll!, 
assets and the real repayment, there is a threshold il'vd of t.lw Hito("k, WI, 
such that,U3 
- -) b Rl,t b 
Wt+lq'l,t+1 (1 - Oh ht = --b,. 
Tic,t+l 
At this threshold level, the real value of undcpredated housing a .... sl'ts, 
Wt+ 1 qh,t+l (1 - t5 h) hf, is equal to the real repayment for tit(' l ( ) a l l S , - ~ ~ Ii:'. 
iT'"I'1 
Therefore, homeowners are indifferent between default and lloll-d<'fallit, as 
we assume that borrowers' housing assets are taken by leuders if tit('y d"fallit. 
Given this threshold level, we can infer that homeowuers' (i<'cisiolls d,,-
!':IFor simplicity. wp ig;nore the expectation operator E t in this ( ' h l \ p t l ~ r . .
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pend on the value of the idiosyncratic shock, 
Wt+l 
< Wt+l => Wt+lQh,t+l (1 - 8h ) h ~ ~ < 1fR1 ,1 b ~ ~ => Default 
c,f.+l 
> Wt+l => Wt+lQh t+l (1 - 6h) h ~ ~ > ! ! : ! . L b ~ ~ => No Default. 
, 1fc ,f.+l 
17(; 
In other words, when the actual level is less than the thresholdl('wl, WI t I <' 
Wt+l, the real value of un depreciated housing assets is less thau til<' rt'al f('-
payment, thus homeowner will default. Therefore, the prohabilit.y of deCault 
is 
Wttl 
F(Wt+l) = ./ f(w)dw = Pr(wl+1 < Wt+l) 
min 
where F (Wt+d is the cumulative distribution function of the idiosyncratic 
shock. In contrast, if the actual level is greater than the throshold J<>\"d, 
Wt+l > Wt+l, the real value of ulldepreciated housing a.'"ls('t.s is great.er t.hall 
the real repayment, thus homeowners will not default, and t.he p r o h a h i l i t . ~ , , of 
no default is 1 - F (Wt+ 1)' 
Meanwhile, the loan to value ratio is defined as 
~ b h h
7r c ,t tit 
rnt = b 
w",qh,I+1 (1 - bh ) 11,1 
which is the ratio of the expected real total debt obligations to tht' t'xpt'ctt'd 
real average value of undepreciated housing a."isets. Note that, ill our lIlodl'\. 
the loan to value ratio is not a choice variableYcl 
If we combine equations 5.2 and 5.3, we have a relat.ion cUUOIlP; tilt' loau 
!lIThis definition of the loan to value ratio is forward lookinl?;. Altl'rBatiwly, H ('Ollll'lII-
porary loan to value ratio can be defined as 
bb r n ~ ~ = _...:;t_..,-
w r n q h , t h ~ ~
which is the ratio of the volumen of loan to ave rag€' h ( ) l \ s i n ~ ~ \'alm', Tht' WH,\' of dt'tillillg; 
the loan to value ratio, however, hat; little impacts on the dynamics of th!' II10dl'1. 
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to value ratio, the threshold level, and the mean of the idioHYlI<Tatk Hho('k, 
which shows that, if the threshold level and the mean are fixml (i.l'., till' 
probability of default is fixed), the loan to value ratio should bl' tixl'd a: .. ; wl'll. 
The allocation of the undepreciated housing assets H('f(' WP db-
cuss the allocation of the undepreciated housing a.'isets betw('PlI hOIl\('owl\I'rs 
(borrowers) and financial intermediaries (lenders) whcn hOllWOWllI'l's dt'l'id" 
to default or not default .. 
If homeowners default and do not repay the loans, financial illt(,f1nedial'i('s 
will take over the housing assets and pay a monitoring cost, which iH It fraction 
Pm of the value of undepreciated housing a.qsets. Meanwhile, hOllleoww'rH ('an 
keep the rcnt payment from renters. The following table Sllllllwnisl's what 
borrowers and lenders get if borrowers default. 
Borrowcrs' gain F (Wt+l) . q r , l h ~ ~
Lend£'rs' gross gain G (Wt+d . C}h,t+l (1 - 6,,) h ~ ~
Lenders' net gain (1- 11m) G (Wt+d . 1/",1+1 (1 - (5/,) II:' 
;;Jl.\ 
where qr,/. is the real rental price of housing, G (Wt+d = .l;":.f (...:) r/",.) is tIll' 
min 
conditional mean of the idiosyn<Tatic shock given borrowers dt'falilt .. 
If homeowners do not default, they will repay the loans to 1<'1I<il'rs with 
the contractual interest rate. The following table 8UIlunaris('s what bO\T()\\'('rs 
and lenders get if borrowers do not default. 
(;":m - G(Wt+l))' (jh,l+l (1 - 8,,) h7 
- (1 - F (Wt+d) . " . ~ i : , : , , b ~ ~ + (1 - F (W'!-I)) . (I ... ,h:' Borrowers' gain 
Lenders' gain 
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max 
where Wm ./ W f (W) dw is the unconditional mean of t.hl' i d i ( ) s ~ ' l l < ' r a l l k 
min 
shock. 
Then we summarise what borrowers and lenders p;<>t frolll t.his dl'hl ("011-
tract problem. Firstly, borrowers' gain is summarised a.'> 
Default F (Wt+d . ( j r , t h ~ ~
(w m - G (wl+d) 
. l/h,t+l (1 - c),,) I t ~ ~
No default 
-WI+l (1 - F (Wt+.)) 
+ (1 - F (wt+I)) . (jr,lhLI 
Total B (Wt+.) . qh,t+l (1 - 5h) h ~ ~ + (j,·,lhr 
where B (Wt+.) = (w m - G (Wf+tl) - Wt+l (1 - F (WI+tl) is til<' !>orrowm.,' 
share of the real value of u n d e p r c c i a t f ~ d d housing asset.\J;, 
Secondly, lenders' gross gain is summarised a..., 
Default G (W1+d . qh,t+l (1 - 8,,) h ~ ~
No default Wt+l (1 - F (Wt+l))' qh.t+1 (1 - ( ( 1 1 ) " ~ ~
Total r (wI+d . l/h,I+1 (1 - 6h ) h ~ ~
where r (wt+d = G (W,+d + (1 - F (wt+d) Wt+l is the lellciprs' gross sharI' of 
the real value of undepreeiated housing assets, l)(lfon' slli>t.rad.ing 11\1' llIoui-
toring; cost. 
Thirdly, lenders' net g;ain is summarised as 
Default (1 - Itm ) G (w,+d 'Q",t+1 (1 - J'I) II:' 
Xo default Wt+l (1- F ( W t ~ I ) ) ' ' q".t+l (1 - 511 ) II:' 
Total L (W1+d· l/II,t+1 (1 - 8,,) h ~ ~
')!iRecall that the equation of the threshold level is 
thus wp can rPl>lacf' (1 - F ( ~ t + l ) ) ) . ~ l / t ' ' by. W'+1 (1 - F (W/+l)) (I IT, .. ,. I ·q".I. I 
borrowers' gain giwn no default. 
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where L (Wt+d = (1- I1rr,) G(Wt+l) + (1 - F(Wt+d)WI+I is tlw It'JI(krs' 111'1 
share of the real value of undepreciated housing assets aftc'!" sui>tradiJlg I hI' 
monitoring cost. 
The financial intermediaries The lenders in this model an' fillancial ill-
termediaries, who take deposits frolll credit unconstrained hOlls<'iI<)lds allli 
provide loans to credit constrained households. For Hilllplicit.y, WI' /\.'iSIlIW' 
a perfectly competitive market for financial intennedia.ricH, thllH tiH'Y Illak(' 
zero profit. We also assume that they facilitate the loanH markl't, at. Z<'I'O 
cost. On the one hand, financial intermediaries t a k c ~ ~ saving, lJ" frolll cr(·eli 1 
unconstrained households in period t, and then return tlH' saving phiS t hI' 
riskless interest rate, ~ b t , , in period t + 1. On the other hand, filllul<'ial 
7f c,t -1--1 
intermediaries provide loans, b ~ , , to credit constrained houHeholcb ill pt'rioel 
t, and receive their net share of the value of u l l d ( ~ p r e ( " i a t ( ' d d housillg /\''is(' 18 , 
L (WI+I)' qh,t+1 (1 - 6 h ) h ~ , , in period t + 1. Therefore, t.he leIHh'rs' participa-
tion constraint is 
(SA) 
where L (W'+I) is the lenders' npt. share of the real v a h l l ~ ~ of IIlHiPpn'ciat('d 
housing asset.s. This equation indicates that t,hp Iml<iprs' 11<'1. /!;aill frolll I hI' 
debt contract prohlem should })(' uo less than tlw real n'paYIIlPllt t.o sm'pl's. 
The homeowners' debt contract problem Then we an' fPad,\' III dl'-
scribe the debt contract problem. As sUlllmrised before, borrow!'rs' gaiJl frolll 
this problem is 
Then borrowerH (homeowners) maximise their expl'ct(\d rdum subjt'(,\. 1.11 til(' 
lenders' participation constraint 5.4. 
\Ve obtained two first ord£'r conditions from til<' hOllH'oww'rs' (h·hl 1'011-
tract problem.'Jli Firstly, the equation that det,l'nllilll'S t.i1l' tlin'sholt! I<'vl'\ (,1' 
!HiTlw hOl/ll'OWIlPrs' (kht contract proiliPlII is shown in t 1)(' Appf'ndix. 
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the idiosyncratic shock is 
(G.G) 
where .xL is the Lagrange multiplier OIl the lender's participatioll ("ollstraillt . 
The LHS, -B' (Wt+l), is the marginal cost to borrowers' r('turn p;iwil that 
the threshold level Wt+l increase by one morc unit, as B (W,.,l) is d(,<T(\;I.'iillg 
in Wt+l' On the RHS, L' (Wt+l) the marginal benefit to IcndP.fs' rdum gi\'l'lI 
that the threshold level Wt+1 increase by one more unit, sin("t' L P, ! I) IS 
an increasing function of :;]1+1. Therefore, the participation constraillt is 
loosened by L' (Wt+d unit, and thus .xLL' (WI+l) is the lllargiIlal b('Jl('fit to 
borrowers, 8..'3 the shadow price of loosening the constraint by 011<' IIlIit is .x:;". 
In sum, this equation implies that, given that the threshold lewl i1\("I"I';I.'iI'S 
by one more unit, the marginal cost is equal to the marginal h(\lH'fit. of It 
loosened participation constraint. 
Secondly, the equation that determines the homeowners' delllalld for 
housing is 
B(:;]t+dqft,l+l (1- 6ft) +qr,t = - . x ~ , 1 1 [L(Wt+l)qll,l+l (1- 6,,) - ~ U I I '1/".1] 
"<'./1 I 
U'>.ti) 
The LHS is the marginal benefit to borrowers given t.hat. t.heir hOllsin)!, ill-
creases by one mOfl' unit. l\leanwhile, given t.hat borrowNs' housing i\l<"1"1'11.'i1'8 
by one more uuit, the incre8..'le in the lenders' ret.urn, L (WI 1 I) (J/,,/ t I ( I (j'l). 
is less than tlw increase in debt obligation, ~ q " , t , , giv('ll t.hat t.1\(' 111'1 
11"",1, I 
worth does not change, thus the pa.rticipatioll constraint is t,ip;i1tt'llt'd by 
L (Wt+d l]h,t+l (1 - 6,,) - r r c ~ t , , 1 qh,1 unitY' As the shadow pricl' of t.ip;htl'lIill).',. 
!liThe patiripatioll constraint i,.; 
thus we hav(' ";\I('h <In inequality. given /lW, b po,.;itiv('. 
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the participation constraint by one unit is .xL, the RHS is the marginal cost. 
of a tightened participation l:onstraint to borrowers. III Slllll, this ('<iuatioll 
indicates that, given that borrowers' hOllsing increases by one mon' uuit, fhp 
marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of a tight,enpd part.icipat.ioll 
constraint. 
The allocation of homeowners' return Here we discuss how hOIlH'OWll-
ers deal with their real return received in period t, 
which is composed by the homeowners' share of the value of 1 l l 1 d p p n ~ c i a . t < ' d d
housing assets and the rent from renters. We assume that hotlwowlI<'rs di-
vide the real return into two partsYtl Firstly, homeowlwrs keep a fract.ioll 
Tnw of real return as down payment (or net worth), nwf, which is wwcl to 
purchase housing in period t, together with the loans taken frolll fillallcial 
intermediaries. The equation of the down payment is 
(5.7) 
Secondly, homeowners give a fraction (1 - Trw') of t.h(·ir fl'al rduru to 
(1M Aoki, Proudrnan and Vligeghe (2004) aSSlIllW t hat till' transfl'r Dr is H I'll II ('t ion of tIll' 
leverage ratio. 
D t = X ( ~ ) )q h , t h ~ ~
where X' (1/» > 0 and A (0) = D, Here <i) = "',"" = 0.7 is the lpvpnt!!:p ratio ill till' ,.,11'1\,1\, %' ' 
state. and D is the level of dividend consistent with o. 
The log-linearised form is 
where Ii = !t'?'» <fJ, T I H ~ ~ adjustment factor 8 on the dividend rule is ;;pl lit :1. "'hii'll i ~ ~
X'I' 
consistent the est imated average elasticity of mortgag(' equity wit lidrawal wit Ii rpsIH'ct ttl 
the net worth ratio, In othC'r words. the amount of equity withdrawn will itlITf'HS" I,,\' :I'X 
if the net worth of the aggregate CK hOIl;;ptlOld sector rise,; by 1'Y., 
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renters as a transfer payment, tT7. The equation of the transfer pay II \('111. is 
Renters Renters also live in credit constrained households. Th('y ('OnSIlIIH' 
goods, rent housing from homeowners, receive a transfer paYIlwllt from hOIlI<'-
owners, supply labour to intermediate goods firms, and receive wap,p. Tlw)' 
maximise their lifetime utility subject to their budget constraint. 
The renters' lifetime utility function is 
where we use superscript i to denote variables associated t.o rent!'rs. In 1.1\1' 
utility fUIlction, EI is the expectation operator, {3i is t.he renters' <iiscollllt 
factor, c; is renters' consumption, Cc measures the degr(l(' of consumption 
habit, r ~ ~ is a scaling fad or , h ~ ~ is domestic housing, / is th(' wl'ight Oil 
domestic housing, n; is the supply of renters' labour, and -+ is till' Fisll<'r 
')" 
elasticity of labour supply. 
Given the lifetime utility function, the renters' marginal utility of ('011-
sumption is 
(5.!» 
which expresses the marginal utility of consumption 11",1 in t('rJllS of iagg('d, 
current, and future consumption. 
The renters' real budget constraint shows that the total ( ~ X P ( \ l l S ( , , (LHS) 
should be no more than the total income (RHS), and is expmised a .. 'i 
(S.IO) 
where qr,t is the real rental price of housing, wi is the real wage rat!', f r:' is tilt' 
real transfer payment from homeowners. We assume that [('nt.ers do lIot sm'!' 
into or borrow from financial intermediaries, thus they 8 1>(' lH 1 all availahh' 
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resource in a given period. 
We obtain two first order conditions from the renters' utility llI1Lxilllisat iOIl 
problem.!HJ Firstly, the equation that governs the rentms' labonr supply is 
(ii. 11 ) 
which implies that the marginal disutility of labour supply at t is ('qual to 
the real wage in terms of the marginal utility consumption at t. This first 
order condition is an intratemporal optimality condition that iudicatl's how 
renters make decisions about consumption and labour supply in ppriod f. 
Secondly, the equat.ion that. governs the renters' demaud for doul('stic 
housing is 
(5.12) 
which implies that the real rent.al price of honsing in terms of thl' lIIarp;iual 
utilit.y of consumption at t is equal to the marginal utility of dOIlH'stic housing 
at t. This first order condition is also an intratemporal optimality coJl(litiou 
that describes an optimal allocation of resource between comnuuptiou /till I 
domestic honsing. 
5.3.2 The idiosyncratic shock 
\Ve have a.<;sumed that an idiosyncratic shock, W " ~ ~ affects t.1l<' ulltit'pf('ciat I'd 
housing a.<;sets, (1 - 6ft ) hi-I, and thus the real idiosyncratic va!tll' of 1Il1th,-
preciated housing assets is qh.tWt (1 - 6h ) hi-I. Following Faia aud ~ 1 ( ) W H ' ( ' l l i i
(2005), and ~ I o r m m m i i (2010), we assume that the idim,yncratic shock ... '/ is 
independently dist.ributed (across homeowners and t.ime) with a 1I11ifOl'lll dis-
tribut.ion and has positive support. lOO We also assUlUp t.hat t.he idiosYllcratic 
shock has a timt'-invariant lllt'all with value of one, W I7I = 1, and t II!' mug" 
of dist.ribut.ion is fixed at 2p..;. Therefore, the uniform distributioll of till' 
!)!)The renters' utility maximisation is showll ill the Appelldix. 
lIJoSernanke. Gt'rtlpr and Gilchrist (1999) consider a log; norlllal di,.,tril.lltioll. 
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idiosyncratic shock is 
The probability density fuuction is 
1 f (wd = F' (wd = , 
max - nlln 
-------------,-- --- --, (wm + p) - (W/1/ - P.J ' 2 f J ~ . .
where F' (wd > 0, Note that we also use 'min' and 'lIlax' to c \ 1 ~ I l ( ) t l ' ' till' 10\\'''1' 
boundary and upper boundary of the distributioll, For It unifortll dist rillll-
tion, the probability density function is a eOllst-ant and dl'pl'JI(is Oil till' nlll).'." 
of the distribution, 2pw, only, 
The cumulative density fuuction is 
l
z;J, lz;J( 1 
F(wd = f(w)dw = -dw = w, ij.,."11 --- I)....,; --- -- ---'--' 
, min ' ..v", --Pw 2p..v 
where F (Wt) ~ ~ 0, limz;J,-+min F (wd ....... 0, and lim;.,( '''111' F (;:;){ ) - - ~ ~ 1. This 
function can be interpreted as the probabilit.y of ({(>fault or t IH' I h·falll1 raI.l , • 
which depends on Uw threshold l ( ~ v e \ , , alld tll<' prolmbility (iPllsity flllll'tioll. 
The prohability of no default iH 
- lllluX W", + fl,.; 1 - F (WI) = I (w) dw = -') -------
. z;J, .. P...; 
since til(' SHIll of the probability of ddault and till' probability of 110 dd'illllt 
is always equal to one. 
The conditional mean givell default. 1S 
G (WI) = /,z;J, wI (w) dw = I':;;;;' 
. nun . w'", --p...; 
,) 
(; .•. :", -- 1 1 ~ . r r
- - - - . " " " . - - - - . - . - ~ . . -< • 
. t/l", 
w h ( ' f ( ~ ~ G (WI) ~ ~ 0, lirnz;J,-.min G (WI) ....... 0, and Ii 1ll;., , ""ilX G (:.'{) -. "-',,,. T h i ~ ~
fun('tion dppellds on t.lw t.hreshold lc'vd Hnd til<' prolmhiJi t." dt'llsi t.v 1'11111'1 iOIl. 
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The derivative of the conditional mean giveIl default. is 
W G' (wd = wtf (w,) = -2 I 
(1.,; 
since both p.,; and Wt are positive, we havp G' (WI) > 0, ilHiicat.ill)..', that (,' (:;)1 ) 
is an increa.<.;ing function of Wt. The second derivatiw is (,'" (;:]1) '2/1", Il. 
indicating G (Wt) is convex at the threshold level. 
The conditional mean given no default is 
{mill 
Wm - G (W,) = .I;.;, wI (w) dw 
since we assume that the time-invaria.nt unconditional 1I1t'IUI of t hI' i<iios.\'I1-
cratic shock is W m . 
The lender's gross share is 
CJt tnux 
r (w,) = ./W1 (w) dw + wI./ 1 (w) r!iJ..,' 
min 
= G (wd + w, (1 - F (w, )) 
where f(wd 2: 0, l i m w , ~ t r l i n n ['(WI) --+ min, and lim:.!, 'IIIi1X 1'(..2/ ),- ... ':,"' Pn'-
dsely, this is til<' Il'lulers' gross s h a n ~ ~ of th!' ),I'al va.hll' of I III' IIl1dl'III'('('ial .. d 
housing assets at period t, bl'fore t.aking tilt' JIIonitorill)..', \'l)sts illto al'('Ullllt . 
TIlf' derivativp of lender's gross share is 
f' (wt) = 1 - F (w,) 
since (1 - F (Wt)) > 0, we know that. r' (wt! is lUI iIllT!'H .... ill)..', fUlId iOIl of -;.:/, 
In addition, the second d e r i v a t i V ! ~ ~ is 1''' (WI) = -1 PI) <. I), hPIl('(' r (,-4:,) is 
COllcave at the threshold lovel. 
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The lenders' net share is 
rAJt rnax ':"", 
fWI (w) dw + WI f I (w) dw - p", fW I (w) ri:....' 
min Wt (nill 
where L (wd ~ ~ 0, lim"it->rnin L (WI) -; min, and liIllwt ~ l I \ I l X X /. (w, )-. (1 -- II ",) ""-',,,. 
Precisely, this is the lenders' net share of the real vahl<' of t.lw 1II1d('pn'('iall'd 
housing assets at period t, after taking the monitoring cost.s illto accounl . 
The differential of lenders' net share is 
There is an optimal value, w; = ...J1,+"+P"" that maximis('s t.llI' it'lIti('rs' 111'1 
It"" 
share. We infer that it is a local maximuIIl as L" (wn < O. Sill('(' /, (-'z'/) 
in increa..,ing on (min, w;) and decrea.<;ing on (L;;;. max), 1I'lIdl'r8 I\('\"(,I" chonsl' 
WI > w;. Besides, our steady state value of WI is far l I ~ s s s than tilt' opt. ill tal 
value, thus L (WI) in increasing in WI and concave aroulld til(' IH'ighhol'liood 
of the steady state. 
Tlw borrowers' share is 
Wt UIUX 
Wm - fWI (w) dw - (.]1 f f ( .... :) II.....: 
where B (wd ~ ~ 0, limwt->rnin n (WI) -> Wm - III ill , awl l i l J l ~ " ' I I I . 1 < < n (::,) 
O. Precisely, this is the borrowers' sharp of t.h(' wal \'ahlt' of Illld('III"('ciall'd 
housing asspts at period t. 
The different.ial of borrower's sharp 
8' (w,) = -G' (WI) - (1 - F P,)) + F' (":';",):::, 
- (l - F (w,)) 
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since - (1 - F (wd) < 0, we know that H' (w,) is a d«'crea • ..,in).!; I'll lid ion of 
Wt. Otherwise, if B (Wt) is increasing in WI! homeowlH'rs' will always choos«, 
Wt = max, thus the probability of default is always equal to OJH'. III iulditioll, 
the second derivative is B" (wd = f (Wt) > 0, illdicat.iu).!; t.hat lJ (;:;:;',) is COII\'I'X 
at the threshold level. 
5.3.3 Credit unconstrained households 
Credit unconstrained households are infinit.ely liwd and of IIWI\,,"'un' OJII', 
They supply labour, consume final gooch;, dplllawl dOIll(,st.ic hOIlSill).!;, IU'-
cumulate goods capital and housing capital. Th<,y Illa.ximisl' Ii f«'li II U' II t ilily 
subject to their budget constraint. We a...,sume that t1wy OWII til«' profitahll' 
retail goods firms. lol 
Similar with renters, tho credit unconst.rained hOllsPilOlds' lifptillll' utilil,\' 
function is 
where E t is t.he expectat.ion operator, Ij is till' (Tl'dit lIIH'ollstraiw'd hOllsl'-
holds' discollnt factor, Ct is credit. I l I H ' o n s t r a i J I I ~ d d hO\ls«·hohls' (,III1SlIlllpt.ioll, 
~ c c measures the degree of ('OllSllIllpt.ion habit, r" is it sl'alill)!, fal'lo\", h( is 
domest.ic housing, j is t.he weight. on dotllPst.k hOllsiu/!" III is t \11' s l I p p l ~ ' ' of 
credit unconstrained households' labour, and J.... is Ihl' FislH'r 1'11\.,'.;1 kit \' of 
1'1 . 
labour supply. 
Giv('n the lifetime utility fUllctioll, til«' (TPliit IlIU'OllHt rail1l'c\ hOlls('ilolds' 
marginal utility of consumption is 
which expresses the marginal ut.ility of conslllllPtioll 1/"" ill tpl'IIIS of la)!.J!pd. 
current, and future consumption. 
1111 Crpdit IIllcollstrailwd hOllst>ilolds \H'hH\'(' ill til!' "HilII' wily a ~ ~ pat i"lIt h ' I \ I ~ , ' h " l d " " ill '11\1' 
Chaptpr 2, 
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The credit unconstrained households' real budgd constraint. shows that 
the total expense (LHS) should be no more than the total illCOlI1I' (lUIS). 
and is expressed as 
wlwre qh,t is the real house price, bt is real bonds (or savillg), It', is till' 
real wage rate, Rt _\ is the (gross) nominal return 011 tJw hOllds Iwld ill t hI' 
previous period or the (gross) nominal interest ratl" 7r(,,t is t h ( ~ ~ (gross) inflat iOI1 
rate, and It is the real profit froIll retail goods firms, For the capital relall'fi 
variables, Kh,t is housing capital, Ke,t is goods capit.a.l, R ~ ' l t , I I alld Uh,l an' 
the real rental price of housing capital and goods ea.pital, 15k)" 15k", IS" an' t hp 
depreciation rates for housing capital, goods capit.al, and hOllsillg sto('k, Tht' 
real price of goods capital and housing capit.al is lIormalisl'd to OW', saHli' 
as the real price of final goods,lIl:.! The last two terms Oil t.ht' LHS arc' till' 
adjustment costs for goods capital and housing capit.al r l ' s p l ~ d i \ ' C ' l y , , fllld Ilk/, 
and '1k" are the coefficiellts of adjustmellt costs, 
We obtain five first order eouciitions from thl' ('fl'<iit. UIII'Ollst railll'd hOllSI .... 
holds' lifetime utility maximisatioll p r ( ) b l < ~ l l l , I ! I : I I TI\(' first. till'l'I' \\'1'1'1' dis('lIssl'd 
in the Chaptpr 2, 
J. . 
1L",I%,1 = h, +d(1-t'>/t)wm Et{II",IlI I/I"I+Il 
where the first equation is the Euler equatioll t.hat !!;OVI'I'IlS till' opt.illlal al· 
loca.tion of consumption over time, t.he second <'<llIatioll is all illtmt('llIporal 
I I I ~ T l w w r ! ~ a l l pri('('s of housing capital alld p;oor\s ('apital art' IlI)f1l1ali".,d ttl "111', 1,,11 II,.. 
rpal relit al prices of t I Will ar!' not. 
11l:'The credit unconstrairwd householch;' utility IIIHxilllisatioll prol,lt'lIl i" ,,11""11 ill 1114' 
Appl'llciix, 
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optimality condition that indicates t.he trade-off \)('t.w(,('11 ("0 II:-i 11 III pt illll alld 
labour supply, and the third eqllation is all optilllality collditioll that <11'-
scribes the optimal allocation of resource between ('oJlsulllptioJl and c\OIlH':-it ic 
housing. 
The fourth first order condition gOV('fIlS til(' ("fl'dit Il!l('ollstrailll'd hOIlSIL 
holds' demand for housing capital, awl it is expn'ss('d a."i 
which implies that the real price of housing capital in terllls of 1/1(' marginal 
utility of consumption at t iH equal to the Sl1l11 of t.h(' ('XI)('cj,('d l"l'al rt'llt al 
price of housing capital and tlw oxpected n ~ a l l pric(' of housillg ('apital (for 
rCHclling uudcpreciated housing capita.l) in t.PfIllS of thl' <iiscollut('d lltargillal 
utility of consumption at. t + 1, subtracting til(' a<ijustJlH'Jlt ('osts Oil housing 
capital. This first o f ( l < ~ r r con<iitioJl is an optilllality condition thai d('sCTii>I's 
the optimal allocation of resource l ) ( ' t . w ( ~ e n n consulllption and hOIlSill).', capital. 
Finally, the equation that gOVPrtlS t h(' ( ' n ~ d i i t. tlllC"Ollst railll'd hOllsd lolds' 
demand for hOllsing capital is 
whkh implies t.hat tlw real p r i ( ' ( ~ ~ of goods capital ill t('rJlI:-i of til!' Illargillal 
utility of cOllHumpt.iou at. t is <'qllal to til<' SI1I11 of tllP l'xl)t'('t I'd n'<111'1'111 al priet' 
of goods capital and til<' ( ~ x p < , c t , ( ~ d d real pri('(' of )!;oot\s capital (for rl':-i1'1I ill).', 
Illldepreciat.ed goods capit.al) ill terms of til<' dis('ollllt.l'd lIIargillal III i l i t ~ · · (.1' 
consumption at t + 1, sllbt.raetinf,!; tlw acijust.IlH'IIt. ('ost:-i Oil goods ('apil ill. This 
first. or<i<'r condition is an opt.imalit.y ('olldit.ioll t.hat d('s('rilH's 1111' opl illlal 
allc)('at.ioll of n ~ s o l l r c e e h ( ' t w ( , ( ~ 1 1 1 ('OIlSII11I pI iOIl alld goods I'll pi tal. 
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5.3.4 Goods production sector 
In the goods production sector, wp have thw(' playprs: (i) filial p;oo<is pro-
ducers buy retail goods from individual reta.il p;oo<is prodll<'('rs, awl (,OIlI\lOSI' 
thcm into fina.l goods, which are ready for cOllsllmptioJl; (ii) n'tail p;oods pro-
ducers (or retailers) buy intermediate goods from illt('f1I1I'<iiatl' p;oo<is prodlll'-
ers, and differentiate the goods at no cost into r<'l,ail p;oo<is; (iii) iut I'rJllI'<iiat (' 
goods producers combine goods sl'ctor technolop;y alld labour frolll patil'lIt 
households to produce intermediat(' goods, which aT<! thc'lI sold t.o rf'l ail goods 
producers. 
Final goods firms and retail goods firms As thes(' t.WI) tyP(' of firllls 
were described in the Chapter 2 already, here w(' only list <'quatiolls that :tn' 
rcleV'ant to the equilibrium of the lllodel. TIlE' first oniPr ('ouditioJl (kri\'('d 
from the retailers' real profit maximisation prohll'lIl is tIH' 1'(l'mtio ll of til(' 
real optimal price, and it is expressed a.s 
e 
Qc,/ = --lE, 
2-
in which we ddiIw the real optilllal price a.s q,." = ,i:-.,. 
<,I 
Given the features of stieky prices and price iwi<'xatioll. th(' lIomillal prjI'(' 
level can also be writ tell as 
The real profit from retail goods firtHS is 
r _ y.. PUll'" \' _ (L 1 ) \' }I- I---C'- --;- 11 
P"I 7., 
(rdO) 
which iIllplies that the real profit is till' dift'('f(')l('1' 1)('1\\'('('11 till' I'ml pri('(' (Jf 
final goods, which is llortllalis('d to OW', alld th(' rl'al prin' of illt I'mwC\iat (' 
i PW(',t goO( H, 1':7' 
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Intermediate goods firms Intermediate gooch.; prodll(,(,[s ('OlllhiIll' I'xogl'-
no us goods sector tcdlIlology and labour froUl cwdit IIIl1'ollst.rairu·d hOIlS('-
holds and credit constrained hOllseholds to produce intl'I'IIH'diatl' goods, which 
are then sold to retail goo(h; producers, \Ve assllJllI' t.hat int (,ntll'diat(' goods 
firms arc perfectly competitive, 
The intermediate goods prodllction function is 
( 
<> ( i) 1'-0)/1" ./,. Vi = Ac,t (nt) 'TIl /\ (.y 1 
where Vi is intermediate goods, TIt and n; an' lahour frolll (Tl'dit IIIH'Oll-
strained households and credit constrained housdlolds rl'sp('('t.iwl,v, /\',,1 I is 
lagged goods capital, I1n is the lahour share of output., Ilk! is thl' capital shan' 
of output, ex is the credit unconstrained households' sharp of labollf ill('OJI\I', 
The goods sector technology A',t follows til{' st.at.ionar,V pn)('l'ss 
A - A1-PAcA(JAc (,EAf',/ 
cJ - celt -1 ' (G.:t2) 
The intermediate goods producers' real profit llIaxilllisatioll prohl<'llI is 
wlH'f(' At,t+k is the stochastic discouut. factor, 1,'/11, is t.Iu' r!'1L1 cost. of lahour 
froIll c n ~ c l i t t unconstrailwd households, 11';11; is tltl' rl'al ('ost of laboll\' [rollt 
credit const.rained households, Ilkc,l /\,.,1 -I is th .. [pal ('(lsI of J!,()ods capital. 
\Ve obt.a.in throe first order cOIHlitiom; frolH Ihp illtl'rIul'<iiatC' goods linlls' 
profit ma.ximisat.ion problem, Firstly, the eqllatioll that dpsnil)('s t hI' ill" 
t ( ~ r l l l e d i a t e e goods producers' d('IIIa.nd for labour frolll (TI'<iit. 11I1('OIlSI raiw'd 
households is 
wltieh implies that the real wage of labour from ('\'I'dit 11ll('Ollst.raillt'<i hOI lSI'" 
holds, w" is equal to the margillal product of labo1ll' frulli ('n'dit 1111('011-
st.rained hOllseholds, 11'11° ,};"/ • 
'd"f',' 
S('('owlly, t.he equatioJl that d('scril)('s t.1I(' illt {'nilI'd iat (' goods prod I\('(TS' 
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demand for labour from credit constrained hOllS<'holds is 
i ( )}, 
w t = p" 1 - (\' -r-; 
ZITI I 
which implies that the real wage of labour froIll (T('dit ('ollstrailll'cl hOllsl'-
holds, 111:, is equal to the marginal product of labour frolll (Tt'dil COllstrailll'd 
households, Iln (1 - a) "Y' •. 
h,Tl t 
Thirdly, the equation that describes the illt('rtlH'<iiate goods prociIICI'l'S' 
demand for goods capital is 
which implies that the real rental price of goods capital, [hl',/. is ('qllal t.o I III' 
marginal product of goods capital, ILk,' z ~ ' t t • 
.It (',t I 
5.3.5 Housing production sector 
Housing firms Similar with tlIP C h a J > t . ( ~ r r ;l, I l < ~ r c ' ' WI' (,()lIsid('r a h ( ) l l s i l l ~ ~
production sector. Housing producers comililH' ('xog('IIOIiS hOllsing s('('for 
technology and housing capit.al fwm h()Ilsl'itolds to I>rodl1<'(' Ill'\\" h ( l I l S i l l ~ . .
which a f ( ~ ~ tllPlI sold to households. \V(' aSSllllll' t.hal h ( ) I I S i l l ~ ~ finns an' Pl'r-
f('ctly competit.ive, thus t1H'Y Blake Z('fO profit.. III additioll. \\'1' a:-is, 11 Ill' flt·xihlt· 
prices in this sector. 
The housing production function is 
IH A I 'I'k!. 1 = ." \",1_1 
whew I H/ is new housing, KII,I 1 is lag-w,d IlOlIsillg ('upil al. II" is I III' hOllsillg 
capital share of hOllsing production, and All is ttl(' h ( ) u s i l l ~ ~ !"'I't'! or I ('t'/lIIolllg,v. 
Tlw housing produeers' real profit I1Htximisat.ioll prohll'lIl is 
DC 
lpax Et L A/,Hk (q",1l-d HIl-k - RH,I j d\'".1 f • I) 
II ,I -- 1 k"ccO 
where At,t+k is the stochastic discount fador, qll,II HI is till' rt'al total f('\'I'l\tlI" 
and Rkh,t J( h,t-l is the real t.otal cost. 
The first order condition derived frolll this r('(\l profit. I11llXilllisatillu dl'-
scribes the housing producers' demand for housillg capit.al, alld it is ('xpn'ssl'd 
as 
Ill, 
Rk:h,1 = q ' I , l l l ~ : h h -[-.--
\ 11,1 I 
which implies t.hat. the marginal cost of housiIlg capital, 1.('., tIll' I'l'al n'lIl al 
price of housing capital, is equal to the llIarginal prodllct. of housillg l'apit al. 
5.3.6 Monetary authority 
Similar with previous chapt.ers, the lIloIlPtary authority IIS(,S tl\l' Ilomillal ill" 
terest rate as a policy inst.rument to affect the r('al eCOIlOIllY and 1lI01H't ar,\' 
policy is nOll-neutral because of tlH' f ( ' a t l l n ~ ~ of sticky pril'l'S t.hat arisl's fn 1111 
the mOllopolistic competition ill retail goO(\:-; finns. As 1\, \'I'sult, t 11(' 1I0111i-
nai intefPst. rate can affect tlw real int(lwst. rat,(\ t.hus has 1l illlpat'l OIl rl'al 
variables. 
Tlw monetary policy ruk, which J'(!acts 1.0 inflatioJ\ awl out.put, is 
I" = (R )'1'" (I ' < / l , . ) , , ~ . . () ~ ) ) (I II ,-I 7f",1 }' 
t'),·)(·J u 
where RII is til(' lagg(ld Ilolllinal int,('f(lst rat.(', 7f,,1 is gross iulla! iOIl rat I" )', 
is actual output, and Y is til<' Ht,pady st.at.(' vallII' of OI1t.put, <'\' ",. I,)" arc' 
weights coefficients. 
The Fisher equation, which gOV('rtIs ttl<' l'dat.ioll I>l't\\,1'1'1I 111(' r('al illli'r«,sl 
rate and till' Ilominal intPfC'st. rat,(\ is 
which impli('s that tlw (groSH) l't'ai iut,('f('Ht rat.('. f'f, is ('ql1al to till' Ilolllillal 
illt('r('st ratE" R
" 
adjusted by till' ('xp<,d('d iuflat.iou ratl'. 1-:, IT, ,/ t I, 
TiH' pfC'lIliulll Oil ('xterllal tiUatj('(I, /(1'." is t.it(' diff('l'I,IIt'I' Iwl\\'('I'11 tIll' ('011-
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tractual lending rate, RI,t, and the riskless saving rat.e, R" 
Rp,t = R/.t - R, 
5.S.7 Market clearing conditions 
The bonds market clearing condition is 
(;,..t I ) 
which implies that, in the loans market, the demand for loa liS !'rolll hOllH'-
owners in credit constraint households is equal to the supply of loalls frolll 
credit unconstraint households. 
The economy-wide constraint. or t.he go()(is Illarkl't d('millg ("ollditioll is 
Ct + c ~ ~ + I Kc,1 + I KIt,I. 
y,- [JlmG (Wt)Qh,t(1-(5 11 )h l tl 
_17kh ( Kh,t _1)2/\,,1_1 _'lk,· ( ~ ~ ~ __ 1)1./\',.1 I ( ; 1 . 1 ~ ) )
2 Kh,t-I ':2 /\',·.1 I 
which implios that the total output frolll goods sC'c\or is divi(kd illto ('011-
sumption goods, which is ("ousulllPd hy hOlls<,holds, awl illn'stllll'lIl ill 1111' 
goods capital aud housing eapital, suhtract.illg lllollitorilll-', costs alld ildjllst-
ment. costs. 
The housing market dearing conditioll is 
which implies that tho total hOllsing sto('k is ()wll<'d by (Tl'dit Illl<"OIlSI millt 
hOllseholds and homeowners ill ('redit ('oust.raill<'d hOllsl'holds. 
The rental housing market ('karing coudition is 
I ii b 
" = '1 (;J.lI) 
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whi h implie tha th demand for r ntal housing from renters is equal to the 
supply of rental ho iug from homeowners. 
Th good capi al umulation is 
(5.45) 
which impli ha g 
undepr iated good 
new investment in th 
d capital in the current period, K e,t, is the sum of 
apital from the previous period, (1 - 6ke) K e,t- I, and 
urrent period, I K e,t. 
Th hou ing api tal a cumulat ion is 
(5.46) 
whi h impli tha housing capital in the current period, K h,t, is the sum 
of und pr iated hou ing pital (1 - c5kh ) K h,t - I, from the previous period 
and n w iny; tm nt in th urr nt period, I K h,t. 
Th hou ing to k umulation is 
(5.47) 
which impli s that th total bou ing tock in the urrent period, Ht, is th 
sum fund pr iat d h using t ck from th pr vious period, (1 - I5It ) H t - I , 
and new housing in th urrent period, I Ht . 
5.3.8 Competitive quilibrium 
An quilibrium i an allocation of pric (7fe t, R t. Q c,t, qh,t. Wt, Zt, T"t. R kh ,t, 
R kc,l Rp,t ~ , t t qr,t, wt) quantiti (Ct Uc,t, hI. yt, nt, it , bt , I H t H t, Kh,t, 
IKh,t, Kc,l, IKc,t, b ~ , , h ~ ~ nwf trt At,t, Wt, ml, : U ~ , t ' ' hL n;' F (Wt), G (iiit), 
G' (,:;:Yt), r (Wt) r' (Wt), L (-t), L' (c:;:it), B (c::;:it) B' (C::;:h)), and exogenous sto-
chast i pr c {Ac,1 L=<J atisfying quations (5. 1) - (5.47) given the initial 
condit ion for L- I, h t - I , -;re,L, R t - l H I - I> Kh ,l - l, J(e, I.- h hL I' RI,t- l , q r ,I.- I , 
i , i 
t - l' 11 _ 1' 
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5.3.9 Calibration 
Firstly, w(' calibrate the coeffici('uts that are related to the debt contract. proh .. 
lem and the idiosyncratic shock. Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1999), w(' spt the coefficient of the monitoring costs to J-lm = 0.12, implying 
a 12% of realisro value of collat.prallost in default. ~ e x t , , we set the quarterly 
steady state default rate to F (W) = 0.008 as the Federal Reserve Bank of 
~ e w w York shows that 3.2% of prime mortgages were in foreclosure at t.he 
end of 2011. Besides, we set the loan to value ratio to TTl = 0.75, consistent. 
with t.he sample average from Federal Housing Finance Agency. For the idio-
syncratic shock, we set the unconditional mean to Wm = 1, consistent with 
Bernanke, Gprtipr and Gilchrist. (1999). 
The debt contract problem 
The coefficient of monitoring cost /1m 0.12 
The mortgage default rate F(W) 0.008 
The loan to value ratio HI n.75 
The idiosyncratic shock 
Th(' unconditional mean of shock L,v'rTl 1 
For erpdit UllCollstrainp<i hOIlSdlOlds, we set. tlH'ir discount factor to j = 
0.9925 = 1.03-0.25, implying a steady state anllual real interest. ra.te of :3 
percent.. Their labour supply c ( ) ( ~ f f i c i e n t t is set to ,),,, = 0.52, implying t.hat. 
the Fisher dasticity of labour supply is ....L = 1.92. TIl£' ch'gree of COllSlllllptioll 
'in 
habit is set to ~ c c = 0.32. T h ~ ~ s e e values are cOllsish'ut with Iacovkllo and ;'\mi 
(2010). MOf('owr, we set tlwir weight on housing to j = 0.08. 
Credit unconstrained households preference 
Households discount factor 
The inverse of labour supply ela.'.;ticity 
The degree of consumpt.ion habit 
The coefficient of housing preference 
.J 0.9923 
I" 0.52 
Er (U2 
.J 0.08 
Following IaC'Oviello and :\'eri (2010), for credit ('()llstrailH'd hOIlS!'holds, 
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we set t.hpir discouut. factor to 3 = 0.97. Their labour supply coefficient 
is S('t to ~ ' T I I = 0.51, implying that the Fisher pla...,ticity of labour supply is 
~ 1 " " = 1.96. The dpgr('(' of consumption habit is set to Er = 0.58. In order to 
hit the sample average, we set till' housing preference coefficient to / = 1, 
which is higllPr t han that of credit unconstrained households. 
Credit constrained households preference 
The households discount factor 
The inversp of labour supply elasticity 
The degree of consumption habit 
The coefficient of housing preference 
:·r 0.97 
I;, 0.51 
E : ~ . . 0.58 
/ 1 
In til(' illtermooiatp goods production, the share of labour in goods pm-
duction function is set to lin = 0.65, implying that the steady state share of 
labour incollle is 65o/c. ~ l e a n w h i l ( ' , , the share of capital is set to Ile = 0.35. 
In addition, illtermooiate goods firms demand labour froIll both e n ~ d i t t UIl-
constrained households and credit constrained households, and we set tht\ 
shares to 0.35 and 0.65 respectively, as til{' Residential Finance Survpy froIll 
the U.S. CPllSllS Bureau suggPSts that 35% of housing owners do lIot haY<' 
mortgages. 
Intermediate goods production 
The share of capital lie 0.35 
The share of labour 11'11 0.65 
Tl}(\ sharphare of credit ullconstrained households 0 0.35 
For the retail goods sed,or, we a.'>811me a. steady state markup of 15% 
in goods sector by setting X = 1.15. For the degrec of prices stickilH'SS, 
we a.<;SlllllC that 17% of retailers are ablc to re ... optimise their prices ill petch 
period by setting (} = 0.83, implying that price-setters <'all rp-optimis(\ tlu'ir 
prkes once every 1 ~ ( / / = 6 pprio<is. TIl£' dpgree of pri('(\ iu(kxatioll is sd. to 
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L1f = 0.69. Th('S(' \1lhH'S an' also consistent with Iacoviello and X('ri (2010). 
Goods sector sticky price 
The steady stat(' gross markup Z 1.15 
Probability of fixed price () 0.83 
The degree of price indexation l1f 0.69 
Following Iacoviello and :'\eri (2010), the share of housing capital in the 
housing production function is S(lt to Ph = 0.1. implying that the steady state 
share of housing capital income is 10%. 
Housing production technology 
The share of housing capital 
For t}}p monetary policy rule, we set the weights coefficients to (b r = 0.6, 
01f = 1.5, and ely = 0.5, which an' similar with Iacoviello and .:\eri (201O).Iil' 
Monetary policy 
The interest rate inertia Or 0.6 
The weight coefficient on inflation 07r 1.5 
The weight coefficient on output Oy 0.5 
The depreciation rates of housing, housing capital and goods capit.a.l are 
set to 6h = 0.01, i5kh = 0.03, and bkc = 0.025, respectively. These vahws are 
consistent with Ia('oviello and Xeri (2010). 
Depreciation rates 
Housing 
Housing capital 
Goods capital 
61! 0.()1 
6kh 0.03 
6kc 0.025 
\Ve also consider adjustment costs in our model. Similar with Iacoviello 
and ~ e r i i (2010). the adjustment coefficients for housing capital and goods 
WIThe p>'tilllat('" ill Iaco\"i('llo and :--;pri (:WI0) for thp,.;e copfficiPllb arc 0,. . ~ ~ ~ (l.G!. (/,,-
1.36. and (Iy = 0.51. 
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capital are set to Tlkh = 11 and Tlke = 15 respectively. 
Adjustment costs 
Housing capital 
Goods capital 
Tlkh 11 
17kc 15 
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At this stage, we focus on the impulse responses of model variables to 
a temporary goods sector shock, thus the autocorrelation coefficient of the 
shock is set to 0.01. t\leanwhile, we set the standard deviation of the shock 
to 0.01. 
Autocorrelation of shock 
Goods sector technology PAc O.OI 
Standard deviation of shock 
Goods sector technology a Ac 0.01 
5.3.10 Steady state ratios 
Firstly, the steady state annual real interest rate is targeted to :3%, which 
is consistent with literature. The data frOIll the I<cderal HOllsing Financ(' 
Agency suggests that the average annual mortgage rate is 3<J{-, higher than 
the average annual yield on 6-month trea.">ury bill, thus tIlP target for the 
external finance premiulll is 3%.10,-, This st('ady state ratio, however, from our 
model is O.4IYr, which is lower than its target. lOti Meanwhile, the Residential 
Finance Survey from the U.S. C('flSllS Bureau suggests that 35 1X of hOllsing 
is without mortgage, and 65% of housing is with mortgage, thus tIll' ratio of 
housing with mortgage to housing without mortgage is 1.86. By setting the 
coefficients of housing preference of both households to j = 0.08 and j' = 1, 
[WIData from Fpdpral Housing Finance Agency suggests that. over the p!'riod 197:3 - 2011. 
t hp average allnual mortgage rate is 8. i%. which is 3% higilpr than t1lf' averagp allllllal 
yield on 6-rnonth treasury bill. 5.7%, 
[IHiW(' can only calibrate the loan to valul' ratio or til<' If'llciing rate. \\,p cannot ('alibrat<· 
both of them. 
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thi:" target i:" also achieved. 
Interpretation Expression Target SS Value 
The annual real interest rate R4 - 1 :Y% :JIJ{ 
The annual premium ((R1)4 - 1) - (HI - 1) 3% 0.4% 
Housing composition hhjh U:!6 1.89 
The targets for macroeconomic variables arc sample averages betwcell 
1947Q1 and 2011Q4 from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The fol-
lowing table shows that the values of steady state ratios an' d o s ( ~ ~ to their 
targets, given the calibration in the previous section. I ()' 
Interpretation Expression Target SS Value 
The share of consumption (c + ci ) JGDP 80%. 721){ 
The share of investment (J 1(. + I K,,) JGDP 14% 22% 
The share of housing investment qhIHjGDP GI/(' fi'/{ 
5.3.11 Impulse response analysis 
In this section, we discuss the dynamics of tllP Illod!'J. Figure 5.5 aud 5.G 
show impulse responses of variables to an one pereent positive shock ill goods 
sector techllology with persistence of PAc = O . f n . I ( ) ~ ~
Firstly, the responses of maeroeconomie variables are standard: it higll<'r 
goods sector productivity leads to a higher output, a IOWI'l" inflation, a lower 
nominal interest rate, and a higher real hOllse price. In the hOIlSillg mar-
ket, although there is an increa.se in lWW housing production, w(' do not 
observe an increase in housing for both households. Instead, as credit Ull-
constra.ined households are competitive in til<' housing llIarkd, tlH'Y not. only 
obtain newly produced housing, but take a fraction of housing fro1ll ("l"pdit 
constrained households. Then·fore, we ohserve a t.ransfpr of hOllsing fro\ll 
11I7CDP is composed by (,OIlSlllllptioll ~ o o d " . . i l l \ ' P s t I l l E ~ l I t S S ill 1!;oods ('apital 1111.1 h ( l l \ ~ i l l g , ,
capital. alld r<'al vallie of IIPW h O l \ s i l l ~ . . i.t' .. G Dr , ~ ~ c + (.1 + 1/\',.1 1/\'" t 1/1 H. 
11l'''In all fi)!;lln's. illlplllse re,.;ponses a n ~ ~ Illt'a"llrpd as PI'f('I'lltag;<' d t ' \ · i H t i ( ) l l ~ ~ 1'1'''"1 tilt' "(t'ady 
state. alld horizontal axps Ilisplay till' 1l1l1ll1H'r of qllart('r" "ftpl" tilE' "ho('k. 
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credit constrained households to credit unconstrained households. For credit 
constraint households, the value of housing a."lsets they can buy is decrea."l-
ing, since the negative impact of having less housing dominates the positive 
impact of thf' higher real house price. 
Secondly, in the credit market, the decrease in the volume of loans froIll 
financial intermediaries to credit constrained households is larger than the fall 
in the expected value of undepreciated housing assets, leading to a lower loan 
to value ratio.L09 In addition, the decrease in the loan to value ratio implies 
that the contractual lending rate decreases more than the riskless saving rate, 
leading to a decrea.'>e in the premium of external finance. I 10 l\Ioreovt'r, the 
decrease in the loan to value ratio leads to a lower threshold level, which 
leads to a decrease in the default rate. 
Finally, because of the optimality condition between housing amI COll-
sumption, credit unconstrained households increase their consumption a." 
they obtain more housing. For the same reason, credit constrained house-
holds need to decrease their consumption to get a higher marginal utility, 
as they have a higher marginal utility from housing due to the transfer of 
housing from them to credit unconstrained households. 
In sum, given a positive goods sector technology shock, the default rate 
displays countercyclical behaviour, which is consistent with our empirical 
evidence discussed at the beginning. The loan to value ratio, however, also 
displays countercyclical behaviour, which is not consistent with our empirical 
evidence. 111 The reason we suppose is that, in reality, similar with cft'dit Ull-
constrained households, credit constrained households ~ t l s o o have mow hous-
ing in an economic upturn, and then the value of their housing assets is also 
higher, leading to an increase in the volume of loans, together with a higher 
real house price. Therefore, the inconsistency between the result from our 
1(J(jlnitially. the loan to value ratio responds positively. bllt we fOCIlS on til<' scenario that 
the responses of yariables have stablised. 
IIOTlw equation that show;; the direct rPiatioll lwtween the I<'nciing ratl' Htld th(' IOHII to 
value ratio is 
III Gin'n a lI1011Ptary policy ,;hock. thpsp two variahk" abo IllO\'e t og;('t hpr. 
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model and empirical evidence suggests that, in the future research, we need 
to modify the model in a way that allows credit constrained households to 
hav more housing in an economic upturn. 
I?:Si J ~ V V : : 1 
1 2 3 4 5 8 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 8 8 Q 10 
~ ~ ~ : 1 :;E;;;J 
1 2 3 • 5 8 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 C 7 8 9 10 
J6;;;: I ~ ~ ~ ~ . 1 
1 2 3 4 5 C 7 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 9 10 
Figure 5.5: Impul r pon es to a positive goods sector technology shock. 
5.3.12 A discussion of the mean of the idiosyncratic shock 
In this section, we di uss the r lation between the d fault rate and the 
loan to value ratio. While mpirical analysis shows a procyclical loan to 
value ratio and a counterc cHcal default rate, our impulse response analysis 
suggests that both of them display countercyclical b haviour given a positive 
goods s tor t chnology shock. If we want to have a procyclicalloan to vallie 
ra tio, we should improve the model to allow credit constrained households to 
have more hou ing in an onomic upturn (i.e., make t hem more competitive 
in th housing mark t ). The s t ting of thi mod 1, how ver , implies that these 
two variables m v in a arne direction in r sponse to any exogenous shock. 
Th reason for this co-movement is the assumption of the time- invariant 
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Figure 5.6: Impulse responses to a positive goods sector technology shock. 
( continued) 
uncondit ional mean of the idiosyncratic shock W m • Then we show that a time-
varying mean is able to break this co-movement. In this case, we actually 
assume that large (small) idiosyncratic shocks are more likely to occur in 
an economic upturn (downturn). For example, in an e onomie upturn, local 
governments have mol' resource to improve environment and reduce crime, 
leading positive impacts on house prices in the area. 
The time-invariant mean Wm Firstly, we discuss th implication of the 
time-invariant mean on the relation between the default rate and the loan to 
value ratio. Recall that the thr hold level of the idiosyn ratic shock is 
Chapter [) 204 
and the loan to value ratio is defined as 
Combining these two equations, we obtain a relation among the threshold 
level, the loan to \"ethle ratio, and the time-invariant mean, 
(5.48) 
which shows that the threshold h'vei, Wt+ I, is positively related to ttl!' loan 
to value ratio, rIlt. 
l'\ext, given the assumption that the idiosyncratic shock is Iluiformly dis-
tributed as Wt '" V (w m - PJJ' Wm + PJJ)' the probability of ddault is 
whieh expresses the default rate in terms of the threshold level, W" auel tlw 
lower boundary of the idiosyncratic shock, Wm - pJJ . Since the coefficient ' 2 ~ ~ ~
is positive, this equation implies a positive wlation betw(,pn the thrpshold 
lewl and the default ratp, 
If we substitutr the threshold level -:;]t usiug equation 5.48, we obtain 
which links the default rate to the loan t.o value ratio and th(\ tillll'-iuvariallt 
mean. Since the coefficient. ~ m m is positive, thiH equatioll impli('s a positivp p", 
relation between the loan to value ratio and the default ratl" 
In other words, tIl<' default rate and th(\ loan to vallie ratios 1Il0W ill ttl<' sall\(' 
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direction in response to an exogenous shock when the unconditional mean 
of the idiosyncratic shock is time-invariant. Therefore, in order to make the 
loan to value ratio exhibit procyclical, the default rate should also bnCOIllP 
procyclical. 
The time-varying mean Wm,t In order to break up the Co-IllOVeIllellt 
between the default rate and the loan to value ratio, one approach is to 
introduce a time-varying mean of the idiosyncratic shock, W rn.t' 
Firstly, the threshold level is 
_ (-) b RI,t!J 
Wt+l(jh 1+1 1 - Oh h t = --bt 
, 7f 
c,lt 1 
and the loan to value ratio becomes 
Combining these two equations, we obtained the relation among tl)(' t.hreshold 
level, the loan to value ratio, and the time-varying mean, 
~ I + I I = TTlIWm.t+1 (5.49) 
which shows that the threshold level, Wt+l, is positiv('Iy rclatt'd j,o tIw loan 
to vahle ratio, Tnt, and the time-varying mean, Wm,l+ I, 
Xext, when the idiosyncratic shock is assuIlwd to be uniformly distributl'd 
with a tillle-varying mean, "[;JI "" U (wm.t - P...;. Wrn,t + P...;), til(' default. rate 
becomes 
F (- ) _ Wt wm,t - P;.; ~ I t t - ---
2p...; 2p...; 
which expresses the default rate in terms of the threshold it'vd, wt. and the 
time-varying minimum of HlP idiosyncratic shock, WIII,t - P"':' This ('<!Ilat.ioll 
illdicat('s that the time-varying mean plays an important rok in tI)(' rdat ion 
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between the threshold level and the default rate, 
~ W I I > ~ ~ m . l : : : : } } ~ W I I +-+ ~ F F PI) 
~ : ; ] I I < ~ ~ m , l : : : : } } ~ W t t +-+ - ~ F F (wd 
20Li 
In other words, if the change in the threshold is morc (less) than the change 
in the time-varying mean, we have a positive (negative) relation lwtwO('lJ the 
threshold level and the default rate. Therefore, if the change in the nwan 
is greater than the change in the threshold level, we will havp a decreasing 
default rate while the threshold level is rising. 
If we substitute the threshold level, WI, using equation 5.49, we obtain 
which link." the default rate to the loan to value ratio and the time-varying 
mean. Their relation is more obvious if we log-linearise it, 
which shows that the time-varying mean also play an important wk in tIl<' 
relation betw<'Cll the default rate and the loan to valtH' ratio, 
-mml-l > (1 - TIl) Wm,l ~ ~ ~ m ' l - l l +-+ ~ F F (Wt) 
---mmt-l < (1- m)wm,t ~ ~ ~ m l ~ - l l +-+ - ~ F ( w l ) )
In other words, if the change in the loan to value ratio is lllon' (lpss) than til(' 
change in the time-varying mean, taking the coefficients into accollnt, WP havp 
a positiVI' (negative) relation between the loan to value ratio and thp dl'fault 
rate. Thus, only when the time-varying mean is more' procydical than til(' 
loan to value ratio, we can have a countercyclical default rate siulII\tallt'ollsly. 
Therefore, the introduction of the time-varying Illean call bn'ak till' pos-
i t i V { ~ ~ r('lation betw('en t he loan to yalue ratio and thl' d(>fauit rat('. III tilt' 
futuft' research, if we improV(' tlu' model to pwdllc(' a pro('ydical loan to 
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value ratio, the time-varying mean is necessary to obtain a c O l l n t t ~ r c y d i c a l l
default rate. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we introduce the agency problem into the housing markpt 
in a DSGE model, and then default becomes a steady state phenomenon 
as borrowers can walk away without repaying their debt. Since the loan to 
value ratio is closely related to the default rate, we can discuss the dynamics 
of the endogenous loan to value ratio in this model. Our empirical analysis 
suggests that, while the default rate is countPfcydieal, Hw loan to value ratio 
is procyclical. 
Our impulse response analysis shows that, given a positive goods sector 
technology shock, the default rate exhibits countercyclical hehaviour. The 
loan to V'alue ratio, however, is also countercyclical. The reason is that, in a.ll 
economic upturn, credit constrained households are not competitive in th(' 
housing market, and thus their honsing is reduep(l. l\Ieanwhil(" the volnllH' 
of loans they receive also decreases, leading to a fall ill the loan to valw' ratio. 
The inconsistency between our results and empirical evidencp sugg('sts t.hat, 
in the future research, in order to have a procydical loan to vahl(' ratio, W(' 
need to improve the model in a way that allows ('[edit COllstraiJl('d households 
to have more housing in an economic uptllfn. 1\1orcov('r, we illustrate that, 
when the mean of the iciiosYIllTatic shock is time-invariant, th(' struet1ll'P of 
our model implies a positiv(' rplation bptween the default rate awl th' loan 
to value ratio. As a result, if we ('an improve tll(' IIlOdel to have a pJ'()('ydi('al 
loan to value ratio, the default rate will become procydical as \\'1'11. III onkr 
to overcome this problem and to havp both proeydkalloall to valw' ratio awl 
countercyclical default rate, a.<> suggested by the dat.a, we' should Cllllsidl'[ It 
time-varying mean of the idiosYllcratic shock. 
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5.A Appendix to Chapter 5 
5.A.1 The debt contract problem for credit unconstrained home-
owners 
Homeowners ma.ximise the return of holding housing assets subject to lenders' 
participation constraint, 
5.A.2 Lagrangian program for renters 
Renters maximise utility subject to their budget constraint, 
5.A.3 Lagrangian program for credit unconstrained households 
Credit unconstrained households maximist' utility subject to their budgpt 
constraint, 
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5.A.4 Steady state ratios 
I I I h 1 I d ell' I I (II, ,,I' (I,.h' n Of( er to ,50 ve t c mo( e , we nee 10 OWlllg skat y stat.l' va ill'S: )--, "t'-. 
9!:.. ~ ~ ~ ~ trb w'ni ~ ~ .£. !..!S..h. 
qh' }"" }/, }"" Y' Y' }/, y' 
From the credit unconstrained housdlOlds' Euler equation, WI' havp 
1 R=-j 
From t.he threshold level of the idiosyncratic shock, we have' 
From the definition of the loan t.o vaille ratio, w(' haw 
m = wm q,,(1-6,,)h il 
Combining t.hf'se equations, we have til(' relation aIllong tlu' luau to vallll' 
rat.io, the uIlconditional mean of the idiosyncratic sho(,k, awl Uu' thn'sitold 
level of the shock, thus we haw the steady state' vahlP of w, aft('!' mlihratillg 
Wm = 1 and Tn = 0.75, 
fll:..v',,, = GJ 
From tht' probability of ddault, after calihratiug F Pl = O.()()i'\, w(' have' 
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the steady state value of p ,,,)1 
z:J - ~ ' T T I I
p"" = 2F (W) - 1 
Then we can following steady state ratios: G (W), G' (w), L (wl, L' (W), B (W), 
B'(w). 
From the lenders' participation constraint, we have 
Combining the lenders' participation constraint and the dl'finitioIl of th(' 
loan to value ratio, we can solve tilt' steady state value of external finaJl('(' 
, !1J. preUllUIll, R ' 
!.Iv' R, 
= 
LP) R 
From the first order condition with resppct to Wt+ \, we haw thl' st!'ady 
state value of A ~ , ,
Frolll t ht' first order condition with respect to hr, WI' hav!' til(' st("tdy stat.(' 
vahI<' of !l!:.. 
qh' 
Combing the 1(,11<lers' participation cOllstraint, tlH' borrowing ('qllatioll, 
and til(' (>quatioll of Il<'t worth, w(' can solve the steady state vahw of ( """ 
From til(' hOmpOWll('rS' demand for hOllsing (tIl<' FOC w.r.t Ii;), Wl' hav(' 
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h' the steady state value of T' 
which is a function of ~ , , while l can be calibrated, 
Combining the steady state value of qr;f and ~ , , we have the steady stat!' 
h b value of ~ ~y , 
qhhb = qrhb I qr 
Y Y qh 
which is a function of q } , ~ b b , and thus in term o f ~ , ,
From the Ipnders' participation constraint, we have HI(' steady stat!' value 
f bb o Y' 
hb = L (rJ) (1 - J,,) qh}/' 
Y R Y 
which is a function of q h ' y ~ b b , and thus in term off., 
From the equation of net worth, we have the stpady state vahl{' of " ~ ' : " " , 
~ ~ d l' t',., which is a function of )' ,an t lU8 III term 0 V' 
Frotll thl' equation of transfer to n ~ n t e r s , , we haw the steady stat(' vahH' 
f trb o y-, 
which is a function of q ~ h b , , and thus in term of t, Although it is lIot 1'1tsy 
to prove Ilsing equations, but values from Matlab show that 
which means that. at steady state, t ht' transfer is equal to t h(' [('lit paYIllPIlt. 
From till' iutl'rmffiiate goods firms' demand for labour. \\'(' han' tlIP stl'ady 
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statf' value of u . ~ ~ ~ . . , 
t/,ini (/1,,) (1 - 0') 
}' Z 
From t.llP renter's budget. constraint, we have 
Then combine the equation of transfer to renters, t.he renter's budget eOll-
st.raint., the int.ermediat.e goods firms' demand for lahour, and t.he FOe w.r.t 
h;, we can solve t.he st.eady st.at.e vahiP of f, 
c' 
y 
In this ('quation, tht' relation hetw('('n f and l is llOt. explicit. However, t.h(' 
relat.ioll lwtwN:'n ~ ~ and l is much dear 
\\,p call SP(, t.hat thl' lower j', the larger till' d(,llominator, the smalh'r tlH' 
fa(,tioll. Therefore, if we want. a higher ~ , , we should havp a larg('r /' Thus 
Wp can solve the st.pady statp ratios of ~ . . l J h \ ~ b b . ~ , , T I ~ , : b b , t ~ b b • 
From th(' c[{,<lit ullconstraim'd households' demand for goods capital, W{' 
have the stpady st.ate vahw of RAn 
From thp int.PrIuediatp goods produ(,prs' demand for goods capital. WI' 
have t.he stt'ady st.at.e \'aJ ue of f, 
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From the goods capital accumulation, we hav(' the steady state value of 
IKe _ 
h" . = (jkc 
c 
Combining the steady state value of ~ ~ and I:.c, we have the steady state 
value o f ~ , ,
IKe 
y 
KcIKc 
---
Y Kc 
From the credit unconstrained households' demand for housing capital, 
Wp have the steady state value of R kh , 
From the housing producers' demand for housing capital, we h a v ( ~ ~ the 
s t ( ~ a d y y state vahw of q ~ ~:1, 
= 
Kh Ilkh 
From the housing capital accumulation, we have the steady state valtH' 
IK of !£il, 
"" 
IKII " 
Kh = (jkh 
Combining tilt' steady statl' value of q ~ : { { and I:;" we have till' steady 
statt' value of q r ~ " ~ { { , 
(lfJH = qhlH /IKII 
IK" K" K" 
From the credit unconstrained households' marginal utility of consump-
tion, we have 
1 
lie = -
c 
From tht' credit IllH'ollstraiupd households' demand for hOllsing, we' hav(' 
til(' steady st att> vahll' of 'ilL!!. , 
• c 
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Combining the steady stat{' value of ¥ and f-, we have tlw steady state 
'-dl\l{' of ¥, 
c Y 
which is a function of f-. 
From till' housing market clearing condition, we have 
h+}/'=H 
Thus gives 
which is a fUIwtion of ¥, and thus in term of f. 
From thp housing capital accumulation procpss, w(' han' the stpa<iy stat!' 
vahl<' of 1// ' 
IH _ 
- = 0" H 
Thus combining til<' stpady statt' value of ¥ and I J ~ I , , w(' have 1.11(' st('(l,dy 
state' vaill(' of 'Ib ;.11 , 
which is a function of ¥, and thus in term of f. 
Combining til(' steady statt' value of %tll and q f ' : ~ , l , , we have til<' st('ady 
stat(' value of ~ , ,
II\" q"l H /q"I H 
Y = -y- II\" 
which is a fUllction of q";fl , and thus in term of f. 
Combining thp st('ady state \-ahl(' of ~ ~ and l ~ ~ : " " w(' ha\,!' tlt(' st<'a<iy 
stat(' vaill(' of q:u., 
A:" [1\" I 1[\" Y = -}-.- / [\'h 
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From dIP goods market dearing condition, we have 
Together wit h other equations, gives 
:\'ow w(' call soln' the steady state value of f, 
c 
}' 
tl')llC' "'" ('all ,,,,I,,,, '1l!!!. 9.b.!!.. %! Ii ! h:1< /{h 
... ''''. "'"'....}'.}..}'.}' . }' . 
Combining the steady statp valu(' of q \ ~ l b b and ¥, Wp have thl' steady 
I f hI> statl' va lIe 0 h' 
hb = (/flhb/q"h 
h Y Y 
This is til(' ratio of housing oWIl('d by mortgage holders to hOllsing owned by 
1l011-111ortgagl' hold('f. The empirical target for this ratio is ~ ~ ~ ~ , , = 1.86. 
From tIl{' d{'finition of GDP. we' have the steady state value of ( i ~ ) / ' , ,
CD? C (i H\/1 I I\(, (j"l H 
-- = -+--,----+----+---y }'}' y' y , }' 
Tlll'1l til<' GDP-rplah'(i s t ( ' a d ~ ' ' statt' ratio are 
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c _ ('/CDP 
---- --CDP Y Y 
and 
IKh + 1Kc = (IKh ~ K . ) / G D P P
CDP Y + Y Y 
and 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
Our thesis focuses on the several housing sector related issues ill the context 
of DSGE models, as the housing sector is important to the economy but 
usually ignored in business cycles analysis. 
To begin with, we conduct a sensitivity analysis using a simple DSGE 
model with the feature of sticky prices, credit market imperfections, and a 
fixed housing supply. When the borrowing constraint is related to production 
housing, which is a factor of production, we find the financial accelerator 
effect when the central banks arc concerned with inflation only, givcu a goo(b 
sector technology shock. \Vhen the borrowing constraint, however, is rplai,pc[ 
to domestic housing, which provides utility to owners, we do not observp th(' 
financial accelerator effect, given a goods sector technology shock. Our results 
suggest that the financial accelerator effect does not necessarily appear givPll 
the presence of credit market imperfections. 
In the chapter 2, we introduce a variable housing supply, thus we call 
discuss the supply side effect in the housing market, including the direct 
effect and the feedback effect. We find that the magnitudes of tlwsc two 
effects are negligible under the standard setting of the housing r n a r k ( ~ t . . Then 
wp examine the U.S. housing sector and suggest that we should (i) construct 
a new setting for the housing market and (ii) introduce tlw feat me of tillle 
to build to new housing production. After constructing the uew setting of 
the housing market, the magnitudes of til<' direct effect alld t.he f('pdback 
effect are 60 times larger, suggesting that the supply side effects an' largply 
underestimated in the literature. Moreover, the f('ature of time to build, 
together with the new setting of the housing market, allows 11S to obta.in 
cyclical behaviour for the real house priee. This result may explain t1w high 
volatility of real house price. In addition, it is suggested that tIl<' s('ttiug 
of the feature of time to build is too simple in our chapter. III our flltllH' 
research, we can consider a more realistic setting by assllmillg that only a 
fraction of housing is built ill each period befon' its cornpktiou, hut our 
results should not be affected. 
:\"ext, while rational exppctatiolls is a standard a . s ~ m m p t i o J l l ill DSGE lllo<i-
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els, we consider the assumption of adaptive learning, as we are conviucml 
that this alternative way of forming expectations partially contributed to 
the house price bubble. In particular, we explore the impact. of t.he AR( 1 ) 
learning model and discuss the int.eract.ion bet.ween the adaptive learning 
mechanism and the feat.ure of time to build. Moreover, we also discllss the 
assumption of het.erogeneous expectations. Specifically, we consider learning 
agent.s under het.erogeneous expectat.ions and compare t.wo cases of hetero-
geneous expect.at.ions, i.e., one wit.h part.ially rat.ional agents and one with 
fully rational agents. In fut.ure research, we plan t.o (i) explore t.he impact. 
of ot.her learning models; (ii) examine t.he determinants of the amplification 
and propagat.ion effects from the adaptive learning mechanism; (iii) allow all 
endogenous transformation from rational agent.s t.o learning agents. 
Finally, we introduce the agency problem into the housing market. Our 
analysis shows that., given a positive goods sector technology shock, til<' df'-
fault. rate exhibit.s count.ercyclical behaviour, which is consist.ent. with our 
empirical analysis. The loan to value ratio, however, is also countercyclical, 
while our empirical analysis suggests procyclical behaviour. The reaBOIl we 
suppose is that., in an economic upturn, credit constrained households haw 
less housing in the housing market, thus the volume of loans they re('('iw 
also decreases, leading to a decrea'ie in t.he loan to valw) rat.io. Th('f('[of(', 
the inconsistency between the results from our lllodel and empirical evi<it'IH'P 
suggests that, in the future research, we lleed to improve the IlHHlel in a. 
way that allows eredit constrained households to hav£' more housing dur-
ing economic upturn. Moreover, we illustrate that, when the llwau of the 
idiosyncratic shock is time-invariant, the structure of the mo(te! implies a 
positive relation between the default ratp and the loan to vahH' ratio. Tlwll 
we show that a time-varying lUean of the idiosyncratic shock is necessary to 
overcome t.his CD-movement. 
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